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The substantive part of this thesis comprises three empirical chapters on national-level (total) 
public spending on education. It encompasses three related topics in Comparative Public 
(Education) Finance with Wagner’s law (after German Economist, Adolph Wagner, 1835-
1917) of public sector growth providing the theoretical ‘theme’ linking all three empirical 
topics. All three empirical inquiries make use of the same (unbalanced) panel dataset, 
predominantly sourced from the World Bank, to operationalise a country-comparative study 
from 1989 to 2015. The national effort (spending as a share of GDP) and budget share 
(spending as a share of total government spending) are the two outcome measures of choice. 
For the most part, the size of government (total government spending as a share of GDP) is 
the key explanatory variable of interest, with a host of other controls ranging from economic, 
political, demographic, globalisation and social factors. The first empirical chapter looks at 
heterogeneity, and conjectures the existence of differences in the mean levels of education 
spending for economically and politically distinct groups of countries. The primary method 
applied is a generalised-form t-test using a regression framework. The key finding is 
summarised in the form of three inequality propositions about education spending and the size 
of government for richer versus poorer countries. These propositions could also be applied to 
other areas of public financing. The second empirical chapter can be described as one of 
comparative dynamics, and makes use of various dynamic specifications in the form of an 
error-correction model framework. It conjectures the existence of cyclical (short-run) effects 
being particularly well-evidenced for richer countries, which is shown to be the case. One 
explanation for this finding is that richer countries have a greater variety of fiscal components 
with which education ‘competes’ during periods of cyclical downturn (e.g., welfare). The 
third empirical chapter can be described as one of comparative statics, and applies a panel 
time-series method. It conjectures the level (long-run) relationship between the national effort 
(budget share) measure and size of government is positive (negative). The sign of the 
relationship in each case is broadly shown to hold true. For the national effort measure, 
common effects are particularly well-evidenced for richer countries, possibly suggestive of it 
being a benchmark comparative measure for these types of countries. For the budget share 
measure, a significant negative relationship for poorer countries, but insignificant relationship 
for richer countries, is possibly explained by the latter having larger, more mature and stable 
public sectors, for which the budget share measure is already very low and/or relatively stable 
around some mean level, to a greater or lesser extent, meaning no long-run relationship is 
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The ‘massification’ of education, through publicly provided primary education, has its roots 
in the mid-nineteenth century, with most industrialised countries having a reasonably 
universal system of public primary education by 1900 (Tanzi & Schuknecht, 2000, p. 33). 
Since then, by far the largest proportion of spending on education in most (if not all) countries 
worldwide, has come from the public sector. Two measures are useful when making reference 
to total (aggregate) national-level public spending on education (education spending or 
education finance, for short), which comprises all spending (current, capital and transfers) by 
general government, namely, the ‘national effort’ measure or total education spending as a 
share of gross domestic product (GDP) and the ‘budget share’ measure or total education 
spending as a share of total government spending. Arguably, there can be little doubt that 
public spending on education provides the impetus through which nationwide human capital 
development takes place. 
 
The modern-day human-capital revolution and associated empirical research can be traced 
back to the pioneering work of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962; 1964). 
Education spending might be considered a subset of this vast field of the economic literature 
on human capital. Since this thesis focuses on comparative public (education) finance, a 
theory linking the growth of the national economy to the growth of the public sector would be 
a promising framework to explain changes in public spending on education. The now well-
known Wagnerian (after Adolph Wagner, 1835-1917) perspective of public-sector expansion 
is one such theory, and provides the economic ‘lens’ through which I investigate education 
spending patterns. Put differently, Wagner’s law is the economic ‘theme’ running through my 
empirical inquiries in this thesis.  
 
But, one must acknowledge that linking public spending on education to educational 
outcomes, human capital and broader national-level economic outcomes (i.e., economic 
growth) is a much more complicated affair, and certainly beyond the scope of this study. For 
instance, endogenous growth theory, which places emphasis on human capital, knowledge 
and innovation, means public investment in human capital can have positive externality or 
2 
 
spillover effects, resulting in increasing returns to long-run economic growth. The seminal 
work by Romer (1986; 1990; 1994) and Barro (1990), as well as the textbook treatment of the 
subject by Romer (2012), all present good accounts of endogenous growth theory. There have 
been studies in the more recent literature linking public spending to human capital 
development and economic growth for a range of countries, with mixed evidence one way or 
another.1 Suffice to say, the spending-education-growth nexus reveals a more complex system 
of relationships. In the next section, I locate the present (macro-level) study in the context of a 
broader literature, by conceptualising these various linkages and detailing where possible 
difficulties lie because of ‘black box’ processes that arguably confound showing clear-cut 
relationships between national-level spending and educational outcomes; between educational 
outcomes and economic growth. 
 
1.2 Locating the Study 
 
This section locates the present study in a broader literature. National-level (macro) public 
spending on education (PSE) can be located within a much wider narrative, encompassing 
education economics (quantity and quality aspects of education); labour economics; growth 
and development, and various policy literatures. Figure 1 attempts to give a succinct 
conceptual illustration of where exactly the present study is situated. Moving in an 
anticlockwise direction, starting from the top right-hand corner of the figure, the Wagnerian 
linkage (as opposed to the Keynesian linkage) flows from economic growth and associated 
development via the policymaking ‘black box’ to affect what level of aggregate spending is 
allocated to education each year. Note the Keynesian linkage depicted only shows the 
direction of association, and, to save space, does not show the fact that public spending on 
school infrastructure, for example, flows through households and firms (the private-sector 
economy) to affect national income in the short run. For my purposes, I theorise the 
policymaking black box to comprise economic, political, demographic, globalisation and 
social factors (see Chapter 2). The Wagnerian linkage is the focus of the empirical chapters to 
follow (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
 
 
1 For example, the interested reader can refer to Dissou et al. (2016); Gemmell et al. (2016); Afonso and Jalles 
(2014); Dao (2012); Agénor and Neanidis (2011); Annabi et al. (2011); Colombier (2011); Neycheva (2010); Al-
Yousif (2008); Angelopoulos et al. (2008); Baldacci et al. (2008); Teles and Andrade (2008); Blankenau et al. 
(2007); Bose et al. (2007); Blankenau (2005); Blankenau and Simpson (2004); Jung and Thorbecke (2003); 
Ramirez and Nazmi (2003); Sylwester (2000); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999, 2004); Zhang and Casagrande 
(1998); Glomm and Ravikumar (1997); Devarajan et al. (1996); Cullison (1993); Barro and Lee (1993); Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993); Levine and Renelt (1992); Quan and Beck (1987); Landau (1983). 
3 
 
Depending on how devolved (fiscally decentralised) spending practices are in a country, 
national-level spending might be thought of as being ‘filtered’ through various sub-national 
levels of spending (state, district, school) to ultimately affect individual student outcomes, 
whether these outcomes relate to aspects of the quantity of education (e.g., student enrolment) 
or quality of education (e.g., test scores). How these outcomes are distributed across the 
school-going population, has implications for broader human capital development and 
associated productivity improvements via the labour market. Better quality labour (i.e., labour 
with better skills and knowledge) is instrumental in producing and innovating better quality 
capital, a process more commonly known as technological advancement, which does not 
happen by osmosis, but requires skilled labour to do so. Therefore, productivity 
improvements and technological advancement are two very important sources of economic 
growth and associated development of a nation. It would be important to mention that I 
identify three distinct ‘black boxes,’ each of which acknowledges myriad factors not so easily 
explained, constituting aspects related to policymaking, education and the labour market, 
making it increasingly difficult to assign clear-cut causal linkages between the various 
concepts. What Figure 1 shows is that linking national-level education spending to 
educational outcomes, human capital development or national economic outcomes, is a 
complex process, and caution should be exercised when making pronouncements about 
relating spending to the quality of education or spending to economic growth.2 
 
A contentious issue is the direction of ‘causation’ (reverse causality or reverse relationship) 
because, not only do changes in national income affect public spending (as the Wagnerian 
hypothesis ascribes), but the reverse might be true too. For example, Annabi et al. (2011) 
establish a linkage between public spending on education, human capital and economic 
growth in Canada. Figure 1 does not dispute this possibility, but actually illustrates how this 
linkage might be established. Rather, for the purposes of testing Wagner’s law, one must 
choose a logical starting point to test this empirical regularity, and the top right-hand corner is 
the most obvious point of departure. In other words, in the empirical chapters to follow 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5), the ‘Wagnerian’ linkage – which flows from national economic 
outcomes (economic growth and development) to public spending – is considered. That being 
said, I do acknowledge the linkage flowing in the opposite direction – from public spending 
 
2 One of the most prominent researchers looking at aspects of the quality of education, school-based educational 
outcomes, and linking schooling to labour market and broader economic outcomes is Eric A. Hanushek. For 
example, see Hanushek (1986, 1998); Hanushek and Kimko (2000); Hanushek and Rivkin (1997, 2010). 
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(and human capital) to economic growth and development. Figure 1 acknowledges this 
linkage explicitly, in both a short-run (Keynesian) and long-run (endogenous growth) sense.  
 
However, what Figure 1 also shows is the difficulty of assigning ‘causal’ linkages in the 
opposite direction because of the two ‘black boxes’ through which education spending must 
first flow before changes to economic growth and development can occur. As said earlier, the 
empirical evidence regarding a directional relationship, one way or another, is inconclusive or 
mixed. For example, in the study by Gemmell et al. (2016, p. 523), which examines the 
compositional effects of government spending on long-run GDP levels, the authors state they 
have not resolved the endogeneity (simultaneity) problem. Regardless, another problem is 
dealing with possible dynamics in education spending [lag order of the model or Et = f(Et-1)]. 
This is a particular problem addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. In summary, it might be prudent to 
point out that this thesis is more about showing associational links instead of ‘causal’ 
relationships. To this end, I do not necessarily make strong claims about producing consistent 













1.3 Scope of the Study 
 
This study focuses on national-level (aggregate or total) public financing of education, and 
not sub-national public spending on education.3 Neither does this study focus on the separate 
components of public education spending (current, capital and transfers), nor does it consider 
the public financing of education for the different International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED) sectors of education (e.g., more broadly speaking, primary, secondary and 
tertiary education), where ISCED is a framework about education maintained by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Rather, I adopt an 
aggregate (country-level) view of education spending, and consequently consider the 
(macro)economic ‘drivers’ behind education spending. For my purposes, I focus on the 
modelling of the national effort and budget share measures, instead of other useful measures 
(e.g., public spending per student, which would require additional currency and deflator 
choices for international and time-series comparisons to be made). 
 
As discussed in the previous section, in conducting this piece of research, I do acknowledge 
the difficulty of making practical educational policy recommendations when dealing with 
aggregate data on education spending. Therefore, in no way do I try to link my inquiry of 
education spending to classroom-based educational outcomes. For one, the well-known 
paradigmatic conundrum known as the ‘policy-practice gap’ would render many policies 
ineffective anyway. In other words, what educational policymakers prescribe often falls short 
or fails to materialise at a grassroots student level because of the many ‘hidden’ factors 
appearing in the “Education Black Box” shown in Figure 1. 
 
Although private (household) spending is also an important component of education 
spending, albeit comprising a much smaller share of total education spending, I do not 
consider private education spending,4 but instead focus on public (government) spending on 
education. It would be worthwhile to point out a distinction between private spending on 
education and private (versus purely public) provision of education, where the former refers 
to what households spend on education, but the latter refers to the process of privatisation or 
 
3 For some contemporary and earlier sub-national studies of public spending on education for different countries, 
the interested reader can refer to Fischer and Wigger (2016); François and Magni-Berton (2015); Serna and 
Harris (2014); Sagarik (2013); Potrafke (2011a); Rauh et al. (2011); Tandberg and Ness (2011); Wang et al. 
(2012); Zhuang (2013); Arvate and Zoghbi (2010); Grob and Wolter (2007); Hecock (2006); Verbina and 
Chowdhury (2004); Fernández and Rogerson (1999, 2001); Falch and Rattsø (1999); Poterba (1997);  Hanushek 
and Rivkin (1997); Miller (1996); Garms (1986); Nord (1983); Bergstrom et al. (1982); Denzau (1975); 
McMahon (1970); Sharkansky (1967); Hirsch (1960). 
4 For example, the interested reader can refer to Wolf and Zohlnhöfer (2009); Tilak (2002); Tan (1985). 
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the growing ‘marketisation’ of education for purposes of, amongst other things, creating 
greater competition in the education sector. A useful discussion of these issues and the 
controversy about private versus public provision of education is given by Adnett (2004). For 
my purposes, I am interested in (public) spending magnitudes, and an analysis thereof. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, one might typically think of public and private spending on 
education as being substitutionary, where in times of public-sector retrenchment (reduction) 
of education spending, private spending must be increased to compensate for shortfalls in the 
public financing of education. However, empirical evidence does not necessarily support this 
view. For example, a study by Tilak (2002) of households in rural India found that public and 
private spending on education complemented one another, meaning that, in times of public 
spending retrenchment, household spending was reduced too, and vice-versa. 
 
From a practical point of view, data availability problems (lack of suitable data) makes 
operationalising an empirical inquiry using panel data on private spending for the range of 
countries and time period under examination, almost impossible. For example, even a cursory 
glance at the data from the OECD’s iLibrary for private spending on education among OECD 
countries – a group of countries for which the data is best populated – shows numerous gaps 
in the time-series prior to 2008. Suitable data for middle-income and poorer (low-income) 
countries would be even more problematic. Therefore, making meaningful comparisons 
across groups of countries, as I do, would be very difficult. 
 
1.4 Thesis Statements 
 
The following details a set of three thesis statements, corresponding to the three separate (but 
related) empirical chapters to come (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Chapter 3 conjectures the existence 
of differences (heterogeneity) in the mean levels of the national effort and budget share 
measures of education spending for economically and politically distinct groups of countries. 
Chapter 4 conjectures the existence of cyclical (short-run) effects for education spending 
being particularly well-evidenced for richer countries because of a greater variety of public 
goods (e.g., welfare) most probably ‘competing’ with education’s share of spending out of 
GDP during periods of cyclical downturn (upturn). Chapter 5 conjectures the level (long-run) 
relationship between the national effort (budget share) measure and size of government is 
positive (negative). These three thesis statements give rise to the specific research questions 




1.5 Research Questions 
 
Since this thesis comprises three somewhat self-contained, albeit inter-related, empirical 
chapters, several research questions can be listed to show the question of interest in each 
chapter. They are as follows: 
 
1. Chapter 3: Are there significant (mean) differences in education spending between richer 
or poorer and politically distinct groups of countries, and, if so, are the empirical patterns 
of differences generally robust to use of alternative estimators and/or reasonable changes 
in specification? 
2. Chapter 4: Are there cyclical differences in the relationship between the national effort or 
budget share measure of education spending and size of government? 
3. Chapter 5: Is the level of the national effort (budget share) measure of education spending 
positively (negatively) related to the size of government? 
 
1.6 Research Methodology and Assumptions 
 
The three empirical chapters apply three broadly different methodological approaches, 
comprising inquiries about heterogeneity, comparative dynamics and comparative statics, 
respectively. In philosophical terms, it could be argued that the methods applied rely less on 
methodological sophistication and more on sensible, intuitive approaches to the modelling of 
education spending. Each chapter has some variations in the assumptions about the data-
generating process. For the most part, although I do not formally test for problems such as 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation or autocorrelation and cross-section dependence (see, for 
example, Chapter 3), I use suitable estimators that allow for the existence or presence thereof.  
 
Chapter 3 makes use of a least-squares dummy-variable (LSDV) estimator to inquire about 
differences in education spending across economically and politically distinct groups of 
countries. The chapter broadly works under the assumptions of cross-section independence, 
heterogeneous intercepts (the user-defined, group-specific ‘observable’ part of heterogeneity) 
and homogeneous slopes.5 The assumption of cross-section independence is also relaxed to 
 
5 Typically, country fixed effects might be thought to capture all ‘unobservable’, time-invariant heterogeneity. 
But, there is a subtle, less obvious reason for making reference to ‘observable’ heterogeneity when speaking 
about employing theoretically interesting, user-defined, group-specific fixed effects. Country-specific, time-
invariant fixed effects, in practice, make use of country dummies to cater for ‘unobservable’ differences across 
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include (endogenous) common effects assumed to be homogeneously distributed across 
countries (i.e., year dummies are incorporated into the models to cater for year fixed effects).  
 
Chapter 4, for the most part, makes use of a robust estimator as applied to a particular 
‘dynamic’ specification – a basic variant of an error-correction model (ECM) – to inquire 
about short-run (cyclical) effects, in particular, for education spending from changes in the 
size of government, whilst also controlling for possible long-run (lagged) effects. The chapter 
proceeds under the implicit assumption of cross-section dependence (as before, year-specific 
fixed effects routinely cater for endogenous common effects assumed to be homogeneously 
distributed across countries, meaning ‘global’ shocks are assumed to exist),6 heterogeneous 
intercepts (i.e., country-specific fixed effects are routinely catered for) and homogeneous 
slopes. 
 
Chapter 5 tries to make more use of the time-series nature of the panel data. It employs a 
panel time-series or mean-group (MG) estimator to inquire about the purely long-run effects 
for education spending from changes in the size of government. The chapter proceeds under 
an assumption of heterogeneous parameters (both intercepts and slopes are allowed to vary 
across panels or countries), and any common effects, are now assumed to be more 










countries. However, using economic and political or regional and political groupings of countries, for which one 
or both of these theoretically appealing (observable) country characteristics is/are either time-invariant or very 
slowly time-varying (e.g., state of polity), means an ‘observable’ component of heterogeneity can be estimated, 
instead of merely being contained in the conventional country fixed effects. In other words, some of the time-
invariant differences across countries that would have otherwise been captured by the conventional country fixed 
effects are now extracted and placed in the observed portion of heterogeneity as explained by the user-defined, 
group-specific (fixed) effects of interest (see Chapter 3). 
6 To elaborate a little further, in much the same way as incorporating country fixed effects deals with a particular 
type of possible omitted variable bias problem (due to endogenous country-specific, time-invariant fixed effects), 
incorporating year fixed effects deals with a similar problem (due to endogenous time-specific, country-invariant 
fixed effects), but under the more restrictive assumption that these ‘common’ effects (i.e., ‘global’ shocks) are 
the same across countries (homogeneously distributed) for the estimation sample. 
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1.7 Data Collection 
 
The data collected is categorised as dependent variables, explanatory variable(s) of interest 
and control variables. Table 1 lists all of the variables or measures used in this thesis, 
including the variable name; brief description of each variable; type of measure; total sample 
size; years of data coverage; date of my retrieving the publicly accessible data and the source 
from which the data was obtained. The data is predominantly obtained from the World Bank, 
which acts as a repository, of sorts, for data obtainable from other sources, such as UNESCO 


































psegdptot Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2551 1989-2015 30/08/2017 World Bank EdStats 
psegovtot Public spending on education, total (% of total government expenditure) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2255 1989-2015 30/08/2017 World Bank EdStats 
Explanatory Variables of Interest 
ypc201521 GNI per capita country grouping 2015, 21 OECD countries Categorical (Ordinal) 5859 1989-2015 21/11/2016 World Bank (Atlas Method) 
region3 Richer versus poorer (bi-modal) country region sub-samples Categorical (Nominal) 3024 1989-2015 Not Applicable Author’s compilation 
poldemoc Political democracy classification: yes; no Categorical (Nominal) 5105 1989-2015 18/11/2016 Freedom House 
gov1 General government total expenditure (IMF, % of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4237 1989-2015 26/04/2017 World Bank TCdata360 
Control Variables 
gdppc1 GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international dollars) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4803 1990-2015 21/04/2017 World Bank WDI 
fiscbal2 Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4184 1990-2015 31/08/2017 World Bank DPG 
debt2 General government gross debt (IMF, % of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3796 1989-2015 26/04/2017 World Bank TCdata360 
hci Human capital index (PWT 9.0) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3703 1989-2014 02/11/2017 Penn World Table 9.0 
xconst Political constraint on the executive: 1 (least) to 7 (most) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4149 1989-2015 18/11/2016 Gurr’s Polity IV Project 
pop024 Population ages 0-24 (% of total) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4714 1990-2015 21/11/2016 World Bank EdStats 
pop65 Population ages 65 and above (% of total) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 5234 1989-2015 21/11/2016 World Bank WDI 
trade Trade or exports plus imports of goods & services (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4785 1989-2015 21/11/2016 World Bank WDI 
urban Urban population (% of total) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 5799 1989-2015 21/11/2016 World Bank WDI 
military Military expenditure (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3870 1989-2015 06/03/2017 World Bank WDI 
 
Notes: The variable “region3” is derived from my own compilation of a variable called “region2” (see Appendices C and D), and is an indicator variable showing whether or not a 
country is located in a richer or poorer geographical region of the world. EdStats refers to the World Bank’s Education Statistics database (see World Bank, 2017a). Atlas Method 
refers to a particular procedure used by the World Bank to classify countries on an economic basis according to gross national income (GNI) per capita country grouping. The 2015 
classification is used to denote fixed (static) groups of countries over time. Freedom House refers to the Freedom in the World Survey Data (see Freedom House, 2016). TCdata360 
refers to the World Bank’s TCdata360 database (see World Bank, 2017b). WDI refers to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (see World Bank, 2017c). DPG 
refers to the World Bank’s Development Prospects Group: A Cross-Country Database of Fiscal Space (see World Bank, 2017d). See Feenstra et al. (2015) for the Penn World Table 





This section briefly talks about several general limitations that pervade my empirical inquiries. 
More specific limitations are detailed as part of each empirical chapter. Firstly, an enduring and 
important limitation relates to the nature of the data used in all three empirical chapters. It is 
common knowledge that national-level (aggregate) public spending on education data is 
somewhat ‘patchy’ with numerous time gaps appearing in different parts of the time-series 
dimension of the panel data. For example, it is often the case that for high-income (OECD) 
countries the data is better populated, but for poorer countries and even many high-income (non-
OECD) countries, the data is more sparsely populated. This means education spending data 
across countries and over time is typically described as comprising unbalanced or strongly 
unbalanced panel data for many countries that make up the samples of interest in my own study. 
Despite the fact that most of the variables I use to model education spending comprise better 
populated panel data, one is inevitably constrained by the number and spread of data points for 
the dependent variable, meaning one is often limited by the methods that can be usefully and 
consistently applied across the samples of interest. 
 
Secondly, dispute might arise about the use of a ‘gross’ (instead of a ‘net’) measure of total 
government spending (as a share of GDP) as an explanatory variable in regression analyses that 
incorporate the national effort (or the budget share, for that matter) measure of education 
spending as the dependent variable. For instance, when using gross total government spending, a 
partial correlation is setup instead of estimating a purely behavioural relationship, because the 
national effort, in effect, appears on both sides of the estimating equation. This was an aspect I 
considered, but I decided to rather use the gross measure of total government spending, without 
first stripping out education’s share [i.e., net (
𝐺
𝑌






)] for the following five 
conceptual and empirical reasons. First, it is more likely the case that government’s decision 
about how to allocate the total fiscus is done in a simultaneous fashion, and not in isolation of 
education’s share of the total fiscal ‘pie’. Second, a gross measure is a better proxy for what 
government has available, in total, to spend each fiscal year. Third, a net measure of total 
government spending is not in keeping with the ‘spirit’ of Wagner’s law; a gross measure is a 
better proxy for the ‘size of government’ needed to test Wagner’s proposition. Fourth, there are 
other papers in the empirical literature (see Chapter 4) that have proceeded in a similar fashion by 
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using a gross measure of total government spending. Fifth, since the average budget share 
(education’s share of total government spending) is about 12-15% amongst all samples of 
countries, the partial correlation spoken about is probably less of a problem, and any outliers or 
extreme observations are dealt with using robust procedures in all three empirical chapters. 
 
Thirdly, it would be worthwhile to mention the conceptual difference between there being a 
statistically significant effect versus an economically meaningful effect. For the most part, in the 
empirical chapters to follow, I am most interested in the former (testing for significant effects). 
However, this is not to say the effects, where evidenced, are not economically meaningful too, 
but rather the focus is on establishing whether or not statistically significant effects are exhibited 
in all three empirical chapters, though it would make sense to interpret the effect sizes of 
representative results. An analogy might suffice as explanation. For example, consider the case of 
convicting a man accused of petty theft. On the one hand, choosing a particular level of 
significance, say, the 5% level (a somewhat arbitrary assignment that has become conventional in 
empirical work), would be tantamount to saying the level of evidence required to find the man 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Failure of the Prosecutor to present evidence and an argument 
to convict the man is akin to saying there is not enough evidence, statistically speaking, to reject 
the null hypothesis of ‘not guilty’. However, this is not to say the man might not indeed be guilty, 
but rather there was not enough evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other 
hand, how economically meaningful the ‘effect’ is, says more about how impactful the ‘crime’ is 
on the broader society (economy), meaning, for instance, multiple homicide or grand larceny are 
more likely to have a greater effect (a greater economic impact) on the wider citizenry than 
would the crime of petty theft. Showing a statistically significant effect is one thing, but it is often 
more debateable whether or not a meaningful economic effect is exhibited.7 It would be useful to 
bear this more nuanced limitation in mind when interpreting the empirical results. 
 
1.9 Original Contributions 
 
All three empirical chapters to follow (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) make various novel contributions to 
the literature on national-level public spending on education. The following comprises the most 
 
7 This very point is documented by Kennedy’s (2002, pp. 580-581) Rule #9. Although Kennedy presents an eloquent 
account of the relevant literature in the form of “The Ten Commandments of Applied Econometrics,” one might also 
argue that upholding these tenets in applied (empirical) work is often easier said than done. 
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important contribution from each of these chapters. Chapter 3 proffers a bi-modal (richer versus 
poorer countries) explanation of education spending patterns, which can be summarised in the 
form of three testable inequality propositions. These propositions could also be tested with 
respect to other parts of the government’s budget allocation, such as military or welfare spending 
to see if they hold with respect to them too. Chapter 4 takes a different approach to what has 
previously been used in the literature when investigating the ‘cyclicality’ of education spending. 
By interacting the size of government with the stage of the economic cycle (i.e., ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
times), one is able to examine how changes in the size of the public sector affect associated 
education spending over the economic cycle. Chapter 5 applies a panel time-series method, rarely 
used in the education-spending literature, to investigate the long-run (levels) relationship between 
education spending and size of government, under the assumption of heterogeneous parameters. 
 
1.10 Thesis Organisation 
 
Chapter 2 presents a summary of the empirical literature and discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings of the variables chosen for my own empirical work based on five dimensions of 
national-level public spending on education (i.e., economic, political, demographic, globalisation 
and social). The particular emphasis is on the economic dimension, framed along Wagnerian 
lines, and comprises the major ‘theme’ running through all three empirical chapters. In a sense, 
this chapter ‘sets the scene’ so to speak, in a non-technical way, for the empirical analyses to 
follow. Chapter 3 is the first of three empirical examinations of education spending. It considers 
aspects related to (observable) heterogeneity, and applies a LSDV model to investigate economic 
and political differences in spending patterns across various samples of countries. Chapters 4 and 
5 then consider how size of government impacts education spending. Chapter 4 takes a 
comparative (dynamic) view of spending, and applies an ECM, in which the interaction between 
size of government and binary categorisation of the economic cycle is used to see if significant 
cyclical effects exist. Chapter 5 takes a comparative (static) view of spending, and applies the 
MG estimator to aid in our understanding of the long-run (levels) relationship between education 
spending and size of government. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, by presenting a summary of 











This chapter reviews a large corpus of the (empirical) literature concerning national-level public 
spending on education. The vast array of this literature can be categorised as encompassing five 
distinct dimensions: economic, political, demographic, globalisation and social.8 The objective is 
to use a heuristic approach to identifying the variables most commonly used or operationalised in 
the empirical literature to inform my own study of education spending. The theoretical 
underpinnings of the chosen variables can then be discussed to motivate for their inclusion in the 
empirical work I undertake in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In some sense, this chapter compiles an 
empirical framework with which to repeat exercises in the empirical literature. The Wagnerian 
approach is the ‘theme’ informing the thesis, and provides an economic basis for the analysis of 
education spending. 
 
Wagner’s law can be thought of as postulating a linkage from economic growth and development 
to public sector expansion, and, in turn, the public financing of education (see Figure 1). For 
instance, if one were to investigate the macroeconomic determinants of public spending on 
education, a worthwhile approach would be to either consider how economic growth and 
development shapes education spending (a line of inquiry in Chapter 3), or consider how public 
sector expansion itself, whilst controlling for a process of economic growth and development, 
shapes education spending (a line of inquiry in Chapters 4 and 5). In both respects, these 
approaches might be thought of as adopting a more strongly ‘economic’ line of inquiry, meaning 
I focus attention on an economic explanation of education finance, framed along Wagnerian 
lines, in each of the three empirical chapters to follow. 
 
 
8 It would be of interest to note that three of these dimensions (demographic, political and economic) are referred to 
by Castles and Merrill (1989) when making reference to a general model of public policy outcomes. Also, although 
with reference to the determinants of sub-national level education spending in the United States, McMahon (1970) 
makes reference to the economic, demographic and social dimensions, meaning only the globalisation dimension 
(trade) is missing, but this is typically treated as a separate dimension in the literature. 
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a summary of the variables used 
in a number of empirical studies. Their respective dependent and explanatory variables are listed 
by using generic terminology so that (heuristic) comparisons can be made across studies at a 
glance. This makes clearer the most commonly operationalised variables in the literature. Section 
2.3 discusses the theoretical underpinnings for the inclusion of certain variables in my own study, 
as categorised by the five aforementioned dimensions. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.  
 
2.2 A Summary of Variables Used in the Empirical Literature 
 
Table 2 presents a synthesis of 46 empirical studies of national-level public spending on 
education spanning more than 40 years. It is by no means an exhaustive survey of the (empirical) 
literature, but is intended to be illustrative of a large body of literature on the subject. A wide 
variety of studies, comprising the disciplines of Economics, Comparative Public Finance, 
Comparative Public Policy and Political Science, are presented in chronological order, and show 
not only the different dependent variables used in each study, but also how their chosen 
explanatory variables are spread across the five dimensions. The table predominantly considers 
studies that have modelled public spending on education as a function of a set of explanatory 
variables using multiple regression of various kinds or correlation analysis as the primary 
research method. In doing so, it must be said the variables listed for each study do not necessarily 
represent a comprehensive list (they mostly do though), but they do comprise the most important 
variables used by the author(s) in each case. 
 
The objective of the table is to use a set of ‘generic’ names to define the variables most often 
used across all of these studies, which then allows the reader to more easily identify the variables 
most important for modelling national-level education spending. Appendix A gives more specific 
information about each generically-named variable. The use of generic terminology provides a 
novel (heuristic) way to show similarities and differences across studies, at a glance. This 
hopefully allows the reader to get a better sense of where the various emphases lie for each of the 
five dimensions. In other words, I am using a literature-based survey to identify the specification 




Various studies have used different measures of education spending as the dependent (outcome) 
variable of interest. These measures range from aggregate national-level spending measures (i.e., 
national effort; budget share; total spending per capita or per student measures) to disaggregate 
national-level spending measures (i.e., primary, secondary or tertiary spending as a share of GDP 
or sector-level spending measured in per capita or per student terms). The choice of using the 
national effort and budget share measures is not only informed by what the majority of other 
studies have done, but also because these two measures are typically more widely available, 
comprising a more complete time series (data with fewer time-series gaps) for a greater number 
of countries. Since this thesis aims to model education spending for as many countries as possible 
over a relatively long period of time (1989-2015), data availability with respect to these two 
measures allows me to do so. In the next section, I discuss the explanatory variables chosen for 
my empirical work, and give a theoretical justification for their inclusion. 
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Economic Political Demographic Globalisation Social 
Zymelman (1976) 
National effort; Spending by 
level (Primary, Secondary, 
Tertiary) 
Income per capita n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Verner (1979) 
National effort; Budget 
share; Spending per capita 
Income per capita; Central 
government 
Democracy; Cabinet size n/a n/a Urbanisation 
Tilak (1984) 
National effort; Budget 
share; Spending per capita; 
Spending per pupil; Human 
capital 
Income per capita; 
Enrolment; Adult literacy 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Urwick (1986) 
Spending per capita (Total, 
Primary, Secondary, 
Tertiary) 
Income per capita; 
Enrolment 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Schultz (1988) 
Spending per pupil 
(Primary, Secondary) 





National effort; Spending 
per capita 
Income per capita; 
Enrolment (Primary, 
Secondary) 
Cabinet shares Youth population n/a n/a 
Tilak (1989) National effort 
Income per capita; Growth; 
Fiscal balance; Public debt 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tilak (1990) 
National effort; Budget 
share; Spending per capita 




Budget share; National 
effort 
SAP; Income; Public sector n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ram (1995) 
Spending per pupil (Primary 
& Secondary) 
Income per capita n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Brown & Hunter (1999) Social spending per capita 
Income per capita; Growth; 
Debt service; Inflation 
Democracy Elderly population n/a n/a 
Castles (1999) National effort Income per capita 
Electoral votes; Cabinet 
shares 
Elderly population Trade Urbanisation 
Castles (2001) 
Social spending; Non-social 
spending 
Unemployment; Growth Ideology; Corporatism n/a Trade n/a 
Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo (2001) Social spending 
Income per capita; Public 
sector; 
Democracy n/a 




Budget share; National 
effort 
Public sector; Income per 
capita; Illiteracy 
Democracy 





Brown & Hunter (2004) 
Spending by level 
(Primary); Spending per 
capita 
Income per capita; IMF; 
Growth; Social spending; 
Debt service; Inflation 
Democracy Youth population Trade n/a 
Mahdavi (2004) Social spending 
Income per capita; Public 
sector; Public debt, IMF 
Democracy n/a n/a n/a 
Avelino et al. (2005) National effort 
Income per capita; Growth; 
Unemployment; Inflation 
Democracy Elderly population Trade; Capital mobility Urbanisation 
Stasavage (2005) 
National effort; Budget 
share; Spending by level 
(Primary; Tertiary) 
Income per capita; Aid Democracy; Election year Youth population n/a Rural population 
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Lora & Olivera (2006) 
Social spending; National 
effort; Budget share 
Public debt; Income per 
capita; Social spending; 
Public sector; Revenue; 
Fiscal balance; Debt service 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Busemeyer (2007) National effort 
Income per capita; Social 
spending; Growth; Fiscal 
decentralisation 
Democracy Youth population n/a n/a 
Castles (2007) 
Social & Non-social 
spending 
Growth; Public debt; FDI Cabinet shares n/a Trade n/a 
Fosu (2007) Budget share 
Debt service; Aid; Income 
per capita 
n/a n/a n/a Rural population 
Shelton (2007) Budget share Income per capita; Gini; Democracy 






Schmidt (2007) National effort 
National effort; Services 
employment 
Cabinet shares n/a Trade n/a 
Busemeyer (2008) National effort 




Youth population; Elderly 
population 
n/a n/a 
Huber et al. (2008) Social spending 
Income per capita; public 
debt; FDI; Fiscal balance; 
IMF 
Democracy; Autocracy Youth population Trade Urbanisation 
Iversen & Stephens (2008) 
National effort; Spending by 
level (Tertiary) 
Income per capita; Inflation; 
Unemployment; FDI 
Cabinet shares; Autocratic 
legacy 
Elderly population Trade n/a 
Busemeyer (2009a) 
National effort; Spending by 
level (PSNTPS; Tertiary) 
Income per capita; Public 
sector; Public debt 
Cabinet shares Age ratio Trade n/a 
Busemeyer (2009b) Social spending 
Unemployment; Inflation; 
Income per capita; Female 
LFPR 
Ideology Age dependency 





Akanbi & Schoeman (2010) National effort 
Income per capita; Public 
sector; IMF 
Corruption index Youth population n/a Urbanisation 
Fosu (2010) Budget share 
Debt service; Aid; Income 
per capita 
Democracy n/a n/a Rural population 
Jensen (2011) National effort 
Female LFPR; Growth; 
Unemployment; Debt 
service 
Cabinet shares; Electoral 
system 
Youth population Trade n/a 
Sanz (2011) Budget share 
Public sector; Income per 
capita; 
n/a 




Potrafke (2011b) National effort 
Income per capita; Inflation; 
Unemployment 
Ideology 




Baskaran & Hessami (2012) 
Spending by level (Primary; 
Secondary; Tertiary) 
Enrolment; Income per 
capita; Internet users 
Democracy; Ideology n/a KOF index; Trade n/a 
Speciale (2012) 
Spending per pupil (Total; 
Non-tertiary; Tertiary) 
Income per capita n/a Youth population n/a n/a 
Afonso & Jalles (2013) 
National effort (or Real 
spending) 
Growth; Fiscal balance n/a n/a ToT n/a 
Arze del Granado et al. (2013) Real spending Growth; Fiscal balance n/a n/a ToT n/a 
Manzano (2013) Spending by level (Tertiary) 
Income per capita; Gini; 
Secondary spending 
Ideology Total population Trade n/a 
Busemeyer & Iversen (2014) Budget share Public sector, Enrolment Ideology; Democracy n/a n/a Union density; Religion 
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Mosher (2015) Social spending  Ideology; Cabinet shares n/a n/a Union density; Religion 
Cockx & Francken (2016) National effort 
Natural capital; Income per 
capita; Aid; Services sector 
Democracy Elderly population n/a n/a 
Garritzmann & Seng (2016) 
National effort; Spending by 
level (Tertiary) 
Income per capita; Public 
debt; Public sector; Female 
LFPR 
Cabinet shares Age ratio Trade n/a 
Afonso & Alves (2017) National effort Growth n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Herwartz & Theilen (2017) 
Spending per capita; Social 
& Non-social spending per 
capita 
Income per capita; 
Unemployment rate; Fiscal 
balance; Public debt 
Ideology 
Youth population; Elderly 
population; Age dependency 
Trade n/a 
 
Notes: See Appendix A for table notes. Not applicable (n/a) means the respective author(s) did not use a variable to operationalise the respective dimension (economic, 




2.3 Theoretical Reasoning for the Chosen Variables 
 
2.3.1 Economic Dimension 
 
This thesis adopts an economic approach to inquiry about education spending, and draws on 
the Wagnerian perspective. In the more recent literature, there have been a number of studies 
that have focused attention on Wagner’s law in more general terms – not necessarily with 
respect to education spending only as I do. These studies also make reference to other studies 
on the subject.9 When deciding on the important (macro)economic variables to be used to 
explain national-level public spending on education, (national) income per capita and size of 
the public sector (size of government) are the two most important explanatory variables 
warranting inclusion, the former being the most widely used explanatory measure in the 
empirical literature and the latter being the most obvious factor linking the national economy 
to the public financing of education, as the Wagnerian approach ascribes.10 In other words, 
higher levels of economic development, as measured by national income per capita, are 
associated with higher levels of public spending (as a share of GDP) – the assertion of 
Wagner’s law (Busemeyer, 2008, p. 461). 
 
There are a couple of other ‘fiscal’ variables, ancillary to the aforementioned key economic 
variables, that can be drawn from the vast array of empirical literature (see Table 2). They are 
likely to be important components of the economic dimension. If the size of government is of 
interest, then it stands to reason the (gross) public debt and the fiscal balance might also play 
an important role in determining how large the public sector can be and how much of the 
public purse can be allocated to education.11 Public debt or debt service (Tilak, 1989; Tilak, 
1990; Brown & Hunter, 1999, 2004; Castles, 2007; Busemeyer, 2009a; Fosu, 2010) and the 
fiscal balance (Tilak, 1989; Huber et al., 2008) have been used in the empirical literature. For 
 
9 The interested reader can refer to the following studies: Afonso and Alves (2017); Magazzino et al. (2015); 
Kuckuck (2014); Kumar et al. (2012); Shelton (2007); Akitoby et al. (2006); Peacock and Scott (2000); Oxley 
(1994); Gemmell (1990, 1993); Ram (1987). 
10 To be clear from the outset, for my purposes of modelling education spending in this thesis, income per capita 
and size of government are the two key economic explanatory variables of interest, with a particular emphasis on 
the former in the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3), and on the latter in the second and third empirical chapters 
(Chapters 4 and 5). 
11 It would be prudent to mention that a host of other ‘economic’ variables have been used in the literature to 
model education spending or, more generally, social spending. But, these variables are of secondary importance 
to including income per capita, total government spending and the two fiscal variables (public debt and fiscal 
balance). For instance, various other measures of inflation (Brown & Hunter, 1999, 2004; Avelino et al., 2005; 
Iversen & Stephens, 2008), unemployment  (Avelino et al., 2005; Iversen & Stephens, 2008; Jensen, 2011), 
adult literacy (Tilak, 1984; Baqir, 2002), foreign direct investment (Huber et al., 2008; Iversen & Stephens, 
2008), development assistance or aid (Stasavage, 2005; Fosu, 2010), labour force participation (Jensen, 
2011) and income inequality (Manzano, 2013) have been used. 
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instance, high debt service ratios impose a constraint on government’s ability to spend 
(Brown & Hunter, 2004, p. 855). But, although debt accumulation might constrain spending 
on certain functional areas of government (such as education), it does allow governments to 
‘finance’ greater spending on priority areas of the public sector over and above what is 
available from taxes and other sources of income. This explains why governments generally 
tend to run budget deficits (not surpluses) during periods of worsening economic conditions, 
when income-generating (tax collection) mechanisms are hampered. 
 
Since the financing of education is linked to human capital, an economic variable that seems 
to be missing from Table 2 is a measure of human capital development. The human capital 
index might be viewed as a proxy for two important economic outcomes, which are likely to 
play a role when modelling education spending. Firstly, since the human capital index is a 
measure of the quality of labour in a country, it does in many ways act as a control for the 
quality of education. Controlling for the quality of education, as far as possible, when 
modelling education spending, would seem like an important consideration. Secondly, 
countries that have a higher human capital index score are more likely to have lower rates of 
unemployment, so it actually serves as a way to control for the unemployment rate. There is 
also the more obvious consideration that, richer countries tend to have higher levels of human 
capital development (higher index scores) anyway, meaning they are more likely to have a 
better-quality workforce, lower levels of unemployment and better-quality education systems. 
Despite a ‘high’ human capital index value presumably reflecting accumulated expenditure on 
education in recent periods, meaning that, in a cross-section, simultaneity might be expected, 
this is less likely to be problematic in a time-series context. 
 
Another way to operationalise various economic differences in countries is to use regional 
categorisations because there are economically richer (developed) versus poorer (developing) 
regions of the world. The usefulness of a regional variable can be traced back to a very early 
study of education spending patterns by Zymelman (1976). Where no significant relationship 
was found with respect to income per capita and education spending, a significant relationship 
emerged when combined with region or region in isolation (Zymelman, 1976, pp. 50-51). One 
reason for the importance of considering a regional dimension as opposed to purely 
considering income per capita groupings of countries is that countries from a similar region 
are more likely to also have some similar economic characteristics. Next, I offer a discussion 
of the theoretical underpinnings for the chosen economic variables (in particular, income per 




As one of the first major contributions to the field of public finance, Wagner’s ‘law of 
increasing state activity’ has now become a well-established theory of public sector activity, 
and is widely recognised as a stylised fact (Kuckuck, 2014, p. 129). Wagner’s hypothesis (see, 
for example, Wagner 1883a; 1883b, 1958; 1883c, 1958; 1892; 1911; Musgrave & Peacock, 
1958) concerning state activity can be said to postulate a positive association between 
economic development and total public spending (Cockx & Francken, 2016, p. 397; Afonso 
& Alves, 2017, p. 347). Insofar as education spending is concerned, the linkage can best be 
thought of as flowing from economic growth and development via the overall public sector 
budget allocation to public spending on education (i.e., Y → G → E), where the education 
sector is one of a host of functional areas of government. 
 
It would be prudent to point out that, from a ‘causal’ point of view, the Wagnerian linkage 
flows from national income per capita to public sector activity, whereas the Keynesian 
linkage flows in the opposite direction. In a sense, the Wagnerian and Keynesian formulations 
represent two contrasting theories of the role the public sector plays in national economic 
growth and development. More about these ‘competing’ theories is detailed shortly hereafter. 
It would also be of interest to note the Wagnerian hypothesis generally reveals an empirical 
uniformity (regularity), and was not necessarily meant for purposes of making bold predictive 
claims (Peacock & Scott, 2000, p. 3). For instance, although the process of growth and 
development is an important ingredient, there are numerous other factors (e.g., debt 
accumulation) contributing towards public sector expansion. 
 
Wagner (1892) referred to the relationship between the level of economic development and 
public sector activity as being attributable to continued progress in the state of the cultural and 
economic environment, where improved social conditions and income growth are associated 
with a larger public sector (Kuckuck, 2014, p. 129). In other words, from a Wagnerian 
perspective, with growth and development comes a growing demand for various social (e.g., 
education and healthcare) and welfare services that the public sector becomes instrumental in 
providing on a more massified (large-scale) basis. However, there is conjecture about the 
‘causes’ of bigger governments. Whereas Wagner (1911, p. 734) points out that growth of the 
public sector comes at the expense of (substitutes for) growth in the private sector (see also 
Peacock & Scott, 2000, p. 2), a different conclusion has been argued when referring to the 




The main conclusion of Part One is that the growth of public spending was not 
caused by inevitable forces that made it imperative. It was thus not inevitable as 
assumed by some theories about the growth of spending such as Wagner’s Law or 
Baumol’s disease. On the contrary, it is argued that growth was nothing but a 
response to changing perceptions about what the government should do. In a way 
the growth of government reflected a lack of confidence in the private sector’s 
ability to deal with some problems and a belief that public spending was the best 
way to deal with several risks faced by individuals. The action of government was 
always assumed to be additive to or complementary of the action of individuals. It 
was almost never assumed to be substitutive. 
  
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, pp. 1-2) 
 
Three points can be advanced here. Firstly, in defence of Wagner, he was formulating his 
ideas at a time in the late-19th and early-20th Centuries, without the benefit of well over one 
hundred years of empirical experience and little in the way of mathematical tools with which 
to ‘prove’ his theory. Secondly, whether one speaks about a growing demand for various 
publicly provided services or changing perceptions in society about the role government 
should play, as Tanzi and Schuknecht suggest, these two ‘causal’ processes behind bigger 
governments might be viewed as being synonymous (and not in conflict) with one another, 
emanating from demand-side socio-political pressures. Thirdly, it is more likely the case that 
a complementary (as opposed to substitutive) relationship exists between public and private 
sector expansion, as Tanzi and Schuknecht also seem to suggest. From a purely logical 
perspective, if wealthier countries tend to have larger public sectors (as ascribed to the 
Wagnerian hypothesis), these wealthier countries have not become richer by osmosis (some 
passive process of growth and development), but have done so by virtue of the private sector 
of the economy having also expanded – this is at the very heart of what growth and associated 
development encompasses. 
 
Once again, adopting the view espoused by Tanzi and Schuknecht, that growth of the public 
sector is more closely related to shifting perceptions about the role government should play in 
shaping society, might be problematic in reality. Such a view might be all well and good, but 
this still begs the question: how are these perceptions matched in practice? The needs and 
wants of society cannot be met in a vacuum, but must be financed in some or other way. The 
process of growth and development arguably implies a growing fiscal base from which tax 
income can be extracted, this income being the very source from which the growing needs 
and wants of society can be satisfied. Hence, inevitably, we still come back to the Wagnerian 





No doubt as later theorists (such as John Maynard Keynes) and other later ‘interventionist’ 
theorists (such as John Kenneth Galbraith) advocated, a growing public sector also has 
positive multiplier effects for economic growth and associated development. For example, in 
the short run, public investment in school infrastructure can work through households and 
firms (the private sector) to boost national income. In the long run, public investment in 
education promotes human capital development, which is an important source of economic 
growth as suggested by Romer (1986; 1990; 1994) and Barro (1990). Whether one speaks 
about the Wagnerian or Keynesian linkage being dominant – by assigning ‘neat’ causal 
linkages – it would be easy to overlook the fact that each approach adopts a different 
theoretical view of the world. As Figure 1 illustrates, to say that economic growth and 
associated development are (directly) affected by education spending would be a stretch, to 
say the least, as there are a number of more complicated linkages through which such 
spending must first flow (in an anticlockwise direction) to (indirectly) shape national 
economic outcomes. Rather, it would be more appropriate to investigate the forces shaping 
education spending patterns, as the Wagnerian linkage suggests. Therefore, for my purposes, I 
make reference to the Wagnerian perspective, with an aspect of the public sector (education 
spending) being my outcome of interest. However, I do acknowledge that both theories 
(Wagnerian and Keynesian) have a role to play, but rather choose to focus on the former, 
because this is at the heart of the economic paradigm underpinning my thesis. 
 
Peacock and Scott (2000) offer a good synopsis of Wagner’s salient ideas and critical 
discussion of the empirical testing thereof with respect to 15 studies which have been 
conducted in the past. One of the most intriguing points of discussion offered by them 
concerns the methodological approach applied in the studies they surveyed, bearing in mind 
all of the studies ostensibly purported to investigate Wagner’s law. They noted most of the 
studies surveyed merely represented a ‘race-to-the-top’ with respect to using more 
sophisticated methods of inquiry, possibly moving further away from what Wagner himself 
may have intended because the testing of the ‘law’ should not necessarily require complicated 
econometric techniques to espouse what is by nature a very simple law (see Peacock & Scott, 
2000, pp. 2-10). For this reason, in some sense, the econometric methods applied in this 
thesis, might be described as being more simplified in their approach, relying less on 
methodological sophistication and eclecticism, and more on simple, intuitive methods when 




Lastly, an explanation of how a bigger public sector (due to economic growth) results in more 
public spending on education is warranted. Wagner’s law predicts that bigger governments 
result from the process of economic growth and development. For one, countries with greater 
income have greater resources with which to fund various social programmes (Brown & 
Hunter, 2004, p. 855). But, whether bigger governments are necessarily associated with 
greater public spending on education is a matter of empirical inquiry – the ‘thematic’ reason 
for this thesis. In other words, income per capita, size of government and education spending 
are not necessarily all positively related, but an explanation can be advanced for why they 
might be. A positive ‘income’ elasticity of education spending with respect to total 
government spending (both as shares of GDP), irrespective of whether education is a ‘luxury’ 
or ‘necessity’ good, implies that education is prioritised when the size of government 
expands. If government views education as being a productive component of public spending, 
any additions to the public purse are allocated, to a greater or lesser extent, to education, 
which is viewed as a merit good having positive externality effects. How governments view 
education (the ‘value’ they place on it) can be signalled by this elasticity coefficient. For 
example, if the income elasticity is positive and significant, then education is a ‘normal’ 
(public) good, categorised as a necessity (0 < ε < 1); unit elastic (ε = 1); a luxury (ε > 1) with 
respect to the size of government. Whether richer countries do indeed spend more than their 
poorer country counterparts, in national effort (or budget share) terms, is the subject of 
inquiry in Chapter 3; whether an expansion in the size of government during a recession 
equates to more spending on education too is the subject of inquiry in Chapter 4; whether a 
positive (negative) association between the national effort (budget share) of education 
spending and size of government holds in the long run is the subject of inquiry in Chapter 5. 
 
2.3.2 Political Dimension 
 
Considering the state of economic development (or regional differences) in isolation from the 
political environment would be short-sighted. As operationalised in its many different forms, 
the political dimension has been shown to be an important ingredient in the education-
spending mix. Measures of the political environment can be broadly classified into two 
general streams: what I refer to as ‘first-generation’ (partisan political or political ideology) 
and ‘second-generation’ (regime-type or political democracy) measures. Measures of political 
(electoral) cycles might be considered a third type of political measure useful for applied 
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work, and distinct from the partisan political and regime-type measures. This study focuses on 
the latter (political democracy) and not the former (political ideology) measure.12 
 
There can be little doubt that ‘politics matters’ when examining education spending patterns. 
Table 2 shows that most studies have incorporated a measure to cater for the political 
dimension, whether tackled from an ideological, regime-type or electoral cycle perspective. A 
measure of democracy conveys information about populist socio-political pressures placed on 
government, pressures that are likely to impact public spending on socially useful public 
goods, such as education. Democracy might be represented by using a binary categorisation 
(democratic versus autocratic state of government) or an ordinal categorisation, showing the 
degree of constraint placed on the executive branch of government, for example. 
Incorporating a measure of democracy is important, and might be thought of as saying 
something about whether governments are acting in the best interests of the citizenry because 
of socio-political pressures placed on government, or rather in the best interests of various 
government stakeholders. 
 
That being said, it is worthwhile to acknowledge the important role various measures of 
political ideology have played in the empirical literature, whether from the point of view of 
general public spending or specific components thereof (education spending included).13 
Schmidt (1996) discusses the usefulness of first-generation measures of polity for applied 
work. A study presenting a meta-analysis of political ideology is that of Imbeau et al. (2001). 
A discussion of government ideology and budget composition is given by Potrafke (2011b). A 
good account challenging the conventional wisdom that party politics matters is that of 
Garritzmann and Seng (2016). However, this inquiry focuses on the use of a suitable measure 
of democracy. For one, this measure is also more widely available for a greater number of 
countries, which makes it an appealing political measure for cross-country empirical work. 
 
 
12 For one, it was generally found that when trying to operationalise a measure of political ideology – Left, Right 
or Centre as sourced from the Database of Political Institutions held by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) (see Cruz et al., 2016) – for a worldwide sample of countries, there was generally no difference in total 
spending patterns for Leftist versus Rightist governments, supporting the view that using a regime-type approach 
might be best suited for the purposes of a global study. However, using a partisan political approach might be 
better suited when studying OECD countries only, which are all classed as politically democratic, but have 
different ideological compositions. This would be an interesting point of inquiry in a future study of the ratio 
measures of total education spending for OECD countries.  
13 There is a rich history of studies using ideological dimensions that can be referred to here, for example: Hibbs 
(1977, 1987); Cameron (1978); Castles and McKinlay (1979); Wilensky (1981); Castles (1982, 1986, 1989); 
Iversen (2001); Adserà and Boix (2002); Kittel and Obinger (2003); Busemeyer (2009a); Careja and 
Emmenegger (2009); Herwartz and Theilen (2017). 
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There are a number of studies in the contemporary literature that have proceeded by using 
various kinds of second-generation measures insofar as education spending is concerned. For 
example, Avelino et al. (2005) used the democracy score and Fosu (2010) used the degree of 
political constraint on the executive in government as suitable regime-type measures of polity. 
The latter can be viewed as a more nuanced version of the political democracy measure. 
Therefore, I focus on the state of political democracy (Yes; No) as my favoured second-
generation measure of polity. The degree of political constraint on government ranging from 1 
(lowest constraint) to 7 (highest constraint) would serve as a useful political control measure 
for models in which a political covariate is needed. Although a strong association exists 
between the two types of political measures (political democracy and political constraint) 
because democratic governments generally face greater constraints in making executive 
decisions or conducting the ‘business’ of politics, one must be cautious about thinking this is 
always the case.14 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the ‘old’ or conventional partisan political (political ideology) 
approach to politics, comprises a more straightforward class-based approach to partisan 
(Leftist versus Rightist) preferences, broadly speaking, predicting a leaning towards primary 
and secondary education spending for Leftist governments; tertiary education spending for 
Rightist governments. In contrast, a ‘new politics’ approach to education spending adopts the 
line of argument that, “political parties are not merely transmission belts for the economic 
interests of social classes, but use policies and spending strategically to attract and consolidate 
voter groups” (Busemeyer, 2009a, p. 107). What this means in more simple terms is that, 
regardless of partisan political affiliation, democratic governments (as opposed to less 
democratic or autocratic ones) are inclined to provide a greater number of services (see Lake 
& Baum, 2001) and favour policies that appeal to a majority of the citizenry in order to 
consolidate political power. 
 
Insofar as political democracy is concerned, education is arguably a ‘populist’ component of 
the budget allocation meaning democratic governments are more likely to have higher levels 
 
14 There are countries classified as politically democratic, but they have very little constraint on government 
(e.g., Liberia from 1997 to 2000); or countries classified as not politically democratic, but significant constraint 
on government exists (e.g., South Africa from 1989 to 1991). The examples of Liberia and South Africa reveal 
anomalies or contrasting political stories. Although the binary measure of political democracy used to categorise 
countries in the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) and the 7-point measure of political constraint used as a right-
hand side control variable in the second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) come from different sources (Freedom 
House and Polity IV Project, respectively), a Chi-square test between the two variables (poldemoc and xconst) 
shows a high degree of association with a p-value of 0.000; Cramér’s V of 0.8563; Goodman and Kruskal’s 




of public spending on education, regardless of how national-level (aggregate) education 
spending is measured (i.e., national effort or budget share measure), ceteris paribus. Knowing 
more about how the state of polity (democracy) impinges on education spending would seem 
like the most worthwhile (but, I acknowledge, not the only) way to incorporate the political 
dimension into a truly global study seeking to make inferences about how politics affects 
education spending. Democracy can be thought of as implying significant socio-political 
pressures being placed on government by a majority of the citizenry, to act increasingly in 
line with the needs and wants of society. 
 
The general notion that democratic governments are more likely than non-democratic 
(autocratic or authoritarian) governments to provide basic services to their citizenry is not so 
contentious. But, the exact decision-making mechanism through which democracy affects 
public policy outcomes (public provision of education and other basic services) is open to 
much debate (Harding & Stasavage, 2014, p. 229). The problem stems largely from there not 
being a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to government decision-making about the provision of 
services like education in democratic countries, which is made even more problematic when 
dealing with a wide spectrum of countries from different levels of economic development. 
 
In discussing the economic foundations of government, Holcombe (1994, p. 219) speaks 
about a monopoly model of government where, regardless of whether government is broadly 
categorised as ‘democratic’ or ‘autocratic’, both regime types use monopoly actions to hold 
onto power. However, if the political environment is more competitive in nature (multiparty 
or electoral competition exists), the citizens are more able to exercise their power to receive a 
more ‘competitive’ bundle of services (education being one of a host of basic services) at 
lower prices than would otherwise be achieved if little to no electoral competition existed. 
Incidentally, one way to restrict the ‘monopoly’ power government has over society is via 
intergovernmental competition (Holcombe, 1994, p. 219), which is the subject of fiscal 
decentralisation. For instance, since democratic governments are more accountable to their 
constituencies and the wider public, they face stronger incentives, than do autocratic 
governments, to provide more widely appealing public services (education and healthcare) 
instead of engaging in rent-seeking behaviour (see Lake and Baum, 2001; Baum and Lake, 
2003 in this regard). In other words, bigger governments might imply greater education 
spending in democratic societies, because policies concerning expanding education are more 
populist in nature, and appeal to a broader reach of society. For example, Brown and Hunter 
(2004, p. 845) make the argument that democratic governments have a stronger incentive to 
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prioritise and steer resources towards primary education, because doing so stands to benefit a 
greater proportion of the potential voter pool. This explains why controlling for the state of 
polity is an important consideration when empirically testing whether bigger governments do 
indeed equate to more public spending on education for a given level of economic 
development. This is the primary objective of the empirical work in Chapters 4 and 5, by 
tackling the empirics from either a short-run (Chapter 4) or long-run (Chapter 5) perspective. 
 
In practical terms, controlling for the state of polity, by using a democracy dummy or 
democracy index score, is important to capture the degree to which government is 
accountable to the electorate (Baskaran & Hessami, 2012, p. 692), and which then says 
something about the effect of democracy on education spending. For example, even if 
democracies have a greater propensity to abolish school fees to encourage primary-school 
attendance (Harding & Stasavage, 2014, p. 230) – a politically popular way of being 
accountable to the broader public and a means to retain voter support – a ‘fees-free’ policy 
still means the state must foot the bill, which equates to higher total public spending on 
education, ceteris paribus, because, for one, spending on primary education (as opposed to 
spending on secondary or tertiary education) typically comprises a majority share of total 
public education spending, not least because the primary sector is where the majority of the 
school-going-age population is likely to be located. 
 
Stasavage (2005, pp. 344-345) proposes that the associational link between democracy 
(broadly encompassing electoral competition) and education spending is based on two 
arguments, made under the assumption that governments subject to the political process of 
electoral competition, are confronted with different risks to maintaining their rule than are 
authoritarian governments. Where the primary risk to an autocratic leader is the removal from 
office by force, the democratic ruler(s) not only face the same threat of force, but also the very 
real prospect of being voted out of office too, hence, why they are more likely to appease 
majority demands by prioritising populist policies focusing on aspects like education. To this 
end, the first argument says that governments who are elected democratically, have greater 
reason to champion public provision of services for the broader population vis-à-vis 
authoritarian governments. The second argument says that democratically elected 
governments are likely to place greater emphasis on public services which are needed by 
majority (not minority) social groups. However, these arguments are not without flaw, 
because as noted by Acemoglu et al. (2003, p. 1), a state of political democracy, especially in 
the poorest countries located in Africa, may only result in institutions being weakly influential 
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over politicians’ actions and degree of accountability to the citizenry, thereby resulting in 
little change to service provision and economic policy. 
 
Assuming democracy imposes an ‘accountability’ effect on government insofar as the public 
provision of education is concerned, is the effect of democracy expected to be the same across 
countries with different levels of economic development? In the richest (OECD) countries, 
which have long-standing and stable democracies, partisan political forces might play a 
stronger role in shaping education spending patterns. This is the prediction of the Boix model 
(1997; 1998) – a political-economy model of partisan-political preferences for education 
policies – which expounds why the likes of social democratic parties might promote increased 
spending on education. “In its simplest version, partisan theory assumes that leftist parties 
represent the interests of low-income classes and thus favour more redistribution, for 
example, in the form of public spending, while rightist parties represent upper income classes 
who oppose public spending because they foot the tax bill” (Busemeyer, 2009a, p. 109). 
According to the Boix model, the expectation might be that a greater proportion of social 
democrats (left-leaning persons) in cabinet is associated with higher public education 
spending, whereas a greater proportion of conservatives (right-leaning persons) in cabinet is 
likely to be associated with lower spending (Busemeyer, 2009a, p. 110). Suffice to say, 
partisan theory might play a more important role when considering how political forces shape 
education spending in richer or the richest countries, but it becomes less practical to 
operationalise a partisan-political perspective when applied to a global sample of richer and 
poorer countries. This is one reason why opting for a more generically applicable ‘regime-
type’ approach (using a democracy dummy or an index score for democracy) makes empirical 
sense when dealing with a wide range of countries and/or different country groups (samples). 
 
2.3.3 Demographic Dimension 
 
The demographic dimension is one of several ‘control’ dimensions (demographic, 
globalisation and social) that have been included in most empirical studies of public education 
spending. Table 2 shows the youth population and/or elderly population (both as shares of 
the total population) as being the most commonly used variables to operationalise the 
demographic dimension. Distinguishing between societies with a relatively larger (and 
growing) cohort of school-going-age citizens versus elderly citizens, would be important 
because this would probably imply different policy choices to be made by government, which 
might inevitably favour one group over another when public choices must be made 
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concerning how best to allocate scarce public resources. This explains why, first and 
foremost, including a demographic control for the school-going-age population (for my 
purposes, 0 to 24 years-of-age, because total spending on education comprises pre-primary, 
primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education) would be important when examining 
education spending. All things being equal, a larger school-going-age population (as a share 
of the total population) imposes greater demand-side pressure on the education system, 
meaning higher education spending. 
 
To capture this aspect of demographic change, some studies have used various measures of 
student enrolment (e.g., Tilak, 1984; Castles, 1989, 1999; Baskaran & Hessami, 2012; 
Speciale, 2012). However, the more common approach has been to use country-level 
population estimates of this cohort (e.g., Schultz, 1988; Castles, 1989, Baqir, 2002; Brown & 
Hunter, 2004; Stasavage, 2005; Busemeyer, 2007, 2008; Huber et al., 2008; Akanbi & 
Schoeman, 2010; Jensen, 2011), and for good reason. Studies using a measure of school 
enrolment as an explanatory variable to cater for the ‘demographic’ effect, induces a problem 
of endogeneity (simultaneity) in the regression model because it is not altogether clear what 
comes first: education spending then enrolment OR enrolment then education spending (a 
classic ‘chicken or the egg’ scenario). Unravelling this cause-and-effect relationship is 
difficult, to say the least. In other words, school enrolment is most probably endogenous, but 
using a measure such as the size of the school-going-age population is likely to be a more 
truly exogenous representation of the ‘theoretical’ demand for publicly-provided education, 
and, therefore, would be a better choice of variable for inclusion in a model. 
 
The share of the elderly population (roughly 65 years-of-age and older) might be especially 
important in countries where transfer payments comprise a substantial portion of total 
government spending, implying an effect on education’s share of the fiscal pie. This control 
measure might be particularly important if considering the budget share measure of spending. 
However, it must be borne in mind the education sector and elderly population might not 
necessarily compete for public spending – they are not necessarily negatively related. For 
instance, in richer countries, a positive relationship between education spending and the size 
of the elderly-share population might actually be indicative of the fact that these countries are 
able to spend more on both parts of the population – they are, in a sense, complements, not 
substitutes – not to mention it may be politically expedient to do so because both 




2.3.4 Globalisation Dimension 
 
The foreign sector may exert an effect on public education spending. The most commonly 
used measure to capture the foreign-sector effect is trade openness or total trade (imports plus 
exports as a share of GDP) (see Table 2). Although measures such as the real exchange rate 
and capital account liberalisation index (see Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001) or index of 
globalisation comprising economic, social and political integration (KOF index) by Dreher 
(2006) (see Baskaran & Hessami, 2012) have been used as suitable variables, the more 
common approach is to use a measure of trade openness such as total trade, which has been 
used in much of the literature on education spending or as a generic measure for studies 
related to other aspects of public spending (see, for example, Castles, 1999; Kaufman & 
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Baqir, 2002; Brown & Hunter, 2004; Avelino et al., 2005; Castles, 
2007; Schmidt, 2007; Huber et al., 2008; Iversen & Stephens, 2008; Busemeyer, 2009a; 
Jensen, 2011; Baskaran & Hessami, 2012; Manzano, 2013; Herwartz & Theilen, 2017). 
 
Although globalisation might be considered an ‘economic’ dimension, it is often treated 
separately in the literature (see, for example, Avelino et al., 2005; Baskaran & Hessami, 
2012). Globalisation encompasses trade behaviour or trade patterns, so that countries with 
greater trade liberalisation (countries that embark on greater inbound and outbound foreign 
sector activity from a goods and services point of view), are likely to have a greater volume of 
(total) trade, whether this be predominantly imports (inbound) or exports (outbound) trade 
activity. Trade is an important control because it has implications for public sector behaviour 
on the basis of two theoretically competing approaches. 
 
The compensation and efficiency hypotheses have been explained in various ways (see, for 
example, Walter, 2010; Adserà & Boix, 2002; Garrett, 2001, 1998a, 1998b; Rodrik, 1998; 
Katzenstein, 1985; Ruggie 1982; Cameron, 1978). Essentially, the compensation hypothesis 
postulates that government needs to ‘compensate’ society for the losses incurred through the 
process of globalisation – supposedly from greater foreign competition eroding opportunities 
domestically – by increasing social and other welfare spending (a positive relationship). In 
contrast, the efficiency hypothesis postulates that a process of globalisation results in a more 
competitive, thriving domestic economy, meaning government is more easily able to curtail 
social and other welfare spending (a negative relationship). To determine which of these two 




2.3.5 Social Dimension 
 
From Table 2, the most commonly included ‘social’ dimension would seem to be population 
density or urbanisation ratio. A number of studies have controlled for a greater concentration 
of people living in urban areas (e.g., Verner, 1979; Schultz, 1988; Castles, 1999, Baqir, 2002; 
Avelino et al., 2005; Huber et al., 2008; Akanbi & Schoeman, 2010). The urban versus rural 
concentration is an indicator of the societal pattern of movement of the population, and is 
likely to have implications for the voracity of socio-political pressures placed on government 
and the education system, because such pressures are thought to be more easily mobilised in 
larger, more highly concentrated urban settings. In conjunction with a growing youth-aged 
population, greater demand-side pressures are placed on government to provide an 
appropriate level of education to the broader society, meaning urbanisation and (public) 
education spending are likely to be positively related. 
 
Stasavage (2005, p. 345) provides a reasoning to include the urbanisation ratio, which is seen 
as a measure of social group influence representing the geographic concentration of urban 
versus rural society. For one, the urban-rural population concentration is closely linked to the 
conceptions of democratic versus authoritarian regimes and, depending on where the greater 
concentration of the population lies (i.e., in poorer, African countries, the majority of the 
population is more likely to be located in rural areas; whereas, in richer countries, the opposite 
is the case), the costs of collective action and how easily these different social groups are 
mobilised, poses a credible threat to government staying in power (see Bates, 1981). 
 
Another ‘social’ variable for inclusion is military spending, although rarely used in the 
empirical literature. For instance, Baqir (2002) is the only paper listed in Table 2 that has 
operationalised a measure of national defence spending. As a functional area of government 
deemed to ‘compete’ with education spending, especially in more autocratic societies, 
military spending might be thought to be negatively related to (public) education spending. 
However, if progressively richer countries tend to also have larger military sectors, this might 
also be indicative of the fact that richer countries have the capacity to spend more on a 
number of priority functional areas of government (military, education and social security or 
pensions) at the same time, meaning the military sector, like that of social security (pensions), 
does not necessarily ‘compete’ with education. The idea that there might not be a trade-off 
(no ‘substitution’ effect) for public education and military expenditures in contemporary 






National-level total public spending on education can be thought of as comprising five major 
correlates (i.e., the economic, political, demographic, globalisation and social dimensions). 
This thesis centres on three empirical topics in comparative public (education) finance, so it 
would make sense to review a large body of (empirical) literature to choose the variables most 
commonly used to model education spending. Moreover, since I adopt a more strongly 
economic approach, an appropriate theoretical ‘theme’ linking the national economy to the 
public sector (and associated public financing of education) is necessary. 
 
Wagner’s law proposes that, as a country’s economy grows and develops, the size of the 
public sector grows too. It makes clear a linkage between the national economy, public sector 
expansion and associated public spending on education (i.e., Y → G → E), where two 
different measures of national-level total public spending on education (national effort and 
budget share) are the outcome measures of interest in all three empirical chapters to follow. 
The Wagnerian perspective provides the major economic ‘theme’ running through all three 
empirical chapters, with income per capita being the key explanatory variable of interest in 
Chapter 3 and size of government (public sector) being the key explanatory variable of 
interest in Chapters 4 and 5. The other economic (public debt, fiscal balance and human 
capital index), political (democracy), demographic (youth population and elderly 
population), globalisation (trade) and social (urbanisation and military spending) variables 
are assumed to be important controls when modelling education spending, which is typically 



























































Since the largest majority of education spending in most countries comes from the public 
sector, a theory linking the growth of the public sector to the growth of the national economy 
would be a promising framework to explain changes in public spending on education.15 The 
now well-known Wagnerian ‘law of increasing state activity’ advocates a clear role for 
including an economic dimension in the study of education spending patterns. By virtue of 
their close association, regional differences are an alternative way to distinguish economically 
richer versus poorer parts of the world. 
 
One of the earliest pieces of empirical work in the arena of public spending on education was 
that conducted by Zymelman (1976), which considered, amongst other things, the economic 
and regional factors explaining education spending patterns for various samples of countries. 
However, political forces matter for education spending, too. The study conducted by Verner 
(1979) is a good example of one of the earliest studies incorporating political factors for a 
large sample of countries. Along with these two studies and a host of others presented in the 
Literature Review section, which comprise a reasonable corpus of the literature (by no means 
exhaustive though) over a relatively long period of time, this study proceeds by using a 
different methodological approach to all of these and other related studies, by seeking to 
inquire how the patterns of mean education spending of two level-form ratio measures, the 
national effort measure and budget share measure vary by different country groupings based 
on economic or regional and political characteristics.16 
 
15 Note that I use the terms “education spending” and “public spending on education” interchangeably. 
16 When making reference to a level-form ratio measure, I am speaking about the raw ratios, not logged, lagged, 
differenced or any other functional form of the variable. Because I am interested in a particular ‘state of being’ 
and not the change in the state of being, it seemed sensible to use the level-form ratio measures, and not the log 
of the ratio measures. One could use logged measures on both sides of the regression equation, resulting in a 
constant elasticities model, in which case, the antilog of the common intercept (or, common intercept plus 
respective mean difference) can be taken to compute the respective ‘fixed effect’ or that level of spending not 
dependent on the covariates – the time-invariant portion. However, the key point is that, regardless of whether 
the levels or logged levels are used, the patterns of mean differences should remain unchanged. As is sometimes 




3.1.2 Problems and Focus 
  
There are two problems addressed in this chapter. The first problem can be seen as stemming 
from an enduring question I had as I worked through the plethora of literature attempting to 
explain national-level education spending patterns. What do we really know about how two 
important national-level measures of education spending vary by economic, regional and 
political categorisation of countries over a relatively long period of time? In other words, by 
imposing my own group structure(s) on the data – groups chosen based on theory and past 
empirical evidence – I am interested in knowing whether or not mean differences exist by 
‘group membership’. These right-hand-side categorical measures are considered to be time-
invariant over the time period in question (1989-2015), except for the political measure, that 
might be very slowly time-varying (if at all) for some countries, but certainly time-invariant 
for the OECD group of countries. Incorporating time-invariant categorical descriptions of 
countries into an analysis using (pooled) time-series cross-section data means I am most 
interested in heterogeneity. A criticism of this approach might be that simply using panel 
(country) fixed effects would capture all unobserved, time-invariant behaviour, including the 
aforementioned categorical dimensions. However, it is often difficult to theorise what exactly 
these country fixed effects comprise. Although county fixed effects capture all unobserved 
heterogeneity, it would seem to make more sense to rather conduct an analysis that captures 
theoretically useful observable components of heterogeneity. The researcher is now able to 
more clearly define education spending patterns by different (observable) types of countries. 
This might be a useful way to describe education spending patterns or provide a different way 
to think about policy outcomes. 
 
The second problem is a methodological one. It is one thing to propose a novel way of 
describing education spending patterns, but quite another to know how best to go about doing 
so. As said before, making use of country fixed effects might be one approach, but this does 
not allow for a useful description of what the diverse state of being (heterogeneity) actually 
comprises – country fixed effects capture all unobserved heterogeneity. However, testing 
user-defined categorisations of countries allows the researcher to make an arguably more 
meaningful judgement about theoretically interesting (observable) aspects of heterogeneity, 
which is a useful approach if describing empirical patterns of education spending based on 
 
share or percentage of GDP, whereas the budget share measure refers to (total) public spending on education as a 
share or percentage of total government spending. 
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observable characteristics is the objective. To this end, although there have been numerous 
studies that have tackled the subject of national-level education spending for a global sample 
of countries (see, for example, those listed in Table 2), none has, to the best of my knowledge, 
done so using the particular methodology I employ here (i.e., an ANOVA and ANCOVA 
approach using a regression framework), which amounts to a more efficient way of 
performing multiple t-tests at once instead of performing a series of two-sample t-tests – a 
method best described as a generalised-form t-test using the general linear model (GLM), 
with a host of other advantages (see the Research Methodology section). 
 
This chapter conducts an exploratory analysis by synthesising three important factors 
(economic, regional and political) for a large worldwide sample of countries over an extended 
and more recent period of time. By jointly operationalising these factors (with appropriate 
measures thereof), I can assess whether the mean spending patterns for different groups of 
countries are similar or different to one another, and whether the patterns of spending are 
noticeably different for the two measures of spending employed. Moreover, this chapter is 
about what is (the state of being), and not necessarily what ought to be (for example, the 
realm of policy thinking or policy formulation) or how the state of being might have come 
into existence (for example, the realm of causal designs). Since I am interested in testing for 
mean (or median) differences in a particular state of being, using level-form variables seems 
most intuitively appropriate for the inquiry in this chapter. 
 
3.1.3 Research Question and Objective 
 
The key research question of interest in this chapter asks whether or not there are significant 
(mean) differences in education spending between richer or poorer and politically distinct 
groups of countries, and, if so, are the empirical patterns of differences generally robust to use 
of alternative estimators and/or reasonable changes in specification? The objective of this 
chapter is to examine whether significant differences in education spending patterns exist for 
distinct groups of countries by economic (or regional) and political categorisation, which, in a 
sense, affords a political-economy explanation of national-level education finance. In going 
about answering the research question, I also consider how robust any patterns of mean 
differences are to the addition of important education spending control variables and using 
different types of estimator of the standard errors and coefficients. A detailed outline of the 




3.1.4 Methodological Assumptions 
 
This chapter proceeds under the assumption of cross-section independence, heterogeneous 
intercepts and homogeneous slopes. However, as part of the various robustness checks, one 
can make two modifying assumptions about the presence of cross-section dependence. Either, 
under the additional assumption that any unobserved common effects are not correlated with 
the regressors, a suitable estimator (the Driscoll-Kraay estimator) can be used to estimate 
consistent standard errors. Or, assuming unobserved common effects are endogenous and 
homogeneously distributed across panels (countries) – an implicit assumption often made by 
many papers ostensibly proposing to control for ‘common shocks’ – time (year) fixed effects 
can be incorporated into the specification. Additionally, tests for regression-related problems 
such as heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-section dependence are not conducted, 
but rather different assumptions about the data-generating process are made that pre-suppose 
the presence thereof, and remedied accordingly. In making the necessary modifying 
assumptions, using different estimators, changing the specification and considering different 
samples, one is able to make a judgement about the robustness of any estimated patterns of 
mean differences in education spending when user-defined group structures are imposed on 
the data. 
 
In the context of this chapter, the two assumptions concerning heterogeneous intercepts and 
homogeneous slopes are important ones. Heterogeneous intercepts mean I am most interested 
in the patterns of spending behaviour exhibited by the time-invariant, user-defined group (as 
distinct from panel or country) fixed effects, ceteris paribus. Homogeneous slopes mean I am 
also interested in knowing what patterns amongst the group fixed effects are still evidenced 
once other important education spending covariates – these are assumed to have a 
homogeneous effect across the groups of interest – have been controlled for. Using various 
continuous control measures forms part of checking how robust the patterns exhibited by the 




There are three noteworthy limitations of this inquiry. First, I do not consider an exhaustive 
list of explanatory variables, but rather choose to focus on those generic economic, political, 
demographic, social and globalisation factors that can be more easily applied to as many 
countries as possible, whilst still including all the important ‘ingredients’ for explaining 
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education spending behaviour. I do, however, test a number of additional control variables as 
part of the robustness checks undertaken. Second, no attempt is made in this chapter to 
establish causal linkages – this would be the subject of a different type of inquiry altogether. 
Third, the basic methodological approach being applied is a relatively simple one, and for 
good reason. An implicit personal (philosophical) objective I have is to see how well the 
application of a sensibly simple (as opposed to more sophisticated) method performs, with 
respect to uncovering some interesting empirical patterns. 
 
3.1.6 Original Contribution 
 
This chapter makes some useful contributions to the literature on education spending. Firstly, 
it provides a useful way to think about fixed effects estimation or consider fixed effects that 
have a more meaningful (empirical) interpretation insofar as patterns of behaviour are 
concerned. Secondly, the inquiry makes some headway towards expounding how robust the 
patterns of mean differences in education spending are to the use of different estimators and 
changes in specification. Thirdly, using a factor-variable interaction approach allows one to 
evaluate to what extent political forces also impinge on what is considered to be an 
‘economic’ process, closely tied to the Wagnerian perspective, which postulates a relationship 
between the process of economic development and bigger governments. Lastly, using a 
‘richer’ (developed) versus ‘poorer’ (lesser-developed or developing) country perspective 
means a bi-modal explanation of education spending patterns can be postulated, giving rise to 
three testable inequality propositions, which can be thought of as a novel way to justify the 
Wagnerian hypothesis and augment our understanding of the developmental process with 
respect to education spending. These propositions could also be applied to other areas of the 
government’s budget allocation.  
 
At this juncture, it might be worthwhile to mention that a specific component of the 
Wagnerian hypothesis (the ‘size’ of government) is not explicitly considered throughout the 
analysis in this chapter, and not without good reason. The size of government (as proxied by 
total government spending as a share of GDP) is omitted from the right-hand side because 
there is something interesting about the behaviour of the two education spending measures 
(national effort and budget share measures) that ‘unifies’ or is implied by the observed 
empirical patterns of education spending. Suffice to say, the size of government is the subject 




3.1.7 Structure of the Chapter 
 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 conducts a review of some 
important theoretical and empirical literature with the view to formulating some suitable 
hypotheses. Section 3.3 outlines the research methodology, encompassing the basic method to 
be applied, empirical model specifications to be used and various robustness checks. Section 
3.4 presents the data collected and description of the data, including various tests of 
association. Section 3.5 comprises the substantive analysis (presentation of results and 
findings) and a more general discussion of the findings. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
 




Adopting a perspective which combines economic and political factors (a political-economy 
approach) would seem like a worthwhile exercise in making sense of differences 
(heterogeneity) in the levels of national-level education spending. Although there are 
numerous studies in the literature that have used economic and political variables (see Table 
3), they have generally done so using one or the other (economic or political) as the focus or 
key variable of interest. For example, supposing a more strongly political explanation was 
being advanced, this would obviously mean the focus would be on some or other political 
dimension of interest, with other factors (economic choice variables included here), merely 
being subsumed as part of the set of control variables included. But, incorporating both the 
economic and political dimensions in an interactive way allows one to construct a political-
economy model of education spending. This section of the chapter advances a political-
economy perspective, reviews some of the important related empirical literature and then 
outlines necessary hypotheses. 
 
3.2.2 A Political-Economy Perspective 
 
The interplay between economic and political forces, and their effect on education spending 
patterns (the political economy of education spending), can be thought of as the Wagnerian 
view contingent on political processes. Growth and development rely on particular 
institutional mechanisms or processes, providing a conduit through which economic 
prosperity can be stimulated (see, for example, North, 1991). In other words, the inter-
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relationship between economics and politics plays a crucial role in the process of growth and 
development (North et al., 2006, p. 2). Suffice to say, economic and political processes are 
more likely to occur simultaneously or together in the broader process of growth and 
development.   
 
As polar extreme explanations, institutional mechanisms might be seen as political constructs 
to promote better governance and market access in democratic, arguably less corrupt, 
societies, but chiefly as a way to maintain political power and limit market access in 
autocratic, arguably more corrupt, societies, in which political rent-seeking behaviour is the 
norm rather than the exception. Depending on the ideological motive behind the government’s 
financing of education in non-democratic (autocratic) versus democratic countries, plausibly 
contrasting implications might apply to these two different types of polity. Democratic 
governments would reasonably be subjected to greater majoritarian political pressures to 
increase spending on education, thereby expanding market access opportunities to the general 
population over the longer term. However, non-democratic (autocratic) governments would 
have greater, unfettered power to substitute away from spending on education and reallocate 
public spending towards the state ‘machinery’ (military spending) used to maintain political 
power and control over the citizenry, thereby limiting market access opportunities over the 
longer term.17 
 
This is a somewhat jaundiced view, and clearly not always the case, but it does, nonetheless, 
represent a realistic example of how public funding might be prioritised in one polity versus 
the other. What I try to highlight here is that economic and political forces are not mutually 
exclusive – they are fundamentally connected. Thus, speaking about political democracy in 
isolation from the state of economic development is useful insofar as understanding political 
forces are concerned, but presents only part of the story. This is why using factor-variable  
 
17 It would be interesting to point out that a whole other branch of Political Science research concentrates on the 
role played by Leviathan governments in state activity, attributable to the pioneering work of Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980), and associated earlier work of Wicksell (1896). The Leviathan approach might be viewed as 
an alternative way of thinking about how autocratic governments behave with respect to taxation and spending, 
when there is very little constraint on these types of government – what Buchanan (1977, p. 13) might refer to as 
“politics for profit”. However, fiscal decentralisation is seen as a mechanism to restrict the Leviathan 
government’s ‘monopoly’ power on state activity, hence, the empirical observation that, “total government 
intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and 
expenditures are decentralized” (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980, p. 15). Thus, hypothetically speaking, autocratic, 
Leviathan-type governments, who adopt a more fiscally decentralised approach to taxation and spending, might 
not have as much of an adverse effect on education spending, than, say, an autocratic, Leviathan-type 
government adopting a strongly centralised approach to taxation and spending. Although not directly related to 
the study at hand, a good example of an empirical study of fiscal decentralisation and education spending (but 
for OECD countries) is that of Busemeyer (2008). 
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interactions (economic or regional and political) becomes very useful for my purposes in this 
chapter, but with a caveat: since this chapter (and broader thesis) focuses on an economic 
interpretation of education spending patterns, more or less in line with the Wagnerian 
hypothesis, any propositions arrived at by way of the empirical analyses must be tempered by 
saying that political processes play an important ‘mediating’ role in shaping these patterns, 
something not necessarily explicitly evidenced in Wagner’s own writings. This caveat is well 
put by Peacock & Scott (2000, pp. 3-4), who speak of the causative relationship between 
national income and public sector growth being coordinated by choices signalled in the 
political system, but reference to this political machinery is not found in Wagner’s own work. 
Therefore, knowing more about how economic and political forces combine (interact) to 
shape education spending patterns across countries, is the focus of this chapter. In other 
words, knowing more about the observable (economic and political) components of 
heterogeneity in education spending is, at the very least, a worthwhile endeavour insofar as 
extending our understanding of the empirics of national-level education spending is 
concerned. 
 
3.2.3 Review of the Empirical Literature 
 
Since most studies in the existing literature have adopted a more strongly political or 
economic approach to inquiring about education spending, it would seem reasonable to 
present the empirical literature with respect to generating expectations about the sign of the 
applicable relationship between the national effort or budget share measure of education 
spending and the economic or political variable of interest. Table 3 presents a list of 16 
studies relating economic and political factors to education spending. The list is not 
exhaustive, but comprises a corpus of the contemporary literature for the purposes of 
formulating hypotheses with respect to the economic (or regional) and political dimensions of 
interest. These studies have operationalised measures of economic activity (most often, 
national income per capita) and regime type (very often, political democracy). The approach I 
adopt in this chapter is similar to many of these studies (e.g., Baqir, 2002; Stasavage, 2005; 
Busemeyer, 2007) in that I incorporate both a political and economic variable on the right-
hand side. However, the difference is that I use categorical (instead of continuous) measures 
thereof as explanatory variables, allowing me to identify different groups of countries, which 
become the implicit sub-samples of interest. Where most of these studies have incorporated 
conventional country fixed effects, I make use of user-defined group fixed effects to 




Table 3 refers to the general sign of the applicable relationship estimated for a number of 
studies in the literature, irrespective of whether correlation or regression methods were used, 
whether or not the applicable economic or political variable was the key variable of interest or 
merely used as a control variable, and where the relationship was generally found to be 
significant (at the 5% level or less). I am most interested in the estimated sign of the 
relationship, owing to the variety of different functional forms of variables used in these 
studies. Note that I have not included the studies by Afonso and Jalles (2013), and Arze del 
Granado et al. (2013), because these studies make use of ‘real’ magnitudes, instead of the 






Table 3: Summary Findings of 16 Empirical Studies of Public Spending on Education 
 
Author/s (Year) Method(s) Sample Size Number of Countries Time Period 
National Effort Budget Share 
Economic Political Economic Political 
Zymelman (1976) Cross-sectional regression 8 to 69 69 developing countries Circa 1973 + n/a n/a n/a 
Verner (1979) Cross-sectional correlation 102 102 countries 1964-1965 + + ns + 
Castles (1989) Cross-sectional regression 18 18 OECD countries 1960; 1981 ns n/a n/a n/a 
Tilak (1989) Cross-sectional regression 16-20 20 Latin American countries 1965; 1970; 1980; 1985 + n/a n/a n/a 
Ram (1995) Cross-sectional regression 18 18 OECD countries 1985 + n/a n/a n/a 
Baqir (2002) Cross-sectional regression & panel-data methods Various 59 to 106 countries 1985-1998 + + + + 
Avelino et al. (2005) Panel-data methods 312; 314 19 Latin American countries 1980-1999 ns + n/a n/a 
Stasavage (2005) Pooled regression & panel-data methods 365; 247; 191 44 African countries 1980-1996 + + + + 
Busemeyer (2007) Panel-data methods 421 21 OECD countries 1980-2001 + or – n/a n/a n/a 
Huber et al. (2008) Panel-data methods 446 18 Latin American countries 1970-2000 + + n/a n/a 
Iversen & Stephens (2008) Panel-data methods 336; 138 18 OECD countries 1960-2003 – ns n/a n/a 
Akanbi & Schoeman (2010) Panel-data methods 135 15 African countries 1995-2004 + + n/a n/a 
Fosu (2010) Panel-data methods 79 35 Sub-Saharan countries 1975-1994 n/a n/a ns or + ns 
Potrafke (2011b) Panel-data methods 552; 247 23; 20 OECD countries 1970-1997; 1990-2006 – n/a n/a n/a 
Cockx & Francken (2016) Panel-data methods 320 to 349 129 to 140 countries 1995-2009 + n/a n/a n/a 
Garritzmann & Seng (2016) Panel-data methods 245 21 OECD countries  1995-2010 ns or – + n/a n/a 
 
Notes: The method(s) used in each respective empirical study refer to the primary method(s) employed. The national effort measure refers to total public spending on education as a 
share of GDP (or similar) and the budget share measure refers to total public spending on education as a share of total government spending. Generally speaking, the economic factor 
refers to national income per capita and the political factor refers to political democracy. Where not applicable (n/a) appears, this means the explanatory variable of interest 
(economic or political) was not used/considered. Where not significant (ns) appears, this means no significant relationship was generally estimated at the 5% level or less. The study 
by Huber et al. (2008) uses public spending on health and education as a share of GDP as the dependent variable. The studies by Akanbi and Schoeman (2010), and Fosu (2010) use 





What should become immediately noticeable from Table 3 is the dearth of empirical evidence 
with respect to the budget share measure, making it an interesting exercise (in itself) to test for 
mean differences for a large global sample of countries over an extended period of time using 
both the national effort and budget share measures. The general ‘theme’ from the 16 studies 
listed is that the national effort measure is positively related to national income per capita and 
the state of political democracy, but given the lack of empirical evidence with respect to the 
budget share measure, it becomes difficult to proffer a meaningful expectation based on 
empirical evidence concerning the sign of the relationship in this regard. 
 
However, one can use theoretical reasoning to build an expectation about the budget share 
measure. Regardless of developmental status, education is likely to comprise one of the larger 
components of fiscal spending in most countries. If richer, more developed (poorer, lesser-
developed or developing) countries, do indeed, have larger (smaller) public sectors as the 
Wagnerian hypothesis suggests, it would stand to reason that education’s share of total 
government spending would tend to be smaller (larger) because richer (poorer) countries 
would also tend to have a greater (lesser) variety of fiscal components to fund from the public 
purse – what I refer to as a fiscal varieties perspective – implying education comprises a 
smaller (larger) share of total government spending. Therefore, the budget share measure and 
national income per capita are expected to be negatively related. 
 
Insofar as political democracy is concerned, all things being equal, one might still expect the 
budget share measure to be positively related to the state of political democracy of a country 
because democracy still implies the same majoritarian socio-political pressures. In other 
words, in isolation from the state of economic development, the budget share measure is 
expected to be positively related to the state of political democracy. But, the complication 
arises when richer countries comprise a greater number of the politically democratic sample 
of countries. This might tend to supress the positive association (even possibly result in a 
negative association) between the budget share measure and political democracy for the 
reason concerning bigger governments in richer countries as mentioned above. Put another 
way, two opposing forces are likely to be at play with respect to the budget share measure 
(unlike the case for the national effort measure) when considering richer countries that are 










GNI per capita Political Democracy 
National Effort + + 
Budget Share – + 
 
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Explanation of the Method 
 
In its most basic form, the method applied can be said to comprise a generalised-form t-test, 
in which only dummy (qualitative) variables are used. In much the same way as the 
conventional Student’s (Gosset’s) t-test is used to test for differences in the means of two 
sample groups, using a least-squares dummy-variable (LSDV) regression framework (a type 
of GLM) is an alternative way to test for differences in means across more than two sample 
groups at once (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p. 278), otherwise referred to as analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). However, the GLM also has the added advantage of being able to condition out 
these differences in means by allowing for the inclusion of additional (quantitative) 
covariates, otherwise referred to as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), which is very useful 
from a modelling point of view. In general terms then, the method of analysis is more 
descriptive of empirical patterns rather than anything else.18 
 
18 The LSDV regression model can be easily set up in Stata using factor or indicator variables, without having to 
explicitly generate separate dummy variables. This approach allows the researcher to select the base or reference 
group of interest, against which all other (categorical) groups can be compared, and is tantamount to performing 
multiple two-sample t-tests in a more efficient way, by testing to see if there are (statistically) significant 
differences among multiple group means in one regression model. A regression framework with dummies has a 
number of very useful properties that conventional two-sample t-testing does not have. First, one can compare 
more than two samples (or groups) at a time. Although multivariate tests (e.g., Hotelling’s T-squared) could be 
used, the regression framework has the added advantage of comparing all other groups against a base or 
reference group. Second, separate standard errors and t-statistics (for individual tests of significance); F-statistic 
(joint test of significance of all the explanatory variables included in the model) and R-squared (joint explained 
variation of the model) are all routinely reported. Third, the regression framework also allows for the inclusion 
of ‘control’ variables, which can use homogeneous slopes (a common slope parameter applied to all groups) or 
heterogeneous slopes, depending on the objective of the research topic or assumptions the researcher is willing to 
make about the data-generating process. Fourth, it allows for the use of different estimators of the standard errors 
or coefficients (parameters), effectively impacting on whether or not (statistically) significant differences are, 
indeed, observed. Fifth, outliers in the dataset that may be ‘driving’ particular results, can be expressly catered 
for using a robust estimator by assigning a lower weighting to more extreme observations in the estimation 




By imposing a particular, user-defined group structure on the data, one is in effect ‘splitting’ 
(partitioning) the education spending data into particular groups that arguably afford more 
empirically meaningful judgements about patterns of spending behaviour. In other words, in a 
panel-data context, using dummy variables on the right-hand side over the time period in 
question, creates time-invariant groups, by definition. In much the same way as a country 
fixed effect would be referred to as that part of heterogeneity that is country-specific and time-
invariant the group fixed effect might be referred to as that part of heterogeneity that is group-
specific and time-invariant.19 Suffice to say, the associated categorical groupings on the right-
hand side now implicitly become the samples or sub-groups of interest. 
 
In summary, for the purposes of this chapter, since I am most interested in interacting two 
types of categorical measure (economic and political or regional and political) the method can 
best be descried as a factor-variable interaction generalised-form t-test (GLM factorial or 
two-way ANOVA). Alternatively, a factor-variable interaction conditional generalised-form 
t-test (GLM factorial or two-way ANCOVA) method could be used, where the word 
“conditional” refers to the mean differences of interest now being conditional on the inclusion 
of the mean moments of the respective covariates in each case. A useful practical guide to 
interaction effects and group comparisons in Stata is that of Williams (2015). 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Model Specification 
 
The empirical model specifications make use of pooled panel data to estimate the applicable 
mean differences. For this reason, the error term is always shown as having both space and 
time identifiers (eit). Below, I show the various specifications without controls (ANOVA 
model specification) representative of Models (1) and various specifications with controls 
(ANCOVA model specification) representative of Models (2) in the tables of results in the 
text. However, for the models appearing as part of the robustness test results in the 
 
investigating about a particular observable portion of group-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity, which would 
otherwise have been embedded in the conventional country fixed effects. These groups are usually chosen on 
some or other theoretical grounds – clearly the case in this chapter – and represent sources of variation in the 
dependent variable that are of key interest to the researcher. Lastly, it is a more flexible and informative way of 
generalising the process of multiple sample testing. 
19 Another way to think of this is to say one is interested in ‘stripping out’ the time-varying nature of education 
spending by virtue of modelling spending (a continuous measure) as a function of the time-invariant groups of 
interest (the categorical measures comprising either economic and political or regional and political groupings of 
countries) that, for the most part, are assumed by design to remain the same over the time period in question. 
This means one is most interested in ‘pooling’ the education spending panel data to compute the mean (or mean 
differences) in spending across countries with particular group characteristics. 
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appendices, these models are named sequentially (i.e., Model 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, …, 6A 
and 6B), to denote progressively more complex specifications, and do not refer to the naming 
convention used for the models in the text. 
 





∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑚Economic𝑗𝑖𝑡 × Political𝑚𝑖𝑡
2
𝑚=1





∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑚Region3𝑘𝑖𝑡 × Political𝑚𝑖𝑡
2
𝑚=1
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                     (Model 1b) 
 


























Yit is either the national effort or budget share measure of total education spending; 
α* refers to the coefficient of the respective dummy-variable interaction;  
βn refers to the coefficient of the respective control variable;  
“Economic” refers to a family of five dummies, with each dummy being a binary (0 or 1) 
categorisation for each of the income per capita country groups; 
“Region3” refers to a dummy, with a binary (0 or 1) categorisation for each of the two 
regional country groups (richer or poorer) – see Section 3.4 for more detail; 
 “Political” refers to a dummy, with a binary (0 or 1) categorisation for each of the two states 
of political democracy (democratic or not democratic);  
Xnit is a vector of continuous control variables comprising a minimum of three or maximum of 
eight controls; 
eit is the pooled error term. 
 
I exclude showing the ‘common’ intercept in all specifications because this can be a user-
defined group of countries that becomes the base or reference group against which 
comparisons (mean differences) can be made. Therefore, the common intercept is subsumed 
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as part of the empirical specifications outlined above. In all specifications, m-1 dummies are 
included to avoid the dummy-variable-trap problem of perfect multicollinearity. Two-way 
models refer to the interaction between different dummies. Although interaction means the 
respective dummies combine in a multiplicative way, their combination still appears in the 
(linear) model in an additive way. These specifications are tantamount to disaggregating the 
intercept (autonomous) component of spending into separate parts, either without or with 
various covariates (controls) appearing as additional regressors, where these controls are 
assumed to have homogeneous slopes. An alternative approach would be to allow the slopes 
of the controls to vary across groups, but this would introduce other methodological problems 
(Greene, 2008, p. 194; see also Cornwell and Schmidt, 1984).20 For instance, in addition to 
heterogeneous intercepts, group dummies would need to be defined for all of the controls, 
resulting in a proliferation of explanatory variables and increased likelihood of 
multicollinearity. 
 
There are three main controls I am most interested in using in the various empirical model 
specifications (pop024, urban and trade). Using control variables can be thought of as a way 
to change the specification in order to estimate conditional mean differences. There are 
generally five dimensions (economic, political, demographic, social and globalisation) that 
explain education spending patterns. Since the models already explicitly consider particular 
economic and political groupings of countries, it stands to reason incorporating suitable 
controls for the other three dimensions would be necessary. The size of the school-going-age 
or youth-age population (pop024), urbanisation ratio (urban) and trade as a share of GDP 
(trade), comprise the three main control variables used to operationalise the demographic, 
 
20 There are generally two approaches that could be used. The first is to assume heterogeneous intercepts and 
homogeneous slopes, in which case, because the mean slope parameters of the continuous control measures are 
held constant across all countries, testing for mean differences simply becomes a test of differences in the ‘fixed 
effects’ (the group-specific differential intercepts). The second assumes heterogeneous parameters. Because 
intercepts and slopes are now assumed to vary between groups, testing for mean differences becomes more 
complicated. For example, one might now be more interested in testing for differences in the linear prediction of 
the means for each group (i.e., using the lincom command in Stata). But, there is another problem that arises in 
this case. Where an incremental or restricted F-test shows that the added information means the null is rejected 
(the unrestricted model is deemed the better one), this would not be surprising because the residual sum of 
squares is likely to be lower anyway as the unrestricted model is possibly more informative. However, because 
different parts of the data are more likely to exhibit greater variation in Y and the Xs (especially for the poorer 
country cohorts), this implies a greater leverage effect of X on Y in these parts of the data, resulting in a lower 
precision with which Y can be estimated for these sub-groups, meaning issues related to a lack of precision, not 
to mention data availability, would foreseeably hamper heterogeneous parameter estimation in the context of 
having many Xs on the right-hand side. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, I focus on the first approach. 
Also, it would be worthwhile to mention that heterogeneous parameters envisaged here refers to group-specific 




social and globalisation dimensions, respectively. These (along with other control variables) 
have already been discussed as part of Chapter 2. 
 
3.3.3 Robustness Checks 
 
This chapter uses various ways to test for robustness of the patterns of mean differences. The 
most basic way of doing so was to check for differences in the unconditional (no controls) and 
conditional (with three main controls) patterns of mean differences. This was extended to use 
different estimators of the standard errors, which potentially alter the significance of any 
differences, and different estimators of the parameters, which potentially alter the sign, size 
and significance of any differences. These aforementioned methods were all used in 
compiling the results presented in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 in the text. However, a couple of 
other robustness checks were also performed, the results of which are presented in 
Appendices I, J, K and L. These checks comprised changing the specification in one of two 
ways, by either using additional control variables or using the additional control variables and 
time (year) fixed effects. This was done to see if any meaningful changes to the patterns of 
differences would be evidenced. I start with a discussion of the different estimators, and then 




Eight different estimators were employed, that each take account of different problems or 
aspects related to the data-generating process. For example, although I do not test for 
regression-related problems such as heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-section 
dependence, these problems can be assumed to exist and remedied accordingly to see how the 
empirical patterns change under different assumptions about the data-generating process. 
Despite being quite a common approach, it does presume these ‘problems’ are natural features 
of the ‘true’ error terms. Using pooled panel data in a regression framework is important for 
the analysis in this chapter, but there are several possible problems related to the errors that 
might typically occur in various dimensions of the macro-panel data, and would, therefore, 
need to be remedied. For instance, non-constant variance of the residuals (heteroskedasticity), 
especially with respect to the space or cross-section (country) dimension of the data arising 
usually in cross-country-type analyses, serial correlation of the residuals (correlation between 
observations of a country ordered over time) with respect to the time-series (year) dimension 
and contemporaneous (cross-sectional) correlation of the residuals (correlation between 
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observations across countries at a point in time, sometimes referred to as cross-sectional 
dependence). Where such problems are assumed to not be specification related, the coefficient 
estimates are not necessarily inconsistent, but are likely to have incorrectly (under-inflated) 
estimated standard errors in most circumstances.21 Despite not formally testing for these 
possible problems, making allowance for their presence by correcting the estimated standard 
errors accordingly, means the significance of the parameter estimates can be gauged under a 
variety of different assumptions about the data-generating process. A brief explanation of 
each estimator is now given. 
 
Six estimators were used in this instance. The LSDV estimator with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors and no controls produces the baseline estimates of the mean differences, and 
provides a point of comparison for other estimators of the standard errors (and coefficients). 
Huber/White standard errors correct for non-constant variance of the residuals 
(heteroskedasticity) typically arising in the space or cross-section (country) dimension of the 
data. Clustered standard errors (clustering by country or year or both) comprise three different 
ways to estimate the standard errors. However, clustering requires the number of clusters to 
be sufficiently large (see Cameron & Miller, 2015), and may actually impose other problems, 
especially when the data are more strongly unbalanced (a different number of time gaps or 
missing data by country in the time dimension of the panel data).  
 
The Newey-West and Driscoll-Kraay estimators provide alternative ways to correct the 
estimated standard errors. The Newey-West procedure produces heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. Since serial correlation of the residuals 
entails a problem related to the time-series dimension of the data, under the assumption that 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are not a result of misspecification, using an alternative 
estimator that corrects the standard errors in the presence of both of these problems seems 
 
21 It would be worthwhile to note that one of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model (CLRM) is 
the random sampling assumption. According to Gujarati and Porter (2009, p. 62), this assumption refers to X 
values independent of the error term. This means X is either fixed in repeated samples or X is stochastic 
(random). By design, the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimator assumes the X variable(s) is (are) independent 
of the error term [i.e., cov (Xi, ui) = 0]. Under this assumption, barring some or other non-linearity in the 
variables specification being a better representation of the data-generating process, it is more likely the case the 
single-equation linear specification in question comprises an endogenous regressand as a function of exogenous 
regressors. Assuming no misspecification, the presence of heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation means the 
standard errors need to be corrected or adjusted accordingly. However, where the assumption of error 
independence is violated, one or more regressors is/are more likely to be endogenous [e.g., an omitted variable 
captured as part of the error term is correlated with the regressor(s)], which poses a biasing effect on the 
coefficient estimate(s). This is why the use of, for example, additional controls and instrumental variables 
(Granger-causality testing and quasi-experimental designs being others) have become popular in applied work in 
the Economic Sciences, when making ‘causal’ inferences is a more explicit objective of the empirical inquiry. 
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appropriate. In addition, in a globally integrated world, where countries have stronger 
economic and regional ties, the likelihood of cross-sectional correlation being present in the 
data-generating process is heightened. As mentioned before, where any unobserved common 
effects (‘common’ or ‘global’ shocks) are exhibited across countries, and these effects are 
assumed to not be correlated with the regressors, the parameters are still consistent, but no 
longer efficient, meaning the solution becomes one of correcting the (biased) estimated 
standard errors (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006, pp. 482-483). The Driscoll-Kraay procedure 
adjusts the standard errors accordingly by estimating spatial correlation-consistent standard 
errors. 
 
The six estimators outlined so far comprise post-estimation approaches to adjusting the 
associated standard errors of the covariance matrix. They make the implicit assumption the 
coefficient estimates are still consistent, hence, the reason why the parameters for all of these 
models in Tables 8 to 11 do not change, except when the model specification is changed. Not 
making an adjustment to the estimated standard errors means one might be overly optimistic 
concerning the significance of the estimated mean differences – a greater likelihood of 
rejecting a true null or committing a type I error (i.e., finding in favour of an effect or mean 
difference when in fact there is not one). The methods used to correct the standard errors 
generally produce estimates thereof that are more conservative (larger). Simply put, all of the 
aforementioned estimators relate to a class of covariance-matrix estimators used to correct the 
standard errors accordingly.22 
 
Quantile regression and robust regression comprise two different ways to estimate the 
parameters. As said before, the LSDV results represent a baseline, of sorts, against which the 
coefficient estimates of the quantile (or median) and robust estimators can be compared. In its 
simplest form, quantile regression provides an alternative estimator of central tendency (the 
median), particularly useful when the underlying samples of data might not necessarily be 
normally distributed, and one wants to compare the mean and median differences on a purely 
 
22 Huber/White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are routinely performed in Stata using “vce(robust)” as 
an option after the regress command. One-way clustering of standard errors is routinely performed in Stata using 
“cluster(cid)” or “cluster(year)” as an option after the regress command. Two-way clustering is performed in 
Stata with the user-written programme “vce2way” by Yoo (2017). For a more practical discussion of cluster-
robust inference, one can refer to Baum et al. (2010) or Cameron and Miller (2015). The Newey-West procedure 
(see Newey & West, 1987; 1994) is automated in Stata using the “newey” command. The Driscoll-Kraay 
procedure (see Driscoll & Kraay, 1998) is performed in Stata with the user-written programme (xtscc) by 
Hoechle (2007). There was an update to Hoechle’s programme on 3 April 2018, which meant the estimation of 
more ‘optimistic’ asymptotic standard errors was replaced with the estimation of more ‘conservative’ standard 




qualitative basis. One might suggest estimating different quantiles, but this would seem 
almost counter-productive in an application that seeks to test for differences in the centrally-
located values as opposed to any other quantiles. Instead of trying to minimise the sum of the 
squared residuals like OLS, quantile regression tries to minimise the sum of the absolute 
residuals (least absolute residual regression). Robust estimation is another useful method to 
deal with ‘outliers’ (extreme observations), often noticeable when working with national-level 
education spending data reported for many different countries. The robust estimator uses a 
weighted least-squares (WLS) approach to estimation, with progressively more extreme 
observations being assigned a lower ‘weighting’ in the estimation sample based on the 
observation’s associated deviation from the sample mean value. Both the quantile and robust 
estimators effectively comprise different ways to deal with outliers with respect to the 
dependent or response variable, and provide different estimates of the coefficients (and 
associated standard errors). 
 
Changes in Specification 
 
There are two aspects to the changes in specification that comprise various robustness checks. 
The first makes use of additional control variables in the various models. The second 
comprises the use of year fixed effects. With respect to the additional controls, the expected 
sign of the relationship is not of particular interest, hence, the reason why I do not necessarily 
proffer an expectation with respect to the sign of the respective relationship. Rather, for my 
purposes, their inclusion is justified here on both theoretical grounds and because of their use 
in various parts of the empirical literature. Suffice to say, I’m more interested in simply 
knowing if their inclusion confounds the estimated mean differences. 
 
Five additional control variables were tested. Most of the discussion about these five controls 
has already been given in Chapter 2, so what follows recaps some important points. First, a 
measure of overall educational ‘quality’ might be a useful control measure. The human capital 
index (hci) for each-and-every country by year serves as one way to measure whether 
educational outcomes are being achieved at a macroeconomic level. Another argument can be 
advanced for including the aforementioned measure. If the ultimate goal of education 
spending (at a macroeconomic level anyway) is to improve a nation’s human capital, and 
improvements in human capital are an important source of economic growth and 
development, then including a suitable measure of human capital development would be 
useful, because this not only foreseeably impinges on policy decisions about how much to 
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spend on education, but might actually be correlated with the economic and political 
categorisations of interest. Said differently, including a suitable measure of human capital 
development controls for a possible endogeneity problem (omitted variable bias). But, it 
might introduce another more important simultaneity problem, in that, higher education 
spending generates higher human capital, although this might only be true over a longer 
period of time, as spending takes time to feed through the education system to impact human 
capital outcomes. To hopefully mitigate this problem, current-period human capital is used to 
‘explain’ current-period education spending. 
 
Theorising a cause-and-effect relationship between education spending and nationwide human 
capital development, might be more tenuous to show, and is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
For one, such a relationship would be further complicated by deciding on the appropriate time 
lag needed to specify such a relationship, irrespective of theorising the direction of the causal 
linkage. Nonetheless, it would be useful to include a measure of overall human capital 
development, because richer (more developed) countries do tend to have a higher level of 
human capital relative to poorer (lesser-developed) countries, which might partly explain 
comparative education spending differences, because a more educated population or labour 
force is likely to have a higher propensity to educate its children. 
 
Second, the share of the elderly population (65 years-of-age and older) out of the total 
population (pop65) might serve as a useful alternative demographic control variable. In some 
sense, it captures how changes in the size of the elderly population, and associated welfare 
and pension spending, supposedly competes with the youth-age population, and associated 
spending on education. The expectation is that education spending and size of the elderly 
population are negatively related, but this need not necessarily be the case. Third, the share of 
military spending out of GDP (military) could be useful to include. Military spending might 
be thought to compete with education spending, especially insofar as the budget share of each 
is concerned. Fourth, the fiscal balance (fiscbal2) might also have a stronger effect on the 
budget share measure of education spending. For instance, the fiscal balance might affect real 
spending on education, but not necessarily the share of spending out of GDP. Also, 
governments that tend to run budget surpluses might more likely prioritise education spending 
during these times because education is arguably a more ‘productive’ component of public 
spending. Lastly, given the link between the fiscal balance and gross public debt stock 
(debt2), including a control measure for debt might also be useful. Debt accumulation might 




The other sensible way to change the specification is to use time (year) dummies. Year fixed 
effects – year-specific, country-invariant effects – might also play a useful role in controlling 
for endogenous common effects (‘common shocks’) under the assumption that such effects 
are relatively homogeneous across panels (countries) for the particular user-defined groups 
tested in each case. There are a number of studies of education spending that have controlled 
for various kinds of common shocks or country-invariant effects, by using time dummies (see, 
for example, Afonso & Jalles, 2013; Arze del Granado et al., 2013; Baskaran & Hessami, 
2012; Speciale, 2012; Akanbi & Schoeman, 2010; Busemeyer, 2007 and Avelino et al., 
2005). 
 
For instance, suppose a global shock has a more or less homogeneous effect on a particular 
group of countries, this might arguably imply similar common effects for education spending 
(cross-sectional correlation) – not necessarily in mean terms, but possibly in terms of how 
these means change over time. Many of these countries may also be in close regional 
proximity to one another, implying a process of spatial correlation in spending patterns. In 
both cases, a problem of cross-section dependence in the data-generating process may be 
exhibited. Therefore, it might be imprudent to estimate models without catering for year fixed 
effects. To this end and for the sake of completeness, year dummies were used in all the 
model specifications as part of the robustness checks. Although the estimates for the various 
years are not reported in the applicable tables of results (see Appendices I, J, K and L) to save 
space, they are discussed as part of the Analysis and Discussion section. 
 




A brief discussion about possible endogeneity can be made at this juncture. A key point, 
especially with respect to (endogenous) omitted variables, is that making use of categorical 
(instead of continuous) explanatory variables of interest should mitigate against a problem of 
endogeneity because much of the possible co-variation is now effectively eliminated. Three 
sources of endogeneity are of interest here: simultaneity; measurement error and omitted 
variables. Simultaneity could be a problem despite ‘theorising’ a directional linkage from the 
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state of economic development (and political democracy)23 to public sector expansion and, 
ipso facto, public spending on education. However, the linkage from education spending to 
economic development is a much more complex and indirect linkage to theorise, often 
involving a long time delay over which education spending might exhibit any appreciable 
impact on the state of economic development whatsoever, depending on the level of education 
(pre-primary, primary, secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary or tertiary) at which spending 
is targeted and where spending provides the greatest economic returns (see Figure 1 and 
Chapter 1 for a schematic and explanation of these various linkages and associated ‘black 
boxes’). 
 
Measurement error is a pervasive problem in applied empirical macro-econometric work. 
There are two aspects to this problem. First, measurement error is arguably mitigated on the 
right-hand side because the explanatory variables of interest are now in categorical form, 
which means any variation is effectively eliminated with respect to these variables. Second, of 
greater concern is measurement error related to the left-hand side variable(s) of interest. One 
approach is to proceed by ignoring measurement error in education spending, as myriad 
papers do. However, I consider a special case of measurement error, related to extreme or 
outlier observations, that is more likely to be a problem when working with national-level 
education spending data. Outliers can have a particularly adverse effect on both the 
parameters and standard errors to be estimated. In dealing with issues related to measurement 
error, I am most interested in the effect of outliers, and, consequently, use a suitable estimator 
(robust estimator) in this and other chapters to cater for this eventuality in the data-generating 
process.  
 
Omitted variables might pose a problem insofar as biasing the estimated mean differences is 
concerned. However, using group fixed effects implies I am controlling for time-invariant 
factors (the economic and regional categorisations do not change over time) and possibly even 
very slowly time-varying factors (political categorisation changes very little, if at all, over the 
time period in question) that are omitted from the models, and are captured as part of the error 
term. Under the assumption that other unobserved time-invariant omitted variables are 
possibly correlated with the categorical measures of interest, controlling for this source of 
endogeneity using group fixed effects is a suitable way to cater for the bias implied by these 
 
23 One could argue that a political-institutional mechanism needs to first be in place for the public sector to 
expand, because the public sector does not expand by ‘osmosis’ (on its own), but needs the coordinated direction 
of the political ‘machinery’ to do so. 
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types of omitted variables. In other words, I am implicitly controlling for a particular type of 
bias resulting from the omission of other time-invariant variables in my various model 
specifications – which may be correlated with my chosen time-invariant groups – by using 
group fixed effects. 
 
Country Fixed Effects 
 
It would seem remiss not to say a bit more about why the inclusion of conventional (country) 
fixed effects does not make sense in the current model context because, if the objective is to 
know more about group differences, considering the use of fixed effects would seem 
plausible. To this end, much can be said about the inclusion of various fixed effects. “The 
fixed effects formulation implies that differences across groups can be captured in differences 
in the constant term” (Greene, 2008, p. 194). The groups being spoken about here by Greene 
can be thought of as referring to either country-specific, time-invariant effects (country fixed 
effects) or year-specific, country-invariant effects (time fixed effects). The inclusion of 
country fixed effects was considered. However, since I pool the data and impose my own 
group structure on the data – based on theory and past empirical studies, I have in essence 
created groups that are, by definition, time-invariant anyway. Part of what is captured by the 
country fixed effects would essentially be captured by the group fixed effects, so using both 
types of fixed effects in a model, would be tantamount to double counting the effects of 
interest. 
 
Certainly, the economic and regional categorical measures are time-invariant, and even the 
political democracy categorical measure – although allowing for country/year observations to 
vary – is largely time-invariant (or very slowly time-varying). All the categorical measures 
would then conflict with the inclusion of country fixed effects. Hence, it would not make 
sense to also include country fixed effects in the various models because this would be 
tantamount to including two different time-invariant variables, one for my user-defined 
groups and the other for each country. This would be over-controlling for time-invariant fixed 
effects and, consequently, would unnecessarily confound the estimated mean differences of 
interest. 
 
In addition, there are two more practical reasons for not wanting to include country fixed 
effects. First, for many countries, there are very few observations for education spending – 
hence, why pooling the data for larger, more aggregated user-defined groups makes sense – 
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meaning that, even if a series of country dummies were included, precise estimates for the 
country fixed effects would be very difficult to obtain because there would be very few 
effective observations for the dependent variable dimension with which to do so. 
Understandably, this would be less problematic if time fixed effects (year dummies) were 
included as there would potentially be a greater ‘pool’ of dependent variable observations 
with which to obtain more precise estimates of the respective year fixed effects. Second, there 
is the even more obvious problem of too much collinearity occurring between the explanatory 
(dummy) variables, implying that larger standard errors of the estimates would most likely be 
the norm rather than the exception. 
 
To summarise the discussion about ‘fixed effects’, the practical econometric issue is that two 
time-invariant variables cannot be included as explanatory variables. Using both country 
dummies (to cater for country fixed effects) and my group dummies (to cater for group fixed 
effects) would amount to including two purely time-invariant regressors for most panels, 
meaning perfect collinearity (or near to perfect) would result. Bear in mind, part of what is 
captured by the country fixed effects (all unobservable heterogeneity) is now subsumed as 
part of the group fixed effects (the observable portions of heterogeneity of interest). This 
chapter is an ‘exploratory’ inquiry into the use of special-case (group) fixed effects. 
 
3.4 Data Collection and Description of the Data 
 
3.4.1 Data Collected 
 
Table 5 presents the data that were collected. Bear in mind the World Bank acts as a 
repository of sorts for data from various other sources, so the sources quoted are the publicly 
accessible sources from which the data were obtained (see the respective sources for the 
original source data). For example, although one can source education spending data from the 
World Bank’s Education Statistics (EdStats) database, these data come from the UIS 
database. Details pertaining to the (Stata) variable name used; description of the applicable 
variable; type of measure; total sample size; effective years of data coverage and the source 
from which the data was obtained, are given. 
 
Appendix B and D list the names of countries comprising the ypc201521 and region3 
variables, respectively. Note the use of the term ‘variable’ here for the categorical explanatory 
variables of interest, actually means each is really a single dummy (binary) variable or a 
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‘family’ (set) of dummy variables. Using a binary categorisation for the regional (region3) 
and political (poldemoc) variables is preferred because it amounts to having a more 
manageable number of group interactions to consider for my empirical work (too many 
groups becomes increasingly problematic; degrees-of-freedom problems are more likely to 
result). The primary focus for the OECD group of richest countries is the 21 ‘core’ countries, 
countries that have been classified as such for the entire time period under investigation (1989 
to 2015). These 21 countries are also the same as those used by Busemeyer (2007) in his 
study of education spending for OECD democracies (from roughly 1980 to 2001), and 
excludes Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia, which would comprise 31 OECD countries. One could have 
also considered using 35 OECD countries (the 31 OECD countries plus Chile, Latvia, Mexico 
and Turkey). Incidentally, the empirical patterns using 31 or 35 OECD countries were very 
similar to those when using 21 OECD countries only. However, since the 21 OECD countries 
comprise a group that has remained unchanged since 1989, it was decided to focus on this 
group of OECD countries as the richest cohort with respect to GNI per capita country 
grouping. A list of countries is not compiled for the poldemoc dummy variable because these 
observations do sometimes vary (albeit very slowly) by year for a specific country, whereas 
for ypc201521 and region3, they remain unchanged over time. 
 
The use of the regional dummy (region3) is very purposeful.24 It offers an alternative 
‘economic’ interpretation based on the regional categorisation of countries because we know 
there are both richer and poorer parts of the world. In other words, one way to ‘triangulate’25 
the results for the economic (GNI per capita grouping) and political (state of polity) 
interaction model is to test a regional (a sub-sample of richer versus poorer country regions) 
and political interaction model. The richer group comprises the countries of North America, 
Nordic Countries and Western Europe. There are no countries classified as not politically 
democratic in this sample of countries, and predominantly comprises OECD countries as well 
as some high-income (non-OECD) economies located in North America and Western Europe 
(i.e., Bermuda, Andorra, Channel Islands, Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, Greenland, Isle of Man, 
 
24 The region3 variable I use comprises a sub-sample of countries from my own compilation of 18 regional 
country groups (region2) that are a more nuanced, geographically coherent adaptation of the World Bank’s 7 
regional country groups. By defining 18 regions, one can distinguish between country groupings that, to a greater 
or lesser degree, are more closely aligned on regional economic and/or political grounds. For example, my “West 
Africa” classification comprises members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Appendix C lists the names of countries that make up the region2 variable. 
25 Triangulation here refers to a term I borrow from the realm of qualitative research which, for my purposes in 
the context of this quantitative research, loosely means to check for the validity of an empirical finding by 
conducting an analysis using a different, but related, economic dimension. 
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Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino). Making reference to places like Bermuda, Channel 
Islands, Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, Greenland and Isle of Man as countries is strictly speaking 
not correct, and referring to them using the more generic term of ‘economies’ might be more 
appropriate. Nonetheless, I use the term ‘countries’ for simplicity. The poorer group 
comprises the countries of, Central America, South America (excluding Chile and Uruguay), 
West Africa, Central Africa (excluding Equatorial Guinea), East Africa, Southern Africa 
(excluding Seychelles), South Asia and Southeast Asia (excluding Brunei Darussalam and 
Singapore). The poorer group comprises a sample of low-income, lower middle-income and 
upper middle-income countries. The abovementioned exclusions are either because they are 
classified as being high-income countries (Chile, Uruguay, Seychelles, Brunei Darussalam 
and Singapore) or their economic behaviour is generally not in keeping with other ‘poorer’ 
countries over most of the time period in question (Equatorial Guinea). Irrespective of the fact 
that the richer cohort includes a mixture of OECD and high-income (non-OECD) countries – 
the latter (non-OECD) which might reasonably be expected to behave somewhat differently to 
the former (OECD) group of countries in education spending terms – and the poorer cohort 
includes a mixture of low-income and middle-income countries, the regional dummy variable 
is still a useful way to triangulate any patterns by using different samples of countries to that 
of the economic (GNI per capita) grouping of countries. 
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psegdptot Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2551 1989-2015 World Bank EdStats 
psegovtot Public spending on education, total (% of total government expenditure.) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2255 1989-2015 World Bank EdStats 
Explanatory Variables of Interest 
ypc201521 GNI per capita country grouping 2015, 21 OECD countries Categorical (Ordinal) 5859 1989-2015 World Bank (Atlas Method) 
region3 Richer versus poorer (bi-modal) country region sub-samples Categorical (Nominal) 3024 1989-2015 Author’s compilation 
poldemoc Political democracy classification: yes; no Categorical (Nominal) 5105 1989-2015 Freedom House 
Control Variables 
pop024 Population ages 0-24 (% of total) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4714 1990-2015 World Bank EdStats 
urban Urban population (% of total) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 5799 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
trade Trade or exports plus imports of goods & services (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4785 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
hci Human capital index (PWT 9.0) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3703 1989-2014 Penn World Table 9.0 
pop65 Population ages 65 and above (% of total) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 5234 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
military Military expenditure (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3870 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
fiscbal2 Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4184 1990-2015 World Bank DPG 
debt2 General government gross debt (IMF, % of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3796 1989-2015 World Bank TCdata360 
 
Notes: EdStats refers to the World Bank’s Education Statistics database (see World Bank, 2017a). TCdata360 refers to the World Bank’s TCdata360 database (see World Bank, 
2017b). WDI refers to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (see World Bank, 2017c). DPG refers to  the World Bank’s Development Prospects Group: A 
Cross-Country Database of Fiscal Space (see World Bank, 2017d). Freedom House refers to the Freedom in the World survey data (see Freedom House, 2016). The pop024 variable 
sums the pop014 and pop1524 variables available from the World Bank EdStats database. See Feenstra et al. (2015) for the Penn World Table 9.0 source. 
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3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics presented comprise a number of parts. First, the basic pooled 
(overall), between countries and within countries summary descriptive statistics for the 
continuous variables are presented (Table 6). Second, the frequency or count data for the 
categorical explanatory variables of interest are outlined (Table 7). Third, box plots of the two 
education spending variables by the separate explanatory variables of interest are shown 
(Appendix E). Lastly, a number of tests of association are performed between the two 
education spending variables (in decile form) and the various categorical explanatory 
variables of interest to show some general relationships (Appendices F, G and H). 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the necessary descriptive statistics. For the explanatory variables of 
interest (which are all categorical measures), I merely present the number of countries for 
each group of the respective categorical measure (see Table 7). Table 6 presents the respective 
descriptive statistics for the various continuous measures. Apart from detailing average 
behaviour and variation with respect to each variable, they also give a good idea of the overall 
sample size, number of countries and average number of years for each variable of the panel 
data. A notable comment concerning the education spending measures as compared to all the 
other measures is the relatively smaller average number of time-series observations – roughly 
half in most cases. This shows the difficulty of modelling education spending because of data 
availability issues, not specific to this study only, but a more pervasive problem presented in 
the general literature, which is not always explicitly mentioned. Thus, more strongly 
unbalanced panel data for national-level education spending are usually the norm, rather than 














Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Continuous Variables 
  
Variable Observations Countries Years Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Overall Between Within 
psegdptot 2551 193 13.2 4.505 2.007 1.988 1.109 0.781 44.334 
psegovtot 2255 181 12.5 14.849 5.036 4.566 2.742 2.563 47.279 
pop024 4714 184 25.6 49.977 13.687 13.230 3.451 20.160 73.288 
urban 5799 215 27.0 55.788 24.901 24.736 3.363 5.342 100.000 
trade 4785 193 24.8 86.996 52.290 46.836 21.717 0.021 531.737 
hci 3703 143 25.9 2.342 0.694 0.677 0.165 1.028 3.734 
pop65 5234 195 26.8 7.073 4.814 4.685 1.113 0.697 26.342 
military 3870 166 23.3 2.433 3.210 2.577 2.235 0 117.388 
fiscbal2 4184 191 21.9 -2.299 13.715 5.706 12.383 -505.442 122.188 
debt2 3796 186 20.4 57.015 49.714 38.888 33.032 0 789.833 
 
Notes: Years refers to the average number of years (time-series observations) for each country. The only two 
substantive changes made to the original data (the psegdptot variable only) were the deletion of observations for 
Turkey in 1998 (0 was deleted because there were no other 0% values in the dataset; nil or negligible appeared in 
the original UNESCO source data for this observation) and Tuvalu in 1997 (3730833.5% was deleted as an 
obvious mistake, which also appeared as such in the original UNESCO source data for this observation). 
However, it was subsequently noted that, for example, in a revised version of the World Development Indicators 
database (as at 21/05/2018), this observation had been deleted anyway. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Categorical Variables 
 
ypc201521 Freq. region3 Freq. poldemoc Freq. 
Low income 837 Poorer country regions 2214 No 2063 
Lower middle income 1404 Richer country regions 810 Yes 3042 
Upper middle income 1512 Observations 3024 Observations 5105 
High income (non-OECD) 1539     
High income (OECD) 567     
Observations 5859     
 
Notes: Freq. refers to frequency or count. 
 
Appendix E shows the box plots of the two education spending measures for each of the three 
separate categorical explanatory variables of interest (economic, regional and political). The 
box plots are a useful nonparametric way of visualising the relationship between the 
dependent variable (education spending) and the various groups of the applicable categorical 
(independent) variable. Box plots are also a useful way to conceptualise the regression 
framework of performing multiple t-tests. A graphical rule of thumb can be applied to 
ascertain whether or not the medians of two groups are likely to be different.26 The positions 
of the medians (and their associated absolute positions in the visual or plot space) would be 
referred to as unconditional medians, and if shown to be significantly different to one another, 
 
26 A sample size of at least 30 is generally needed to make inferences about population behaviour when 
comparing two groups in a box plot. A graphical method to compare the medians from two box-and-whisker 
plots is to compute a ratio equal to the vertical distance between medians divided by the total vertical distance 
covered by the two boxes. For sample sizes between 30 and 100, if the ratio is greater than 0.33, then there is 
likely to be a difference. For sample sizes between 100 and 1000, if the ratio is greater than 0.2, then there is 
likely to be a difference. And, for sample sizes greater than 1000, if the ratio is greater than 0.1, then there is 
likely to be a difference. This explanation has been partly adapted from that appearing on the Nayland College, 




would comprise unconditional median differences. A similar logic would apply if one 
assumed the medians were mean values. However, when other covariates are added, as would 
be the case when testing for median (or mean) differences using a multiple linear regression 
framework, the absolute positions (and possibly even relative positions) of the medians (or 
means) and respective boxes in the visual space are likely to change, which might also change 
the significance of any differences with respect to a base or reference group in the regression 
model.    
 
For the sake of generating the appropriate box plot in each case, all data were included, but 
for ‘scaling’ purposes, I excluded Zimbabwe when plotting the relationships between the 
national effort measure and respective categorical variable because of several extreme values. 
The various box plots are meant to be illustrative of possible patterns and not definitive of 
empirical patterns, per se. A general observation from the various box plots is that richer 
countries spend more in national effort terms, but less in budget share terms, in accordance 
with theoretical (and empirical) expectations. However, although politically democratic 
countries should be shown to spend more in terms of both spending measures, the budget 
share measure might seem to suggest otherwise. A simple explanation for this visual 
‘anomaly’ is that the (negative) ‘economic effect’ of having many richer countries represented 
in the politically democratic group is likely to be working against the (positive) ‘political 
effect’ in this respect. For instance, selecting ‘poorer’ countries only, shows a somewhat 
higher median value for poorer countries that are politically democratic, which would be in 
keeping with expectations about the budget share measure. 
 
3.4.3 Tests of Association 
 
Appendices F, G and H present the various two-way tabulations (and statistics from the tests 
of association), which give a more formal (statistical) insight into the various relationships. 
For the sake of clarity, education spending here refers to total public spending on education, 
and each table presents the count data and tests of association for both the national effort and 
budget share measures, separately. What becomes immediately evident is that for both the 
income (GNI) per capita measure (ypc201521) and country regions (region3), a positive and 
significant association is found for the national effort measure, but a negative and significant 
association is found for the budget share measure, which supports the observation from the 




However, although a positive and significant association is found for political democracy 
(poldemoc) with respect to the national effort measure, a somewhat weaker negative and 
significant association is found for the budget share measure. This would seem to be contrary 
to expectations, but, if one considers that many of the countries categorised as politically 
democratic would also tend to be ‘richer’ countries, this finding is not surprising because the 
expectation would be that these richer countries would have lower budget share measures. In 
other words, the sign with respect to the budget share measure by political democracy 
depends very much on the number of richer versus poorer countries in this sample of 
countries. If anything, this finding lends support to the view that, when modelling education 
spending using a regression framework (as I do next), considering the interaction between the 
economic or regional and political categorical measures would be important to consider. 
 




This section comprises two parts. The first part opens with some notes and a number of 
general findings, including the common ‘themes’ running through all of the empirical results. 
A more specific discussion of the results and findings related to Tables 8 to 11 is then given 
with respect to answering the research question. The second part then presents a discussion, 
and contextualises the general findings, by highlighting particular differences for economic or 
regional (and politically distinct) groupings of countries. To conclude this section a synthesis 
of the empirical results is given by proffering three inequality propositions (see Table 13). 
 
3.5.2 Results and Findings 
 
There are some notes and several general findings, which apply to the tables presented (see 
Tables 8 to 12). The base or reference group is the richest/richer and politically democratic 
group of countries in each case. For the results reported in Tables 8 to 11, I do also present 
Wald test results (Table 12) to evaluate whether or not significant differences exist between 
various pairwise groupings of countries from the same economic or regional group. For 
example, it would be very useful to know whether (mean) education spending in low-income 
politically democratic countries differs significantly from that of low-income countries that 
are not politically democratic. Hence, the Wald test results control for the economic or 




Insofar as the general findings are concerned, there are a number of noteworthy comments to 
make prior to briefly discussing the results presented in each table. Firstly, in broad terms, the 
control variables in each case report the ‘correct’ (positive) hypothesised sign for pop024 and 
urban. The trade variable seems to come out positive in most cases, which would be more 
supportive of the compensation hypothesis. Thus, the applicable controls used in each case 
generally report significant sensible effects. Secondly, for the various estimators of the 
standard errors, clustering by country (as opposed to clustering by year or by country and 
year) seems to have the most dampening effect on the significance of the estimated mean 
differences. This would not seem too surprising if one considers there are many countries for 
which very few observations of the dependent variable exist, meaning it becomes particularly 
problematic to estimate precise standard errors when clustering by country. However, this is 
arguably less problematic for clustering by year, or clustering by country and year (two-way 
clustering), for that matter. Thirdly, although the explanatory power of each model (shown by 
the estimated R-squared) is not of any real importance, what should be readily noticeable is 
how accounting for outliers using the two methods of weighting observations (quantile and 
robust estimators) qualitatively improves the goodness of fit. Once again, this is not a 
surprising result, in itself, but does highlight the importance of using an estimator that takes 
extreme values (with respect to the outcome variable, in particular) into consideration.  
 
Fourthly, although the high-income (non-OECD) group of countries generally seems to spend 
less on education relative to their high-income (OECD) counterparts, it is the latter (OECD) 
group of countries I am most interested in making comparisons against because we know that 
high-income (non-OECD) countries are ‘contaminated’, in part, by oil-producing countries 
(e.g., Kuwait; Qatar; Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), politically different types of 
countries (e.g., Brunei Darussalam and Singapore versus San Marino and Chile), and tax 
havens (e.g., Isle of Man and Monaco). In other words, although there is bound to be a greater 
or lesser degree of heterogeneity within income (or political) groupings of countries, the 
degree of heterogeneity within the high-income (non-OECD) country grouping is likely to be 
more pronounced, hence, why the results for the low-income and middle-income country 
groups are of greater interest. However, from a political perspective and for interest sake, I do 
show results for politically different types of high-income (non-OECD) countries too. Lastly, 
and most importantly, the general finding of a ‘reversal’ in the pattern of mean differences for 
the national effort versus the budget share measure of education spending between different 
economic (or regional) and political groupings of countries is most noteworthy. These 
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estimated patterns lend credence to a particular empirical regularity, which is elaborated upon 
later in this section.  
 
Tables 8 and 9, and Tables 10 and 11 present the results for the two factor-variable interaction 
models. To reiterate, since both models essentially combine an economic and a political 
categorical variable, only three controls (pop024, urban and trade) were used. The two 
different (interaction) specifications reveal qualitatively similar results – the empirical 
‘theme’ with respect to richer and poorer countries is very similar. Interacting the economic 
(or regional) and political dimensions, generally reveals a pattern of significant negative mean 
differences with respect to the national effort measure, and significant positive mean 
differences with respect to the budget share measure. These patterns are generally robust to 
using different estimators and changing the specification (no controls versus three controls 
used). An interesting, more subtle, pattern of spending behaviour emerges in these economic 
and political or regional and political interaction models that gives a more nuanced political-
economy explanation for education spending patterns. 
 
The Wald test results reported in Table 12 generally show that the state of polity does play an 
important mediating role because there are many significant mean differences within the same 
economic or regional grouping of countries. Put differently, within income groups 
(controlling for economic status) or within the poorer country regions (controlling for regional 
country grouping), there is evidence to suggest that different political sub-groups of countries 
behave differently. Regardless of the spending measure considered (national effort or budget 
share), one might expect that, controlling for economic (income) or regional grouping of 
countries, politically democratic countries should spend more than their non-democratic 
counterparts because of the majoritarian or populist socio-political pressures exerted upon 
governments in these countries. Bear in mind that, for high-income (OECD) countries or 
richer country regions, neither of these have countries categorised as not politically 
democratic, so the same state-of-polity comparisons cannot be made for the richest or richer 
countries too. 
 
Focusing on the models with controls (Model 2), except for the statistical comparison of the 
estimates for the low-income group of countries using the national effort measure, all other 
group comparison tests conducted (see Table 12) reported significant differences within 
economic or regional groups based on different states of polity. These results substantiate the 
abovementioned expectation that, with respect to both spending measures, politically 
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democratic countries spend more than their non-democratic counterparts, ceteris paribus. 
Therefore, generally speaking, although relatively poorer countries spend significantly less 
(more) on education in national effort (budget share) terms relative to richer countries, 
significant patterns of mean differences also tend to exist within (poorer) economic groupings 
of countries, showing that the state of polity – or a political-economy interpretation – matters. 
This finding accords with the theorised hypotheses given in the Literature Review section 
concerning the effect of political democracy. 
 
Lastly, in addition to considering the robustness of the patterns of spending behaviour using 
three control variables and different estimators, I also tried a couple of other robustness tests 
that comprised changes in specification (i.e., additional control variables and inclusion of year 
fixed effects). These results are reported in Appendices I, J, K and L. Only the LSDV and 
robust estimators were used in conjunction with the regional and political factor-variable 
interaction model specification – richer versus poorer country regions interacted with the state 
of political democracy – because this model specification comprises a synthesis and is at the 
heart of what this chapter attempts to show. The estimates for the coefficients of the various 
year fixed effects and applicable additional controls are excluded from the tables to save 
space. A detailed description of each model specification is given in the notes to Appendix I. 
 
Three major points can be gleaned from Appendices I, J, K and L. First, regardless of which 
pair of models is considered (Model 1A and Model 1B; Model 2A and Model 2B etc.), using 
the Akaike or Bayesian information criterion (AIC or BIC) as the yardstick, the addition of 
year fixed effects did not seem to add value – in a purely informational sense – to the model 
specifications in all cases. For instance, the R-squared obtained from a LSDV regression is 
bound to be higher with year fixed effects included. However, information criteria depend on 
∑ 𝑒2 (related to R-squared) and a penalty function. On this basis, adding year fixed effects 
lowered the informational value of the models. The general finding was that including year 
fixed effects weakened the results somewhat, as expected, but left the substantive patterns of 
mean differences unchanged.  
 
Second, the use of a robust estimator was purposeful. Taking cognisance of extreme 
observations or outliers might be of particular importance when working with education 
spending data that often exhibit extreme observations in one direction or the other. There is 
little doubt that outlier observations in certain sub-groups or sub-samples of the data might be 
driving particular results. In general terms, using a robust estimator meant the results and 
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associated empirical patterns were exhibited more clearly regardless of what specification was 
employed. 
 
Third, the coefficient estimates for the various additional controls (hci, pop65, military, 
fiscbal2 and debt2) generally reported sensible effects in most cases. Under the assumption of 
homogeneous slopes, introducing an additional control each time revealed more complex 
specifications that either did not confound or only partially confounded the empirical patterns 
evidenced.27 In actual fact, the most comprehensive specification (using eight controls) 
generally seemed to improve or substantiate the empirical patterns. Therefore, on this basis 
and for the purposes of this chapter, more parsimonious specifications comprising three 
controls only might be defensible on the grounds of the patterns of spending behaviour (in 
particular, those exhibited in Tables 10 and 11) generally being robust to certain sensible 
changes in the specification. 
 
27 Partial confounding refers to the case where only poorer countries that are not politically democratic were 
shown to be significantly different from the base group (richer and politically democratic countries) and with the 
correct expected sign. No confounding refers to the case where, either, both poorer country groups (irrespective 
of state of polity), or, poorer and politically democratic countries were shown to be significantly different from 
the base group and with the correct expected sign. 
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Table 8: Mean Differences in the National Effort Measure by GNI per capita & Political Democracy (Using 21 OECD Countries) 
 




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way; Both) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
1#0. Low income & not politically 
democratic 
-1.551*** -1.635*** -1.551*** -1.635* -1.551*** -1.635*** -1.551*** -1.635* -1.551*** -1.635*** -1.551*** -1.635*** -1.787*** -1.885*** -1.979*** -2.013*** 
(0.254) (0.359) (0.544) (0.911) (0.265) (0.394) (0.549) (0.926) (0.311) (0.486) (0.294) (0.531) (0.133) (0.260) (0.130) (0.207) 
1#1. Low income & politically 
democratic 
-1.684*** -1.756*** -1.684*** -1.756** -1.684*** -1.756*** -1.684*** -1.756** -1.684*** -1.756*** -1.684*** -1.756*** -1.757*** -1.877*** -1.724*** -1.759*** 
(0.123) (0.257) (0.330) (0.774) (0.129) (0.255) (0.332) (0.773) (0.178) (0.389) (0.185) (0.371) (0.127) (0.257) (0.153) (0.216) 
2#0. Lower middle income & not 
politically democratic 
-1.152*** -1.412*** -1.152*** -1.412** -1.152*** -1.412*** -1.152*** -1.412** -1.152*** -1.412*** -1.152*** -1.412*** -1.170*** -1.578*** -1.362*** -1.611*** 
(0.130) (0.220) (0.406) (0.688) (0.108) (0.197) (0.399) (0.681) (0.196) (0.338) (0.152) (0.290) (0.209) (0.259) (0.116) (0.171) 
2#1. Lower middle income & 
politically democratic 
-0.454*** -0.663*** -0.454 -0.663 -0.454*** -0.663*** -0.454 -0.663 -0.454* -0.663** -0.454*** -0.663*** -0.739** -1.126*** -0.979*** -1.123*** 
(0.158) (0.199) (0.484) (0.627) (0.108) (0.131) (0.470) (0.609) (0.235) (0.305) (0.162) (0.169) (0.318) (0.287) (0.117) (0.159) 
3#0. Upper middle income & not 
politically democratic 
-1.090*** -1.389*** -1.090** -1.389* -1.090*** -1.389*** -1.090** -1.389* -1.090*** -1.389*** -1.090*** -1.389*** -1.357*** -1.669*** -1.432*** -1.764*** 
(0.155) (0.230) (0.534) (0.801) (0.131) (0.140) (0.527) (0.780) (0.244) (0.369) (0.195) (0.193) (0.166) (0.177) (0.129) (0.146) 
3#1. Upper middle income & 
politically democratic 
-0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.819*** -1.097*** -0.797*** -1.131*** -0.935*** -1.133*** 
(0.097) (0.132) (0.295) (0.423) (0.085) (0.119) (0.292) (0.419) (0.141) (0.203) (0.092) (0.159) (0.106) (0.156) (0.106) (0.127) 
4#0. High income (non-OECD) & not 
politically democratic 
-1.123*** -1.987*** -1.123** -1.987*** -1.123*** -1.987*** -1.123** -1.987*** -1.123*** -1.987*** -1.123*** -1.987*** -1.478*** -1.933*** -1.329*** -2.047*** 
(0.183) (0.217) (0.514) (0.702) (0.197) (0.192) (0.519) (0.695) (0.249) (0.332) (0.273) (0.259) (0.152) (0.195) (0.171) (0.189) 
4#1. High income (non-OECD) & 
politically democratic 
-0.814*** -0.768*** -0.814** -0.768** -0.814*** -0.768*** -0.814** -0.768** -0.814*** -0.768*** -0.814*** -0.768*** -0.644*** -0.654*** -0.777*** -0.721*** 
(0.091) (0.101) (0.338) (0.357) (0.049) (0.064) (0.329) (0.348) (0.144) (0.156) (0.059) (0.085) (0.123) (0.130) (0.106) (0.111) 
5#0. High income (OECD) & not 
politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
5#1. High income (OECD) & 
politically democratic BASE 
5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.352*** 3.668*** 5.226*** 3.107*** 5.325*** 3.449*** 
(0.055) (0.312) (0.225) (0.945) (0.058) (0.171) (0.226) (0.908) (0.089) (0.467) (0.083) (0.200) (0.056) (0.334) (0.073) (0.260) 
                 
Youth population  0.016***  0.016  0.016***  0.016  0.016*  0.016**  0.022***  0.018*** 
  (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Urban population  0.009***  0.009  0.009***  0.009  0.009**  0.009***  0.011***  0.011*** 
  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Trade  0.008***  0.008**  0.008***  0.008**  0.008***  0.008***  0.008***  0.007*** 
  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.060 0.100 0.060 0.100 0.060 0.100 0.060 0.100 n/a n/a 0.060 0.100 0.074 0.107 0.123 0.190 
F-value 35.86*** 34.89*** 3.78*** 3.79*** 78.63*** 120.42*** n/a n/a 15.83*** 15.72*** 60.00*** 387.40*** n/a n/a 43.22*** 48.51*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 
Countries 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 183 169 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 2468 2288 
 
Notes: BASE group is high income (OECD) & politically democratic countries. The model uses 3 controls: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). 
Because the controls use homogeneous slopes, the parameter estimates for each control are computed at the mean of all country-year observations included in the estimation sample 
for the respective control variable. A pseudo R-squared is reported for the Quantile regression. Not applicable (n/a) means the respective statistic was not available or not reported. 
The number of countries and years were taken from the results reported for the various estimators of the standard errors. The LSDV and Quantile estimators use Huber/White 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The various LSDV estimators use one-way (country or year) and two-way (country and year) cluster-robust standard errors, hence, the use 
of ‘one-way’ or ‘two-way’ in the table(s) of results refer to the type of clustering of the standard errors used, and not the type of fixed effect (country and/or year) being controlled 
for. Country fixed effects are excluded from all models for various econometric reasons. The Newey-West and Driscoll-Kraay estimators use their own covariance matrix corrections 
to compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC), and cross-sectional or “spatial” correlation consistent standard errors under different data-generating 





Table 9: Mean Differences in the Budget Share Measure by GNI per capita & Political Democracy (Using 21 OECD Countries) 
 




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way; Both) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
1#0. Low income & not politically 
democratic 
3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.633*** -0.012 3.948*** -0.162 3.387*** -0.210 
(0.436) (0.726) (1.208) (2.003) (0.292) (0.682) (1.163) (1.988) (0.644) (1.069) (0.314) (0.984) (0.608) (0.696) (0.392) (0.614) 
1#1. Low income & politically 
democratic 
4.796*** 1.339* 4.796*** 1.339 4.796*** 1.339* 4.796*** 1.339 4.796*** 1.339 4.796*** 1.339 5.135*** 1.290** 4.821*** 1.467** 
(0.381) (0.686) (0.832) (1.748) (0.310) (0.754) (0.802) (1.776) (0.500) (0.966) (0.451) (1.092) (0.366) (0.581) (0.467) (0.643) 
2#0. Lower middle income & not 
politically democratic 
4.304*** 1.081* 4.304*** 1.081 4.304*** 1.081* 4.304*** 1.081 4.304*** 1.081 4.304*** 1.081 4.231*** 0.614 4.196*** 0.850* 
(0.368) (0.600) (1.148) (1.791) (0.348) (0.563) (1.142) (1.779) (0.555) (0.899) (0.468) (0.803) (0.595) (0.531) (0.353) (0.511) 
2#1. Lower middle income & 
politically democratic 
4.852*** 2.421*** 4.852*** 2.421* 4.852*** 2.421*** 4.852*** 2.421** 4.852*** 2.421*** 4.852*** 2.421*** 4.137*** 1.661*** 4.224*** 1.830*** 
(0.369) (0.446) (1.009) (1.236) (0.214) (0.390) (0.963) (1.217) (0.548) (0.639) (0.219) (0.440) (0.470) (0.419) (0.348) (0.468) 
3#0. Upper middle income & not 
politically democratic 
2.520*** -0.022 2.520* -0.022 2.520*** -0.022 2.520* -0.022 2.520*** -0.022 2.520*** -0.022 2.058*** -0.131 2.317*** -0.128 
(0.455) (0.503) (1.380) (1.502) (0.461) (0.378) (1.382) (1.465) (0.663) (0.749) (0.668) (0.547) (0.748) (0.371) (0.405) (0.450) 
3#1. Upper middle income & 
politically democratic 
3.643*** 1.708*** 3.643*** 1.708 3.643*** 1.708*** 3.643*** 1.708 3.643*** 1.708*** 3.643*** 1.708** 3.556*** 1.205*** 3.411*** 1.347*** 
(0.279) (0.354) (0.862) (1.053) (0.230) (0.415) (0.847) (1.076) (0.409) (0.524) (0.280) (0.617) (0.331) (0.179) (0.318) (0.374) 
4#0. High income (non-OECD) & not 
politically democratic 
0.987** -2.057*** 0.987 -2.057 0.987** -2.057*** 0.987 -2.057 0.987 -2.057** 0.987* -2.057*** 0.034 -3.107*** 0.683 -2.852*** 
(0.499) (0.566) (1.699) (1.648) (0.378) (0.407) (1.668) (1.600) (0.770) (0.830) (0.516) (0.339) (0.751) (0.356) (0.502) (0.543) 
4#1. High income (non-OECD) & 
politically democratic 
0.568** -0.038 0.568 -0.038 0.568*** -0.038 0.568 -0.038 0.568 -0.038 0.568** -0.038 0.923*** 0.308 0.471 -0.099 
(0.249) (0.254) (0.834) (0.815) (0.188) (0.211) (0.818) (0.803) (0.372) (0.379) (0.260) (0.284) (0.308) (0.342) (0.333) (0.338) 
5#0. High income (OECD) & not 
politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
5#1. High income (OECD) & 
politically democratic BASE 
12.245*** 4.332*** 12.245*** 4.332** 12.245*** 4.332*** 12.245*** 4.332** 12.245*** 4.332*** 12.245*** 4.332*** 11.973*** 0.885 12.217*** 2.576*** 
(0.122) (0.831) (0.500) (2.156) (0.088) (0.602) (0.493) (2.079) (0.196) (1.172) (0.128) (0.621) (0.166) (0.643) (0.214) (0.768) 
                 
Youth population  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.146***  0.191***  0.164*** 
  (0.015)  (0.038)  (0.013)  (0.038)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
Urban population  0.029***  0.029  0.029***  0.029  0.029***  0.029***  0.046***  0.040*** 
  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Trade  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.022***  0.021*** 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.141 0.198 0.141 0.198 0.141 0.198 0.141 0.198 n/a n/a 0.141 0.198 0.092 0.146 0.136 0.226 
F-value 64.55*** 56.40*** 7.16*** 8.08*** 234.33*** 201.25*** n/a n/a 29.30*** 26.94*** 315.69*** 476.80*** n/a n/a 42.96*** 54.58*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 
Countries 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 175 165 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 2194 2069 
 
Notes: BASE group is high income (OECD) & politically democratic countries. The model uses 3 controls: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). 













Table 10: Mean Differences in the National Effort Measure by Richer versus Poorer Country Regions & Political Democracy 
 




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way; Both) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not 
politically democratic 
-1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.298*** -2.031*** -1.633*** -1.756*** -1.681*** -1.760*** 
(0.147) (0.216) (0.396) (0.582) (0.128) (0.168) (0.389) (0.566) (0.199) (0.315) (0.152) (0.218) (0.117) (0.234) (0.104) (0.199) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & 
politically democratic 
-0.804*** -1.412*** -0.804** -1.412*** -0.804*** -1.412*** -0.804** -1.412*** -0.804*** -1.412*** -0.804*** -1.412*** -1.163*** -1.235*** -1.110*** -1.178*** 
(0.104) (0.166) (0.343) (0.467) (0.081) (0.135) (0.336) (0.457) (0.158) (0.239) (0.110) (0.162) (0.121) (0.180) (0.098) (0.166) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not 
politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & 
politically democratic BASE 
5.169*** 2.095*** 5.169*** 2.095** 5.169*** 2.095*** 5.169*** 2.095** 5.169*** 2.095*** 5.169*** 2.095*** 5.114*** 2.047*** 5.213*** 2.520*** 
(0.069) (0.375) (0.264) (0.989) (0.052) (0.255) (0.260) (0.950) (0.110) (0.534) (0.064) (0.319) (0.062) (0.404) (0.074) (0.348) 
                 
Youth population  0.034***  0.034**  0.034***  0.034**  0.034***  0.034***  0.025***  0.019*** 
  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Urban population  0.016***  0.016**  0.016***  0.016**  0.016***  0.016***  0.022***  0.020*** 
  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Trade  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.013***  0.011***  0.011*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.057 0.167 0.057 0.167 0.057 0.167 0.057 0.167 n/a n/a 0.057 0.167 0.090 0.170 0.154 0.313 
F-value 52.61*** 63.60*** 5.45*** 6.80*** 148.23*** 109.08*** n/a n/a 24.89*** 31.33*** 161.84*** 103.56*** n/a n/a 135.10*** 125.25*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 
Countries 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 102 97 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 1486 1382 
 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are politically democratic. The model uses 3 controls: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). See 




















Table 11: Mean Differences in the Budget Share Measure by Richer versus Poorer Country Regions & Political Democracy 
 




LSDV (One-way; Year) LSDV (Two-way; Both) Newey-West Driscoll-Kraay Quantile Robust 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not 
politically democratic 
3.880*** 1.492** 3.880*** 1.492 3.880*** 1.492*** 3.880*** 1.492 3.880*** 1.492* 3.880*** 1.492*** 4.046*** 0.726 3.757*** 1.108* 
(0.305) (0.612) (0.909) (1.609) (0.229) (0.360) (0.887) (1.531) (0.452) (0.892) (0.210) (0.466) (0.499) (0.764) (0.303) (0.597) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & 
politically democratic 
5.077*** 3.321*** 5.077*** 3.321** 5.077*** 3.321*** 5.077*** 3.321** 5.077*** 3.321*** 5.077*** 3.321*** 4.833*** 2.284*** 4.923*** 2.945*** 
(0.233) (0.458) (0.711) (1.397) (0.141) (0.236) (0.686) (1.341) (0.345) (0.684) (0.157) (0.301) (0.287) (0.496) (0.283) (0.491) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not 
politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & 
politically democratic BASE 
11.944*** 5.333*** 11.944*** 5.333 11.944*** 5.333*** 11.944*** 5.333* 11.944*** 5.333*** 11.944*** 5.333*** 11.849*** 2.093** 11.943*** 3.705*** 
(0.127) (1.193) (0.506) (3.265) (0.116) (0.952) (0.504) (3.185) (0.203) (1.719) (0.176) (1.039) (0.160) (0.960) (0.212) (1.036) 
                 
Youth population  0.104***  0.104*  0.104***  0.104*  0.104***  0.104***  0.163***  0.127*** 
  (0.021)  (0.059)  (0.013)  (0.056)  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Urban population  0.029***  0.029  0.029***  0.029  0.029**  0.029***  0.044***  0.037*** 
  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Trade  0.018***  0.018**  0.018***  0.018**  0.018***  0.018***  0.017***  0.021*** 
  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
                 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.195 0.222 0.195 0.222 0.195 0.222 0.195 0.222 n/a n/a 0.195 0.222 0.140 0.171 0.189 0.247 
F-value 270.00*** 113.21*** 25.86*** 13.06*** 723.40*** 323.35*** n/a n/a 118.36*** 51.83*** 611.34*** 290.39*** n/a n/a 158.19*** 84.82*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a n/a 0.000 0.000 
Countries 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 99 96 
Years 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 
Observations 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 1360 1299 
 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are politically democratic. The model uses 3 controls: youth population (pop024); urban population (urban) and trade (trade). See 
the notes for Table 8. The various standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 12: Wald Tests for Parameter Equality of the Factor-Variable Interactions 
  
         
Wald Tests for Parameter Equality from Tables 8 and 9 
         
 
 Robust Estimator 
 (1)  (2) 





(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
Test parameter 1#0 = 1#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 2.19 
No No 
 F (1, 2276) = 2.33 
No No 
 p = 0.1388  p = 0.1273 
Test parameter 2#0 = 2#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 8.90 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 2276) = 14.79 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0029  p = 0.0001 
Test parameter 3#0 = 3#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 14.38 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 2276) = 24.17 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0002  p = 0.0000 
Test parameter 4#0 = 4#1 
 F (1, 2459) = 10.20 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 2276) = 51.44 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0014  p = 0.0000 
 
 Robust Estimator 
 (1)  (2) 





(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.0125) 
Test parameter 1#0 = 1#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 7.33 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 2057) = 11.37 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0068  p = 0.0008 
Test parameter 2#0 = 2#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 0.00 
No No 
 F (1, 2057) = 6.75 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.9438  p = 0.0094 
Test parameter 3#0 = 3#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 6.88 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 2057) = 13.88 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0088  p = 0.0002 
Test parameter 4#0 = 4#1 
 F (1, 2185) = 0.16 
No No 
 F (1, 2057) = 25.58 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.6852  p = 0.0000 
         
Wald Tests for Parameter Equality from Tables 10 and 11 
         
 
 Robust Estimator 
 (1)  (2) 





(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Test parameter 0#0 = 0#1 
 F (1, 1483) = 33.66 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 1376) = 35.80 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0000  p = 0.0000 
 
 Robust Estimator 
 (1)  (2) 





(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
 Wald Statistic 
Uncorrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Corrected 
Significance 
(α = 0.05) 
Test parameter 0#0 = 0#1 
 F (1, 1357) = 16.59 
Yes Yes 
 F (1, 1293) = 37.70 
Yes Yes 
 p = 0.0000  p = 0.0000 
 
Notes: The “#” naming convention accords with that in the respective table of results. Using interaction models 
with applicable controls, “Yes” means the applicable interaction parameters are significantly different (“No” 
means not significantly different) from one another for the respective pairwise comparison at the conventional 
(uncorrected) 5% critical level of significance or Bonferroni (corrected) critical level of significance. Appendix 
N gives a brief explanation of the Bonferroni correction. As before, “(1)” refers to the model with no controls 
(unconditional mean differences) and “(2)” refers to the model with controls (conditional mean differences). 
Because there is only one pairwise test of parameter equality performed on the estimates from Tables 10 and 11, 




So, what can be inferred from the many empirical results presented? An obvious place to start 
would seem to emanate from the following question, which presents a ‘bi-modal’ (two 
different, commonly-occurring, states of being) perspective on education spending: all things 
being equal, why do richer countries seem to make a greater national effort towards education 
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(spend more on education as a share of GDP), but have a lower budget share (spend less on 
education as a share of total government spending) relative to poorer countries?28 The 
intuitive answer to this question, which partly seems to reconcile these two findings, is that 
richer countries are more likely to have larger public sectors (in terms of expenditure as a 
share of GDP) as compared to poorer countries – a point consistent with the Wagnerian 
hypothesis. But, there is also a political aspect to this argument, which augments the 
Wagnerian view, because education spending patterns seem to also be different among poorer 
countries with contrasting political environments. 
 
A most noticeable pattern that applies to both measures of education spending is that politics 
seems to matter. Moreover, there generally appear to be significant differences between 
politically democratic and not democratic countries from the same income group (controlling 
for income grouping of country), implying that: either, political pressures compel 
governments in more politically democratic countries to spend more; or, it could be the case 
that higher income in these types of countries makes it more possible to leverage taxes; or, 
democratic governments tend to be more educationally benevolent, anyway. The empirical 
evidence for poorer countries that are not politically democratic, having relatively low budget 
share measures not necessarily significantly different from rich (democratic) countries is 
possibly indicative of these poorer countries not only having smaller public sectors, but a 
smaller relative share of spending being allocated to education, which, from a human capital 
point of view, might partly explain why they remain poor and under-developed. 
 
There are two plausible (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) reasons for why the observed 
empirical patterns spoken about so far come about. Firstly, richer countries spend more as a 
share of national income (national effort), not because they necessarily value education more 
highly than do poorer countries, but because they have a greater capacity to leverage income 
from taxes. In other words, richer countries are less likely to be fiscally supply-side 
constrained relative to their poorer country counterparts, insofar as raising the necessary tax 
income is concerned to publicly finance various educational demands. However, poorer 
countries being less able to extract tax income from a relatively smaller fiscal (tax) base, 
constrains not only the growth of these types of countries’ public sectors – a point noted by 
 
28 For my purposes here, “richer” is generally synonymous with developed countries (OECD countries or regions 
predominantly occupied by OECD countries and some other high-income non-OECD countries) and “poorer” is 
synonymous with developing or lesser-developed countries (low- and middle-income countries or regions 
predominantly occupied by these types of countries). In this sense, I am able to proffer a bi-modal (richer versus 
poorer countries) explanation of education spending patterns. 
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Holcombe (2005), albeit in more general terms about countries in the 21st Century – but also 
their ‘national effort’ towards education. For one, progressively poorer countries tend to have 
a greater preponderance of informal-sector, cash-based economic activity relative to the size 
of the formal private-sector economy, which implies it becomes increasingly problematic for 
governments in these types of economies to extract the tax income necessary to finance a 
larger variety of publicly provided goods and services – the fiscal varieties perspective I 
mentioned earlier – which is possibly one explanation for why the size of the public sector in 
poorer countries is smaller. This is plausibly another contribution to the Wagnerian 
hypothesis along with the caveat mentioned earlier that ‘politics matters’ as expounded by 
Peacock & Scott (2000, pp. 3-4).  
 
Secondly, poorer countries tend to spend more as a share of total government spending 
(budget share) because they tend to have smaller public sectors as a whole, which means 
education (as a key budgetary component) might plausibly comprise a larger share of the total 
public sector budget. However, since richer countries tend to have larger public sectors (a 
stylised result postulated by the Wagnerian hypothesis), they are more likely to have a greater 
variety of fiscal components to be financed through taxes and other income-generating 
mechanisms, which would not be the case in poorer countries. For instance, the growing role 
of the state in richer (developed) countries with respect to welfare spending might tend to 
crowd out other forms of public spending (e.g., education spending).29 Consequently, in richer 
countries with larger public sectors and a greater variety of fiscal components to be serviced 
via the public purse (the fiscal varieties perspective), education’s share of the total ‘fiscal pie’ 
would tend to be smaller, partly explaining why public spending on education is lower 
(higher) as a share of total government spending in richer (poorer) countries. 
 
A more simplified version of the two basic reasons for why the observed patterns of spending 
come about, can be stated as follows. One, the extent to which countries are fiscally or 
supply-side constrained, which means, the ability of country governments to extract tax 
income away from their private sector economies, plays an important role. Two, the number 
of fiscal components to be financed from the public purse, could be labelled a ‘fiscal 
varieties’ perspective, which means, increasingly, country governments have to make hard 
choices about which public goods they should prioritise. This also plays an important role. 
 
29 I do acknowledge here the rise or fall of the welfare state in developed countries is a matter of great 





A synthesis of the two reasons can be advanced. The rate at which tax income can be 
extracted from the economy has implications for how fast real education spending can grow 
relative to the growth of real GDP. Moreover, how this relationship varies over different 
periods of the economic cycle – a topic of interest in the fiscal cyclicality literature (see, for 
example, Afonso & Jalles, 2013; Arze del Granado et al., 2013) – has implications for how 
the national effort measure changes over time. Making budgetary choices, by prioritising one 
public good over another (or all others), means one form of spending may be crowded out in 
favour of another. Alternatively, having to make budgetary choices when faced with a greater 
number of fiscal components to finance from the public purse, means the problem becomes 
one of prioritisation afforded education relative to all other public goods, and has implications 
for how the budget share measure changes over time. 
 
Table 13: Three Inequality Propositions 
 
Description Richer Countries  Poorer Countries 


































Notes: E refers to public spending on education, Y refers to national income (GDP) and G refers to total public 
spending. R refers to richer countries and P refers to poorer countries. If Propositions 1 and 2 are shown to 
generally hold true, then, by implication, Proposition 3 will necessarily result.30 
 
Table 13 summarises the salient empirical findings by proffering three inequality propositions 
with respect to richer versus poorer countries, bearing in mind that different states of polity do 
also reveal differences in spending patterns within the poorer cohort of countries. To the best 
of my knowledge, this bi-modal perspective of education spending (Propositions 1 and 2), 
 
30 Two interesting points to note here. First, it does not matter whether E, Y and G are measured in real or 
nominal terms, provided both the numerator and denominator of the respective ratio are both measured in the 
same nominal or real terms. For instance, if wanting to make a ‘real’ interpretation, assuming the same deflator 
is applied to both the numerator and denominator in each case, the ratio of the nominal measures is 
mathematically equivalent to the ratio of the real measures. Second, bear in mind the same estimated size of the 
public sector (as a share of GDP) in any one country, as given by sources such as the IMF, cannot simply be 
obtained by taking the quotient of the national effort and budget share for that country because, for one, these 
education spending measures are estimates, in themselves. The quotient thereof will only give a rough 
approximation of the size of government, and most likely an even less accurate approximation for countries that 
have less accurate education spending data. 
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and, by implication, the relative size of the public sector (Proposition 3) in the two different 
types of countries, has not been presented like this before in the literature. This affords an 
interesting way to think about education spending patterns in richer (developed) versus poorer 
(developing) countries. Propositions 1 and 2 imply the existence of larger (smaller) public 
sectors in richer (poorer) countries, by using education spending patterns as a way to justify 
the Wagnerian hypothesis. In essence, what the empirical work has revealed is a novel way to 




3.6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
 
This chapter sought to inquire whether or not mean differences exist in education spending 
among different economic (or regional) and political groupings of countries (two-way 
effects). Various empirical results were presented with respect to two different measures of 
education spending: the national effort and budget share measures. In general terms, it was 
found that there were significant mean differences between economically (or regionally) and 
politically distinct groups of countries, either without controls or including several or more 
important controls, patterns of differences that accord with theoretical (and other empirical) 
expectations. More specifically, two important empirical patterns were exhibited with respect 
to the (time-invariant) behaviour of education spending. Firstly, controlling for the state of 
economic development (same income per capita or regional grouping of countries), there was 
evidence to suggest that ‘politics matters’ – countries with different political make-ups from 
the same economic or regional grouping behave differently with respect to education 
spending. Secondly, and possibly more importantly for this inquiry, controlling for the state of 
polity (political democracy), it was generally found that richer (poorer) countries tend to 
spend a larger (smaller) share of GDP on education, but a smaller (larger) share of total 
government spending on education. 
 
 
31 Bear in mind that, with respect to making judgements about richer and poorer countries, the propositions may 
actually be peculiar to education spending, and, for that matter, only over the time period in question. 
Nonetheless, they still represent a set of testable inequality propositions that may or may not hold with respect to 
other areas of public financing. For one, the implication that richer countries have larger public sectors (in 
spending as a share of GDP terms) than do poorer countries, does not necessarily always hold true. For example, 
richer countries with large real total government spending and large real GDP, may actually have public sectors 
of similar size relative to poorer countries with small real total government spending and small real GDP. Put in 













In other words, richer countries tend to make a greater national effort towards education and 
poorer countries tend to make a greater budget share prioritisation towards education. This 
conclusion lends itself well to proffering a ‘bi-modal’ perspective of education spending 
patterns. The bi-modal patterns of education spending evidenced are consistent with supply-
side fiscal constraints in raising tax income faced by poorer countries, and richer countries 
being more able to finance a greater variety of societal needs and wants through the public-
sector mechanism. Bigger governments or larger public sectors are a distinguishing feature of 
richer countries relative to their poorer country counterparts. 
 
The general findings were summarised in the form of three inequality propositions. One might 
think of the empirical patterns exhibited as being an alternative way to justify the Wagnerian 
hypothesis, which postulates that a larger public sector is associated with the process of 
growth and development. Put another way, the inquiry was tantamount to using a simple 
methodological approach to enunciate particular patterns of education spending, but, as it 
turns out, also reveals a novel way to empirically support the existence of Wagner’s law. 
 
3.6.2 Possible Policy Implications 
 
The logical policy conclusion is that decision-makers and researchers now have a testable set 
of propositions with which to better understand a specific component of policy outcomes 
(national-level education spending) as countries move through the evolutionary process of 
growth and development – from poorer to richer country status. Part-and-parcel of 
understanding why these propositions come about concerns the way in which various 
countries are able to expand their respective public sectors. Supply-side fiscal constraints 
mean poorer country governments are less able to leverage income from taxes in a sufficient 
and sustainable way to meet national effort education spending targets more closely aligned 
with their richer country counterparts. Debt accumulation might seem like a reasonable way 
to raise the capacity of poorer countries to meet higher education financing targets, but this 
would only be a short-term measure (to finance, say, a specific short-term objective for the 
education sector, like building a number of new schools) and certainly not sustainable over 
the longer term. 
 
A more sustainable mechanism would seem quite rhetorical: poorer countries need to grow 
their respective (formal) private-sector economies (using myriad public policy prescriptions), 
which is easier said than done. Failure to grow the formal private-sector economy or find 
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innovative ways to leverage income from the burgeoning informal-sector economy, means 
poorer (or the poorest) countries will struggle to develop their respective education sectors 
sufficiently to improve their overall development reality. Development assistance and aid are 
potentially important mechanisms to kick-start the process of growth and development in the 
poorest countries, but these mechanisms are arguably not sustainable over the longer term. 
The fact that richer countries have larger public sectors is not a matter of serendipity – they 
have larger formal private sectors too, meaning growth of the public and private sectors are 
strongly associated. The two sectors are best described as complements, as Tanzi and 
Schuknecht (2000, p. 2) seem to suggest, and not substitutes. In other words, with growth of 
the private and public sectors of the economy, public provision (and private provision too, for 
that matter) of education is less likely to be supply-side constrained. 
 
3.6.3 Avenues for Further Research 
 
There are several useful avenues for further research that stem from the empirical findings 
and inequality propositions advanced in this chapter. For one, it would be of interest to know 
whether or not the spending-related inequality propositions (Propositions 1 and 2) hold for 
other areas of public financing or the fiscal allocation (e.g., health spending, military spending 
and welfare spending etc.). Another avenue concerns the political dimension considered. 
Ostensibly, a measure of political democracy was used. However, since all OECD countries 
are categorised as democratic over the time period in question (1989-2015), a study of how 
economic and partisan political forces (Left versus Right orientation) or more nuanced 
political categorisations interact with the economic measures to shape the ratio measures of 
total spending might be interesting. The last avenue concerns the next two empirical chapters. 
Insofar as sensitivity analysis is concerned, robust estimation can play a key role in checking 
whether or not parameter estimates (and associated standard errors) change much (Kennedy, 
2008, p. 380). Since this chapter showed noticeable differences in the coefficient estimates 
and standard errors when modelling mean differences in the levels of the national effort and 
budget share measures using a least-squares versus robust estimator, it would seem sensible to 
routinely apply a robust estimation procedure (i.e., robust regression) to cater for outlier 
observations when modelling these same education spending measures in the subsequent 
empirical chapters. 
 
In closing, the two empirical chapters to follow explore more about the key time-varying 
mechanism through which education is financed, namely, total government spending (as a 
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share of GDP), and how changes therein affect the national effort or budget share measure of 
education spending. These separate, single-equation relationships can be thought of as 
encompassing the three inequality propositions established in this chapter. Chapter 4 and 5 
can largely be distinguished from one another on the basis of different methodological 
approaches and assumptions made about the data-generating process. By adopting a 
comparative ‘dynamic’ versus comparative ‘static’ approach; making different assumptions 
about the behaviour of the slope parameters to be estimated (homogeneous versus 
heterogeneous slopes) and whether common effects (i.e., cross-section dependence) are 
homogeneously versus more heterogeneously distributed, means one can evaluate the 
empirical patterns of aggregate national-level education spending with respect to the ‘size’ of 
government, whilst controlling for changes in income per capita. Therefore, the next two 







































































The previous chapter expounded upon heterogeneity (differences in the state of being), by 
looking at how two measures of education spending differ by economic and political status of 
countries. The major finding was summarised in the form of three inequality propositions. 
These propositions show that richer or developed (poorer or developing) countries tend to 
spend more (less) in national effort terms, but less (more) in budget share terms, and, by 
implication, have larger (smaller) public sectors. Put differently, as countries grow and 
develop their respective public sectors grow too – the Wagnerian assertion, and we might 
expect the national effort (budget share) measure to be positively (negatively) related to the 
size of government.32 This chapter extends our understanding of these relationships by 
looking at a particular aspect of dynamics. For instance, what is not clear is how these 
relationships might change during periods of economic expansion or contraction. Therefore, 
the subject of inquiry in this chapter is the ‘cyclical’ behaviour of education spending. 
 
Several more recent papers have considered the cyclical nature of various types of public 
spending (see, for example, Abbott and Jones, 2011; Alesina et al., 2008; Jaimovich and 
Panizza, 2007), otherwise referred to as the ‘fiscal cyclicality’ literature. However, there are 
two key papers that have particular relevance for this chapter, namely, those by Afonso and 
Jalles (2013) and Arze del Granado et al. (2013). Insofar as education spending is concerned, 
the former paper found acyclical behaviour (no cyclical differences) for both developing and 
developed countries, whereas the latter paper found procyclical behaviour (spending patterns 
that move in the same direction as the economic cycle) for developing countries and acyclical 
behaviour for developed countries. This chapter revisits the concept of ‘cyclicality’ with 
respect to total education spending, but with a difference to these two papers. 
 
 
32 I use the terms size of government and (total) government spending interchangeably, and, unless otherwise 
stated, refers to G/Y or total gross government spending as a share of GDP. 
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Using the same method (Hodrick-Prescott filter) to extract the cyclical component of real 
GDP per capita, but a different specification, I can offer a different perspective on the concept 
of fiscal cyclicality of education spending. To be clear, I use a time-series filter to identify 
booms (‘good’ times) and recessions (‘bad’ times) in the form of a dummy variable, and then 
interact the current period cyclical categorisation with the first-differenced or one-period 
lagged size of government variable on the right-hand side in an ECM framework.  
 
By using a first single-equation specification that considers the relationship between the 
national effort measure (E/Y) and size of government (G/Y), ceteris paribus, if the estimated 
elasticity is positive and less than one, then education’s share of the total fiscal ‘pie’ should 
fall. By using a second single-equation specification that considers the relationship between 
the budget share measure (E/G) and size of government (G/Y), ceteris paribus, one can cross-
check for a declining share of education spending out of total government spending.33 These 
expected results from both specifications would accord with the inequality propositions 
proffered in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 considers these levels relationships more specifically. 
However, in this chapter, I am most interested in knowing whether or not these relationships 
cycle, for which a dynamic specification incorporating measures of growth in these 
magnitudes would be more suitable. 
 
4.1.2 Problem and Focus 
 
There is arguably a fundamental theoretical shortfall of the two key papers in that they assume 
a direct linkage between national income and education spending (Y → E). However, national 
income affects education spending in an indirect manner. Rather, by considering the linkage 
between government spending and education spending, whilst controlling for national income 
(Y → G → E), one is plausibly adopting a more informative representation of the 
‘prioritisation’ mechanism associated with this public financing problem. Put differently, the 
former mechanism would seem to ignore the fundamental channel or source of income (the 
public purse) through which education is (directly) financed – the former only shows the 
indirect mechanism of financing. For instance, when considering cyclical effects, it might be 
better to control for GDP per capita, and use the cyclical component of this measure to 
 
33 From a conceptual point of view, one might think of the various components being specified as follows: real 
total public spending on education (E), real total government spending (G) and real national income or real GDP 
(Y). A rationale for why one might refer to ‘real’ (or, for that matter, ‘nominal’) magnitudes is given in the 
Research Methodology section where a discussion about the use of ratio measures is provided. 
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categorise different cyclical ‘states of being’ to see if the education spending-government 
spending relationship cycles. This is the theoretical approach I adopt with my specifications. 
 
It could be argued that a discussion about the ‘cyclicality’ of education spending is inherently 
related to the real business cycles literature, so the positioning of this chapter around this 
literature is warranted. For one, the two papers on which I base my empirical inquiry do not 
themselves make an explicit link to real business cycle theory. Under the assumption that 
labour supply decisions are important in determining cyclical fluctuations, how might 
variation in labour supply be associated with changes in (public) education spending? One 
might theorise a linkage. For example, a ‘shock’ to labour supply, resulting in an economic 
downturn, impacts a decision about public spending on education because of changes in 
unemployment. However, a particular empirical exercise is of interest in this chapter. The 
focus is about choosing an appropriate method to identify the cyclical component of real GDP 
per capita to distinguish between changes in education spending over the economic cycle. 
 
4.1.3 Research Question and Objective 
 
This chapter considers the relationship between (total) public spending on education and 
(total) government spending with the view to answering a simple question. Are there cyclical 
differences in the relationship between the national effort or budget share measure of 
education spending and size of government? This question is tackled in a novel way by using 
dynamic representations of the data-generating process in conjunction with a different cyclical 
specification. The objective of this chapter is to test whether or not there are significant 
(cyclical) differences in these relationships. Knowing how these measures of education 
spending vary with changes in the size of government over the economic cycle would be very 
useful from a cross-country (comparative) perspective. For example, if the estimated 
coefficient (an ‘income’ elasticity34) for the national effort measure of education spending 
regressed on the size of government is always and everywhere positive and less than one, then 
this necessarily implies the budget share measure will fall with expansion of the public sector, 
 
34 Typically, one might think of an income elasticity as relating, for example, real education spending (E) to real 
national income (Y). This is perfectly reasonable. However, an arguably better approach would be to relate real 
education spending (E) to real government spending (G) because this identifies the direct source of ‘income’ 
from which education spending flows. In simple terms, one might distinguish between an indirect elasticity 
(relating E to Y) and a direct elasticity (relating E to G). Conceptually, the latter is my preferred elasticity to 
estimate in this chapter. However, I use ratio measures to do so, largely because they were used to formulate the 
inequality propositions in the previous chapter and because they are arguably a more ‘intuitive’ way to think of 
the various concepts being specified. Therefore, my preferred specifications consider the (income) elasticity of 
education spending (E/Y or E/G) with respect to size of government (G/Y). 
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meaning the empirical patterns and propositions from the previous chapter are guaranteed to 
be empirically true, at the very least, for the panel data in question. How cyclical effects 
impact these empirical patterns might be useful to know for policy purposes. 
 
4.1.4 Methodological Assumptions 
 
This chapter proceeds under the implicit assumption of cross-section dependence (year fixed 
effects), heterogeneous intercepts (panel or country fixed effects) and homogeneous slopes. 
This chapter employs methods to investigate the time-varying behaviour of education 
spending with respect to government spending, from a within-country perspective for 
different samples of countries. For my purposes, working under the assumption of 
homogeneous slopes (‘pooled’ slope parameter estimates) is a major distinguishing feature of 
the ‘first-generation’ (versus ‘second-generation’) panel-data methods used in this chapter 
(versus the next chapter).35 Using homogeneous slopes is also consistent with the approach 
adopted by the two papers of interest in this chapter. 
 
Individual (country-specific, time-invariant) fixed effects are assumed part of the data-
generating process. An additional point must be made about common effects (common or 
‘global’ shocks) across countries. Despite not expressly testing for cross-section dependence 
in this chapter, under the assumption of endogenous common effects that are homogeneously 
distributed across countries, a set of year dummies can be incorporated into the modelling 
procedure to cater for year fixed effects. Although very much a common-practice approach, 
typically adopted in many empirical papers using first-generation methods, it has a distinct 
drawback in that ‘common effects’ may not necessarily be distributed in a similar way across 
countries. Nonetheless, Wald tests for (joint) parameter equality are performed on the 
estimates of the country and year fixed effects in the baseline models. 
 
35 One could use various ways to distinguish ‘first-generation’ from ‘second-generation’ panel-data methods. 
Bear in mind these terms are neither used in the sense espoused by Baltagi and Pesaran (2007) with reference to 
the evolution of panel unit-root tests, nor are they used in the sense espoused by Eberhardt (2012) concerning the 
evolution of panel time-series econometric methods, per se. One could make a distinction based on earlier panel-
data methods originally designed for a micro-panel setting (large N, small T panels), where greater emphasis is 
placed on the cross-section (N) dimension of the panel data, instead of a later class of methods more specifically 
designed for use in a macro-panel setting (small N, large T panels) or the even more recent meso-panel methods 
(moderate N, moderate T panels), where the latter two methods are classified as panel time-series methods 
because of their greater emphasis on the time (T) dimension of the panel data. However, an alternative and my 
preferred way of distinguishing between first- and second-generation panel-data methods is to do so based on 
how the parameters (for the intercept and slopes) are dealt with. Typically, first-generation methods use either a 
‘pooled’ approach (homogeneous parameters) or ‘fixed-effects’ approach (heterogeneous intercepts and 
homogeneous slopes), the key being the use of homogeneous slope parameters in both cases. Second-generation 
methods have made allowance for heterogeneous parameters to be estimated by using a MG approach. They are 






The most important limitation of this chapter relates to how one goes about extracting the 
cyclical component of the income per capita series. A widely used method of doing so is the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. However, the key issue is the smoothing parameter or smoothing 
constant (lambda) specified when using this method of time-series filtering of GDP per capita 
(in constant 2011 PPP dollars). Since this chapter is about cyclicality, in order to identify the 
cyclical component, one first needs to identify the trend component of the underlying series. 
The choice of lambda to extract the trend of a series in annual data is one of the major 
problems associated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.36 
 
There have been various suggestions in the associated literature about the appropriate lambda 
when applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to annual data. For example, Backus and Kehoe 
(1992) use λ = 100. Baxter and King (1999) suggest λ = 10 is more appropriate. Ravn and 
Uhlig (2002), in devising their ‘rule’ for choosing lambda, suggest a similar value of λ = 6.25, 
but this is based on the ‘fact’ that λ = 1600 is appropriate for quarterly data. However, bear in 
mind Hodrick and Prescott’s (1981, 1997) prescription of λ = 1600 was little more than a 
suggestion – a heuristic of sorts that has become a widely accepted rule of thumb in empirical 
practice – meaning any subsequent ‘rule’ derived from this prescription is not necessarily 
based on an empirical ‘truth’. With reference to the broader literature, a value of λ = 100 or λ 
= 400 when using annual data is more typical of empirical practice (Baxter & King, 1999, p. 
590; Ravn & Uhlig, 2002, p. 375). Therefore, for my purposes, I use λ = 400, which is 
consistent with the suggestion of, for example, Correia et al. (1992), and Cooley and Ohanian 
(1991) for annual data. 
 
On the one hand, using λ > 400 (e.g., λ = 1600) is not preferable because a larger smoothing 
parameter is more likely to generate longer cycles in annual data, meaning part of the long-
run tendency of the series is likely to be picked up in the cyclical component being extracted. 
 
36 By extracting the cyclical component of real GDP per capita, I can categorise periods of cyclical upturn or 
economic expansion as ‘good’ times and periods of cyclical downturn or economic contraction as ‘bad’ times. It 
would not be appropriate to define positive or negative changes (first differences) in real GDP per capita as 
equating to good or bad times, respectively, because cyclical changes need to be defined in relation to some 
underlying trend in the aforementioned series. The smoothing parameter might be referred to as the ‘key choice 
parameter’ because this has implications for what periods of time are categorised as upturn or downturn. In 
theory, depending on how the trend component is defined, this might impinge on whether or not cyclical effects 
for education spending are evidenced. For a good discussion of the properties of the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
procedure in low frequency (annual data) contexts, see King and Rebelo (1993).  
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As suggested in the literature, a larger value of lambda might be more suitable for data with a 
greater frequency (i.e., quarterly data). On the other hand, using λ < 400 (e.g., λ = 6.25) is also 
not preferable because a smaller smoothing parameter is more likely to generate shorter 
(‘choppy’) cycles in annual data, which is not consistent with what we typically think of when 
referring to the economic cycle. It also presumably means discerning significant differences 
between good and bad times might be more problematic because there is less variation to 
exploit, made even worse when considering an instrumental variable (IV) estimator, such as 
the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimator, which is well known for being a less efficient 
estimator. In summary, using λ = 400 would seem to be a suitable compromise between 
choosing a higher versus a lower value for the smoothing parameter. Nonetheless, I did 
conduct a series of replications of the baseline (dynamic) models for the national effort 
measure using the robust estimator and four or ten controls, for which the general patterns 
were only somewhat sensitive to the choice of smoothing parameter in excess of 1600 or 
equal to 6.25 (see Appendix P). Despite certain drawbacks, the Hodrick-Prescott method of 
time-series filtering is chosen chiefly because the other two papers on which this chapter is 
based did so, which at least allows for a measure of comparability between studies with 
respect to the way in which the trend and cyclical components are extracted.37 Also, the 
timing of booms and recessions do not seem to be particularly sensitive to the choice of using 
a one-sided or two-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter when estimating the trend component (see 
Figure 4 in Hamilton, 2017, p. 43). 
 
Another related issue pertains to what is meant when referring to a ‘cycle’. For instance, how 
many years does a cycle include? Since I make use of annual data, a cycle (a period of 
economic downturn or bad times), refers to one or more years. However, there is not 
necessarily an a priori reasoning for how long a cycle might be like, say, an electoral cycle 
(3-5 years). Certainly, switching from good to bad times should not occur every year though, 
otherwise a very ‘choppy’ cycle would result, which would not be in keeping with what we 
might typically associate with an economic cycle. For my purposes in this chapter, I adopt a 
methodologically agnostic stance, and rather see how changing lambda in conjunction with 
 
37 Another option was to use a more recent method of time-series filtering proposed by Hamilton (2017), in 
which the linear projection (regression) of a variable at time t+h on a constant and the four most recent values of 
the variable as of date t is performed (Hamilton, 2017, p. 12; 15). However, this method means several 
observations are lost at the beginning of the time series because of lags used on the right-hand side of the linear 
regression, which only serves to exacerbate the degrees of freedom problem already present in a more strongly 
unbalanced panel-data setting. Insofar as the use of the Hodrick-Prescott filter is concerned, I do acknowledge 
that it too arguably has a number of drawbacks, one of which is the endpoint problem (endpoint bias) or how 
observations at the beginning or end of a time series are dealt with (see, for example, Mise et al., 2005). For a 
critique of the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the interested reader is directed to Hamilton (2017). 
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the Hodrick-Prescott filter procedure (larger smoothing parameter means longer cycles are 
exhibited; smaller smoothing parameter means shorter cycles are exhibited) impacts the 
estimated effects. Using different smoothing constants and showing how this affects the 
underlying cyclical patterns is the whole point of the robustness exercise in Appendix P. 
 
4.1.6 Original Contribution 
 
The previous chapter makes a novel contribution to our thinking about the Wagnerian 
hypothesis as applied to education spending. This chapter extends our understanding thereof 
by considering the interplay between the measures used to formulate the three inequality 
propositions in conjunction with cyclical effects. Using dynamic representations of the world 
is not new in applied macroeconometrics. However, applying a particular dynamic 
specification, that also considers cyclical effects, to the relationship between the national 
effort or budget share measure and size of government, ceteris paribus, makes for an original 
contribution. Moreover, how cyclical effects are modelled into the data-generating process 
provides a novel way of thinking about the fiscal cyclicality of education spending. 
 
4.1.7 Structure of the Chapter 
 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 conducts a brief review of some 
important empirical literature and theoretical concepts with respect to the cyclical nature of 
the relationship between education spending and size of government. Section 4.3 outlines the 
research methodology, including explanation of the method, empirical model specifications, 
hypotheses, robustness checks and other methodological considerations. Section 4.4 presents 
the data collected and description of the data. Section 4.5 reports on the key findings and 
presents a discussion thereof. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 




The relationship between education spending and government spending is a well-founded 
one, and one that has been tested empirically in various ways in the contemporary literature. 
In simple terms, the Wagnerian hypothesis asserts that a process of growth and development 
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is positively related to growth of the public sector. In other words, the richer countries 
become, the more likely is the case that countries’ associated public sectors grow too.  
 
The existing literature can be thought of as comprising two parts. One part contains a number 
of studies that have considered the effect of government spending on education spending, 
whether the former be the explicit variable of interest or merely used as a control variable 
(see, for example, Sahn, 1992; Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Baqir, 2002; Mahdavi, 
2004; Lora & Olivera, 2006; Busemeyer, 2009a; Akanbi & Schoeman, 2010; Sanz, 2011; 
Busemeyer & Iversen, 2014; Garritzmann & Seng, 2016).38 The other part contains studies of 
cyclical effects on education spending (see, for example, Afonso & Jalles, 2013; Arze del 
Granado, 2013). But, to the best of my knowledge, there is no study unifying these two 
disparate parts of the literature into a coherent investigation of the cyclical effects of the fiscal 
relationship of interest (i.e., the relationship between education spending and government 
spending). This would certainly make a novel contribution to the contemporary literature, 
especially insofar as a global inquiry is concerned. My approach might be thought of as being 
similar in spirit to that adopted by Velenyi and Smitz (2014), who use an interaction term 
incorporating the business and fiscal cycles when modelling the effect on government health 
expenditures. This section briefly presents and discusses the studies conducted with respect to 
the two separate literatures. It then proposes a combined framework and outlines empirical 
predictions about the cyclicality of the fiscal relationship in question. 
 




Wagner’s law postulates that, as countries grow and develop, the size of their public sectors 
grow too. What Wagner’s (1883c, 1958) law predicts is that (total) public or government 
spending (G) should increase at a relatively faster rate than does gross national product (GNP) 
or GDP, with minor variation depending on the measure of national income (Y) used for 
empirical purposes. This means the size of the public sector in share terms (G/Y) should 
consequently increase over time (Kumar et al., 2012, p. 607). The Wagnerian linkage flows 
from national income growth to public sector growth, unlike the Keynesian linkage, 
advocating a flow from public sector growth to national income growth in the short run or the 
 
38 Of these papers, the studies by Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), and Mahdavi (2004) generally made use 
of social (health and education) spending as a share of GDP as the dependent variable. 
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idea behind endogenous growth theory, which links public investment in human capital to 
national income growth in the long run.39 
 
However, working under the Wagnerian assumption, when postulating a relationship flowing 
from economic development to public sector expansion, it would be reasonable to think that 
education spending should also be positively related to the two aforementioned components, 
under the assumption that education is always and everywhere a normal (public) good. 
Wagner’s law might be thought of as postulating a linkage from national income to public 
spending to education spending (i.e., Y → G → E). Although an argument could be made for 
the reverse relationship (i.e., E or G → Y), this is arguably a more indirect linkage, that is 
‘filtered’ through a couple of ‘black boxes’ before impacting national economic outcomes as 
illustrated in Figure 1. More specifically, with growth and development (a rise in national 
income per capita), public sector expansion occurs, which results in growth of education 










Controlling for income per capita by using samples of countries with broadly similar income 
per capita characteristics and/or using income per capita as an explicit right-hand side 
variable, one can investigate the relationship between education spending (dependent 
variable) and total government spending (explanatory variable of interest), ceteris paribus. 
 
The studies mentioned previously, for example, do not necessarily use the ‘size of 
government’ as their key explanatory variable of interest. Although it would be difficult to 
make direct comparisons between these studies in terms of the size of the empirical estimates 
– these studies used various different methods, such as an ECM and 2SLS estimation using 
panel data, and cross-sectional analysis – where applicable, these studies generally found a 
significant positive (negative) relationship between the national effort (budget share) measure 
and size of the public sector. In purely theoretical terms, a case could be made for why a 
positive (negative) relationship is observed empirically. In the first instance, where the 
national effort measure is a function of the size of government, since Y is controlled for in the 






)], a rise (fall) in G implies a rise 
(fall) in E (positive relationship between E/Y and G/Y). In the second instance, where the 
 
39 There are a host of studies that have tested and found support for Wagner’s law or the Wagnerian linkage (see, 
for example, Kumar et al., 2012; Lamartina and Zaghini, 2010; Akitoby et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2004; Chow et 
al., 2002; Kolluri et al., 2000; Oxley, 1994; Abizadeh and Gray, 1985). However, in presenting a ‘balanced’ 
view, it must be said there are a number of studies that have also shown mixed (or even no) evidence supporting 
Wagner’s law. The Introduction section to Narayan et al. (2008) details a number of these studies for the 
interested reader.  
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budget share measure is a function of the size of government, since G is controlled for in 






)], then controlling 
for Y, a rise (fall) in G implies a fall (rise) in the budget share measure, provided the 




The majority of studies about the cyclicality of fiscal policy find procyclical behaviour in 
developing countries and acyclical or anti-cyclical (counter-cyclical) behaviour in developed 
countries (Afonso & Jalles, 2013, p. 669). Examples of these types of studies in the more 
recent literature are those by Abbott and Jones (2011), who considered the procyclical nature 
of government spending for different functional categories for 20 OECD countries; Alesina et 
al. (2008) or Alesina and Tabellini (2005) who investigated the procyclical behaviour of fiscal 
policy; Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) who studied fiscal cyclicality with respect to developing 
countries; Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) inquiring about the causal nature of fiscal 
cyclicality; Kaminsky et al. (2004) with a more general inquiry concerning the cyclicality of 
capital flows and macroeconomic policies; and Lane (2003) with an inquiry of fiscal 
cyclicality for OECD countries. 
 
A brief explanation of the various conceptions of ‘cyclicality’ might suffice. One is most 
interested in knowing whether or not significant positive (procyclical) or negative (counter-
cyclical) spending behaviour is evidenced. Where no significant relationship is evidenced, this 
is referred to as acyclical spending behaviour or acyclical fiscal policy. Procyclicality means 
education spending, for example, increases (decreases) with expansion (contraction) in 
economic activity. Put simply, procyclical (counter-cyclical) behaviour means education 
spending and the economic cycle move in the same (opposite) direction. Acyclical behaviour 
either means education spending is not responsive to changes in the national economy or a 
lack of precision about the estimate of the (cyclical) effect means a statistically insignificant 
result is reported. 
 
Two papers are of particular interest in this chapter. Although the study by Arze del Granado 
et al. (2013) ostensibly considered developing countries from 1987 to 2007 to assess the 
cyclicality of education and health (social) spending, evidence for developed countries was 
also reported. They found education and health spending was procyclical in developing (low-
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income and middle-income countries) and acyclical in developed countries. Their conclusion 
was that, “the degree of cyclicality is higher the lower the level of economic development” 
(Arze del Granado, 2013, p. 16). However, somewhat in contrast, the study by Afonso and 
Jalles (2013) considered emerging (developing) and OECD (developed) countries from 1970 
to 2008 to assess the cyclicality of education, health, and social security and welfare spending. 
They found acyclical behaviour across both types of countries and all spending components, 
except in the case of social security and welfare spending of OECD countries, for which 
counter-cyclicality was evidenced.  
 
A counter-cyclical phenomenon with respect to welfare spending or, for that matter, any other 
component of public spending might be explained by an automatic stabiliser mechanism 
being at play. An ‘automatic stabiliser’ is any fiscal mechanism that automatically adjusts 
without case-by-case or discretionary government policy intervention (Dornbusch et al., 2011, 
p. 208) to protect or guard against the damaging effects of an economic downturn. As 
incomes decline during a cyclical downturn, benefit (welfare) payments are likely to 
automatically rise due to higher unemployment levels, raising the budget deficit and limiting a 
fall in incomes (Black et al., 2009, p. 46). Bear in mind, without more information, it would 
be difficult to say with certainty whether counter-cyclical fiscal policy action is due to the 
operation of an automatic stabiliser mechanism or discretionary fiscal policy compelling 
governments to behave this way due to socio-political pressures. 
 
Regardless of acyclical findings of the two papers, it might be more reasonable to think of 
education spending behaving in a procyclical manner. For example, consider the case of 
countries with well-developed welfare systems. It might well be the case that education and 
welfare are ‘competing’ public goods. For any increase in total government spending during 
periods of cyclical downturn, education might still be prioritised (positive income elasticity), 
but to a lesser extent, because of other areas of more immediate public financing need, such as 
welfare, now taking precedence, which would be consistent with a discretionary view of fiscal 
policy (see, for example, Hercowitz & Strawczynski, 2004; Tornell & Lane, 1999) or an 
automatic stabiliser view (see, for example, Darby & Melitz, 2008).40 
 
40 The following is an interesting point to note. Education spending might still be thought to exhibit procyclical 
behaviour even if the sign attached to an ‘income’ elasticity coefficient is always positive. To elucidate, for a 
given increase in the size of government (G/Y), if education spending (E/Y) always rises, but the proportional 
increase is relatively larger (smaller) for periods of cyclical upturn (downturn), then education spending might 
still be said to exhibit procyclical properties as opposed to counter-cyclical properties. Using the aforementioned 
logic, counter-cyclical properties would refer to the proportional increase being relatively larger (smaller) for 




4.2.3 A Combined Framework 
 
This section unifies the two parts of the (empirical) literature. The one part has used 
government spending on the right-hand side of the regression models fitted. The other part 
has used cyclical categorisation of national income or national income per capita on the right-
hand side. However, I combine both of these components in an interactive way on the right-
hand side. In doing so, one is advancing a combined framework suitable for empirical testing 
purposes that takes account of cyclicality in the public financing of education. From an 
identification perspective, using a specification for a study of cyclicality with real income or 
real income per capita, fiscal balance and terms of trade on the right-hand side – the 
specification used by the two papers of interest – might have several problems or deficiencies. 
 
First, the abovementioned specification might be useful from an implied reduced-form 
perspective, but ignores the key source from which education is directly financed, namely, the 
total budget allocation or total government spending. It would arguably make more sense to 
model this missing component (government spending) explicitly on the right-hand side, and 
then use a measure of real income per capita to model cyclicality of the education spending-
government spending relationship, ceteris paribus. Second, the use of the (lagged) fiscal 
balance might capture the debt constraint on government spending (Arze del Granado, 2013, 
p. 17), but it would seem more sensible to include both the fiscal balance and gross public 
debt stock as explanatory variables. Under the assumption these two components are not 
perfectly correlated, excluding a measure of the debt stock would most likely bias the 
coefficient attached to the fiscal balance and/or government spending variables anyway. 
Third, a terms-of-trade measure that captures the effect of the foreign sector on public 
spending is useful, but considers only relative pricing differences across countries. It ignores 
volume and comparative size effects of the trade sector on public spending. It would make 
more sense to model a conventional measure of the trade sector – total trade as a share of 
GDP – on the right-hand side. 
 
From an empirical testing perspective, it would be difficult to make direct comparisons 
between my results and those of the other two papers, for several reasons. Firstly, the previous 
two studies supposedly used ‘real’ measures of education spending on the left-hand side as 
 
everywhere be prioritised in national effort terms, but how the positive elasticity between the national effort 
measure and size of government varies over different states of the economic cycle is of key interest. 
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their outcome variable of choice, despite Afonso & Jalles (2013, p. 670) actually stating in the 
notes to their Table 1 that all dependent variables (education spending being one of them) are 
measured in percent of GDP. I use ratio measures, which is a common feature of the 
aforementioned studies using government spending on the right-hand side. More about the 
use of ‘ratio’ versus ‘real’ measures is given in the Research Methodology section. Secondly, 
the fundamental specification used is different. Whereas the other two papers consider the 
cyclical relationship between education spending and national income or national income per 
capita, I consider the relationship between education spending and government spending, and 
how this relationship cycles. Thirdly, the methods applied are also different. The two papers 
primarily used a system generalised method of moments (System-GMM) estimator, originally 
designed for use with large N, small T (micro) panel data (Roodman, 2009b, p. 86) to control 
for fixed effects and endogenous explanatory variables, while at the same time dealing with 
possible dynamic panel bias (see Nickell, 1981). This method makes use of a greater number 
of moment conditions (orthogonality restrictions) to produce consistent (and more efficient) 
estimates. A System-GMM estimator has its uses insofar as considering higher-order lag 
structures and multiple IVs are concerned. But, two drawbacks of this estimator are that it is 
particularly sensitive to the choice of IV set (see Roodman, 2009a) and being a data-intensive 
approach, means a reduced sample size may be problematic. As part of the robustness checks, 
I use a fixed-effects instrumental-variable two-stage least-squares (FEIV 2SLS) estimator to 
produce consistent estimates, where the second lag of the level dependent variable is used as a 
suitable instrument for the first lag of the level dependent variable on the right-hand side. 
 
There are several additional considerations for a ‘cyclical’ specification that can be gleaned 
from the contemporary education spending literature and intuitive reasoning. Firstly, there are 
some other useful control measures that could be tested (i.e., political constraint, youth 
population, urban population, human capital index, elderly population and military spending). 
These measures are explained as part of the Research Methodology section. Secondly, I use a 
double-log specification in this chapter to facilitate interpretation. Thirdly, despite cyclicality 
being best thought of as a short-run phenomenon, using an ECM allows one to test whether or 
not cyclical effects are manifested in both the long-run and short-run relationship; or whether 







4.2.4 Empirical Predictions 
 
The relationship between the national effort measure of education spending and size of 
government (both as a share of GDP), ceteris paribus, tells us two very important things. One, 
the estimated coefficient from a regression of log(E/Y) on log(G/Y) can be thought of as 
saying something about the elasticity of education spending with respect to government 
spending, ceteris paribus. Two, the sign and size of this estimated elasticity, in turn, says 
something about the approximate way in which the budget share measure (E/G) responds 
when the size of government changes.41 
 
Irrespective of which sample is considered (i.e., all countries, 21 OECD countries, richer 
countries, middle-income countries or poorer countries), one might not expect the 
fundamental sign of the relationship between education spending and size of government to 
be altered during different periods of cyclical activity. However, the size and significance of 
this relationship might vary in a predictable manner. For instance, with respect to the national 
effort measure, one might still expect a positive relationship to be exhibited, but the size of 
this relationship is reduced during periods of cyclical downturn or economic contraction 
(positive coefficient that is smaller in size). This would be indicative of the national effort 
measure exhibiting procyclical properties (see Footnote 40). The ‘income’ elasticity is 
expected to be smaller in absolute size for reasons associated with the reprioritisation of 
spending towards other areas of more immediate public financing need, such as welfare 
spending, during periods of cyclical downturn. This reduction in the size of the coefficient 
during ‘bad’ times versus ‘good’ times, then says something about how the budget share 
measure is expected to respond with changes in the size of government. During periods of 
economic contraction, one might reasonably expect the reduction in the budget share measure 
to be larger in absolute size (negative coefficient that is larger in size). This would be 
indicative of the budget share measure also exhibiting procyclical properties (see Footnote 
40). Put simply, all things being equal, for a given increase in the size of government during 
times when the economy is contracting, the national effort (budget share) measure is expected 
to rise (fall) at a slower (faster) rate relative to periods of economic expansion. 
 






, ceteris paribus. A regression equation with logs taken on both 
sides, gives the linear expression log 𝐸 − log 𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(log 𝐺 − log 𝑌) + , ceteris paribus, which means that, 
by considering the relationship between the national effort measure (E/Y) and size of government (G/Y), one is 
also essentially considering the relationship between E and G, and how the budget share measure (E/G) is 
approximately likely to respond, because GDP (Y) is effectively controlled for on both sides of the equation. 
Moreover, taking logs of these ratio measures has the useful property of being able to specify a linear 




For one, this pattern of behaviour might be expected to hold for countries with well-
functioning public systems comprising welfare and/or unemployment protection. During bad 
times, the public-sector automatic stabiliser mechanism, for example, routinely compensates 
various parts of society for losses associated with economic decline, implying a possible 
reprioritisation of public spending needs. For example, welfare-type spending might 
reasonably be given priority over, say, education spending, for any increase in total 
government spending during bad times. Said differently, the marginal effect of changes in the 
size of government on changes in both measures of education spending is expected to be 
reduced during bad times. Suffice to say, whether this pattern of cyclical behaviour is indeed 
significant and occurs across different samples of countries is a matter of empirical inquiry.  
 
4.3 Research Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Explanation of the Method 
 
This chapter uses an ECM that incorporates both long-run and short-run effects. This 
‘dynamic’ modelling framework has been used in education spending applications (see, for 
example, Busemeyer, 2009a; Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). The ECM includes a 
dummy variable, signifying ‘good’ times (annual periods of cyclical upturn) or ‘bad’ times 
(annual periods of cyclical downturn) that is interacted with the size of government variable 
to evaluate the effect government spending has on the national effort or budget share measure 
of education spending during these different categorisations of the economic cycle. The 
dummy variable is constructed by categorising the cyclical component of real GDP per capita 
extracted using a suitable time-series filter (Hodrick-Prescott), the same approach used by the 
two papers. It would be useful to point out the term ‘interaction’ is not used here in a strict 
sense (the interaction effect of two continuous variables on the right-hand side), but rather the 
effect of a continuous variable on the right-hand side (total government spending) is separated 
out or partitioned into two separate groups using a categorical (dummy) variable. 
 
The right-hand side of the two, separate single-equation models includes a set of important 
control variables. The controls are drawn from the relevant literature, and comprises either 
four controls (income per capita, trade, fiscal balance and gross public debt) or ten controls 
(income per capita, trade, fiscal balance, gross public debt, political constraint, youth 
population, urban population, human capital index, elderly population and military spending). 
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By using these two specifications, including country and year fixed effects, one is able to 
assess the extent to which the education spending-government spending relationship ‘cycles’. 
 
All of the variables considered (except the fiscal balance and political constraint) are in 
natural logarithms. Most of the variables (except income per capita, human capital index and 
political constraint) are ratio measures of some kind (i.e., shares of GDP or shares of total 
population).42 There are several good reasons why the use of ratio measures for the key 
variables of interest on the left- and right-hand side are deemed important, instead of using, 
say, ‘real’ measures of education and government spending. For one, these ratio measures are 
more commonly used in the empirical literature of education spending (the studies by 
Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Baqir, 2002; Busemeyer, 2009a; Akanbi & Schoeman, 
2010 all use ratio measures for the outcome and explanatory variables of interest). They are 
also measures more typically referred to when wanting to make comparative judgements 
across countries, or when referring to how little or how much countries spend on education, or 
when communicating with layperson audiences. Lastly, despite ratios defined in nominal and 
real terms not necessarily being the same, depending on the deflator(s) applied, the use of 
ratios avoids well-known problems of making international and time-series comparisons, 
which require the additional consideration of price and exchange rate variables. Regardless, a 
further explanation for the use of ratio measures is given later in this section. 
 
With respect to the two papers, there are some similarities and differences in the model 
specification. My specification is similar in that I use the cyclical component of real income 
per capita. However, interacting the dummy categorisation of this cyclical component with 
the size of government is a different approach to modelling education spending. Insofar as the 
controls are concerned, I also consider a trade-related variable, except that I choose to make 
use of trade as a share of GDP (a more commonly operationalised variable in the education 
spending literature) instead of a terms-of-trade measure, which I believe is more limited in its 
scope because it only really caters for relative price differences, and does not also consider 
volume implications. Likewise, I use the fiscal balance as a control, but extend this to also 
explicitly control for the gross public debt stock because the debt constraint on government 
might not adequately be captured by using the (lagged) fiscal balance alone. Furthermore, in 
 
42 A somewhat ‘common sense’ or tautological explanation, but possibly useful to know nonetheless, can be 
made about the logging of a ‘ratio’ measure at this juncture. Regardless of whether one takes the natural 
logarithm of the variable in the original percent of GDP form or one first divides through by 100 (the result 
being the raw ratio measure that can then be logged), the estimates of the slope coefficients, standard errors and 
all other model statistics will be the same, but the intercept coefficient will be different. For my purposes, I took 
the natural logarithm of all the applicable variables as they appeared in the original data sources. 
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contrast, I use another six controls in an alternative specification of this public financing 
problem. 
 
4.3.2 Empirical Model Specification 
 
The empirical model specification comprises a dummy-variable interaction with government 
spending and additional continuous control variables that are assumed to have homogeneous 
(pooled) slopes and heterogeneous intercepts (country and year fixed effects). For interest 
sake, in addition to considering fixed effects, I do also make allowance for the autonomous 
component of education spending to vary across different periods of cyclical activity by 
including a differential intercept variable. Although not necessarily of great interest, allowing 
the autonomous component to vary across different cyclical states of being did, nonetheless, 
seem a sensible approach to adopt. 
 
Equations (1) and (2) represent the dynamic or ECM variants to be tested in each case, with 
respect to two different cyclical periods, upturn (‘good’ times) and downturn (‘bad’ times), 
respectively.43 An ECM has three useful properties when trying to answer a question about 
cyclicality of education spending. One, at a very simple level, it comprises a useful way to 
incorporate dynamics into a model of the data-generating process, meaning, where 
autocorrelation is a signal of a more serious mis-specification problem, arising from a lack of 
dynamics in the model, an ECM might be a useful way to remedy mis-specification. Two, it 
allows for the testing of a cointegrated (stationary) process. The cointegrating parameter is 
given by β3 and θ3 in Equations (1) and (2), respectively. Three, short-run and long-run effects 
can be estimated, which then says something about growth and levels effects, respectively. 
For what it is worth, although this chapter is about cyclicality – a phenomenon better 
exhibited in the short-run variables – an ECM also allows one to test if there are possible 
long-run differences in spending behaviour across the two different cyclical periods. Although 
this is not expected to be the case, it seems reasonable to test, nonetheless. The coefficients 
attached to the differential terms in the unrestricted model can be tested to see if they are 
jointly equal to zero, in which case, the restricted model (with no differential terms or no 
cyclical effects) would be a better representation of the data-generating process. 
 
43 Since I use GDP per capita (in constant PPP dollars) on the right-hand side, it makes sense to extract the 
cyclical component of this variable using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, and then generate a (cyclical) dummy 
variable that can be interacted with government spending to assess the fiscal cyclicality of the education 
spending-government spending relationship. The cyclical component equals actual real GDP per capita minus 
potential real GDP per capita (the trend component). A positive (negative) value for the cyclical component of 




















































































All variables except the cyclical dummy (CYCLE), fiscal balance (fiscbal2) and political 
constraint score (xconst) are in natural logarithms; 
Equation (1) uses the national effort measure as the dependent variable; 
Equation (2) uses the budget share measure as the dependent variable; 




𝛽1 and 𝜃1 are the common intercepts from Equations (1) and (2), respectively; 
𝛽∗ and 𝜃∗ refer to the coefficient of the explanatory variable of interest or applicable control; 
CYCLE𝑖𝑡 refers to a cyclical dummy that categorises the cyclical component of real income per 
capita (gdppc1) extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, taking on either 0 (‘good’ times) 











∗ CYCLE𝑖𝑡 refer to the interaction of the size of government and 
dummy categorisation of cyclical activity for long-run and short-run variables, respectively; 
X is a vector of control variables (4 or 10 controls); 
𝜐𝑖 refers to country fixed effects to control for country-specific, time-invariant effects; 
𝜂𝑡 refers to year fixed effects to control for ‘global’ shocks or common effects that are 
assumed to be homogeneously distributed across countries; 
The number of countries is given by i = 1, 2, …, N; 
The number of years is given by t = 1, 2, …, T; 




Table 14 presents the various cyclical hypotheses with respect to both single-equation 
specifications (see the Empirical Model Specification section). Because the variables of 
interest are in natural log form, the coefficients of interest comprise elasticities. Theoretical 
predictions concerning Equations (1) and (2) can be proffered. Since I use an ECM 
framework, hypotheses can be formulated with respect to the long-run and short-run 
parameters of interest. Since this chapter concerns ‘cyclicality’, one might reasonably expect 
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cyclical variation to be evidenced for the short-run parameters, but not so for the long-run 
parameters. 
 
With respect to the long-run relationships (parameters), the national effort measure is 
expected to be positively related to the size of government (β4 is positive); the budget share 
measure is expected to be negatively related to the size of government (θ4 is negative). The 
long-run relationship in each case is not expected to cycle (β5 and θ5, both zero). With respect 
to the short-run relationships (parameters), the same fundamental relationships as before are 
predicted to occur (β6 > 0 for the national effort measure; θ6 < 0 for the budget share 
measure). However, both of these relationships are expected to be reduced during periods of 
cyclical downturn (bad times), hence, the negative coefficients predicted (β7 < 0 for the 
national effort measure; θ7 < 0 for the budget share measure). Both single-equation 
specifications incorporate differential slope coefficients (mean differences). For Equation (1), 
the ‘good’ times coefficient (β6) is expected to be greater than the ‘bad’ times coefficient (β6 + 
β7), meaning the absolute value of the ‘good’ times coefficient is further from zero. For 
Equation (2), the ‘good’ times coefficient (θ6) is expected to be greater than the ‘bad’ times 
coefficient (θ 6 + θ 7), meaning the absolute value of the ‘bad’ times coefficient is further from 
zero. 
 
Table 14: Summary of the Hypotheses 
 
Equation Dependent Variable Description Theoretical Predictions 
Eq. (1) 
 








β4 is positive 
β5 is not significant, regardless of sign 
β6 > 0; β7 < 0; β6 > β6 + β7 
    







θ4 is negative 
θ5 is not significant, regardless of sign 
θ6 < 0; θ7 < 0; θ6 > θ6 + θ7 
 
Notes: In the context of the empirical model specifications, bear in mind an insignificant differential effect 
merely means the fundamental relationship between the respective education spending measure and the lagged 
(or differenced) size of government variable does NOT cycle. 
 
4.3.4 Robustness Checks 
 
The various robustness checks are part-and-parcel of the estimation procedure, and comprise 
different approaches to checking for the robustness of the results. Using different samples, 
changing the specification, accounting for possible dynamic panel bias and dealing with 
106 
 
outlier observations are four ways in which robustness checking is conducted. I briefly 
explain these four approaches next. 
 
Different Samples of Countries 
 
Cyclical effects might be better evidenced for certain types of countries. In addition to 
estimating models for all countries, since the previous chapter essentially considered ‘richer’ 
(developed) versus ‘poorer’ (developing or lesser-developed) countries, I continue with this 
theme. For the richer cohort of countries, I use either the 21 ‘core’ OECD countries or richer 
countries from the previous chapter (see Appendices B and D). For the poorer cohort of 
countries, I use either middle-income countries, comprising lower and upper middle-income 
countries or poorer countries from the previous chapter (see Appendices B and D). Five 
samples of countries (all countries, 21 OECD countries, richer countries, middle-income 
countries and poorer countries) are tested. The poorer countries sample is a combination of 
both low-income and middle-income countries. How robust any cyclical patterns are to 
changes in the estimation sample is one aspect of interest. 
 
Changes in Specification 
 
Using the size of government or total government spending as my explanatory variable of 
interest might hamper estimation since there are likely to be omitted variables that are also 
correlated with government spending, implying a biasing effect on the estimated coefficient. 
One way to address this source of endogeneity is to include additional control variables. The 
basic model, of education spending (psegdptot and psegovtot) regressed on the size of 
government (gov1), includes four important controls, namely, income per capita (gdppc1), 
foreign sector (trade), fiscal balance (fiscbal2) and gross public debt (debt2). This 
specification loosely accords with the one used by the two papers. I extend this specification 
to also include a further six controls, namely, political constraint (xconst), youth population 
(pop024), urban population (urban), human capital index (hci), elderly population (pop65) 
and military spending (military). All of these variables and their abbreviated names (in 
parentheses) are described in Table 15. Although these additional controls have been shown 
in various parts of the literature to have an effect on education spending, they are also 
correlated – but not perfectly so – to varying degrees with total government spending (see 
Tables 17 to 21). It would seem reasonable to include them as controls. For comparative 




Concern might arise about bi-directional causation or simultaneity (another source of 
endogeneity) with the inclusion of the various controls, which brings into question the 
exogeneity of the regressors. Two of them, the human capital index and military spending, 
might be more problematic. Using the human capital index is a novel addition to control for 
the initial ‘quality’ of education, and a higher (units-free) index score means a better quality 
of human capital. A case could be made for bi-directional causation here, but given the 
arguably long time lag between education spending and its impact on educational outcomes of 
various sorts (the human capital index measure is based on years of schooling and returns to 
education), it would seem more appropriate to specify this measure of quality of the labour 
force as being predetermined, and impacting the education spending decision. Insofar as 
military spending is concerned, a decision by government to spend more on the military 
sector is not necessarily endogenous, in the sense that decisions to expand or contract the 
military sector are predetermined, and might plausibly take precedence over other public 
goods, such as education, especially in more strongly autocratic states and/or countries with 
traditionally large and long-standing military presence. It would be worthwhile to point out 
that all of the controls have been used in various parts of the literature as right-hand side 
(explanatory) variables (see Chapter 2). 
 
Dynamic Panel Bias 
 
OLS estimation of autoregressive (AR) models is consistent, but biased in finite samples 
(Reed & Zhu, 2017, p. 302). From a time-series perspective, this is referred to as Hurwicz 
bias (Hurwicz, 1950). From a dynamic panel perspective, in the context of large N, small T 
and panel (one-way) fixed-effects, such bias is referred to as Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). 
Nickell’s original paper considered bias resulting from the use of a fixed-effects within-group 
estimator (a process involving time-demeaning of the variables) to eliminate unobserved 
panel fixed effects. A within-transformation of the variables sets up a correlation between the 
AR term and error, by construction, resulting in a biased estimate of the associated parameter 
that is not alleviated by increasing N (Baum, 2013, p. 3). If there is some degree of persistence 
in a series, “the bias is invariably negative, so that the persistence of y will be underestimated” 
(Baum, 2013, p. 4). From a panel-data point of view, the ‘finite’ sample aspect refers to the 
small T dimension, so if T → ∞, bias would be mitigated – bias is smaller (larger) for larger 
(smaller) values of T. In addition, the presence of autocorrelation in the error process does not 
cause bias, because it would result even if the error process was independent and identically 
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distributed (i.i.d.), but it certainly exacerbates the severity thereof making it increasingly 
difficult to derive a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the AR term (Baum, 2013, p. 5). 
Therefore, a biasing effect is established when fixed-effects (within-group) estimation is used, 
and problems with consistent estimation are made even worse when autocorrelation is present, 
as Baum suggests. 
 
Depending on the length of the applicable time dimension and the lag order exhibited in the 
data-generating process of the underlying variable (education spending), this means the 
lagged level dependent variable in an ECM may be endogenous because a ‘shock’ to the 
dynamic term on the right-hand side feeds through to the outcome variable. In other words, 
when using a lagged dependent variable (LDV) the assumption of strict exogeneity is not 
likely to hold, and the least-squares estimator is no longer a consistent estimator in a panel-
data context with individual effects (fixed or random) where T is fixed and N → ∞. Under the 
assumption the lag order of the series being modelled (education spending) is not too 
complex, certainly not beyond two lags, using a second lag of the level dependent variable 
might sufficiently expunge the endogenous component of the AR term.44 In the case of a 
process exhibiting more complex dynamics a greater number of (linear) moment conditions 
(orthogonality restrictions) might be required to compute consistent and efficient estimates of 
the coefficient on the AR term, which is one reason for applying a generalised method of 
moments estimator (e.g., System-GMM). As an alternative to using System-GMM, there are 
basically three IV approaches that could remedy possible dynamic panel bias. 
 
First, a within-group transformation of each variable could still be used, but a suitable 
instrument(s) for the affected variable needs to be found and employed as part of FEIV 
estimation. Although this might remedy the problem of endogeneity of the affected regressor, 
any remaining autocorrelation might still hamper estimation. Second, a first-difference 
transformation of the variables, which effectively eliminates the constant term and panel fixed 
effects, in conjunction with suitable instruments comprising second and third lags of the 
dependent variable, either by way of lagged differences or lagged levels (Baum, 2013, p. 7) 
might prove useful at expunging any biasing effect, whilst also mitigating an autocorrelated 
error process. This is the basic intuition behind the Anderson-Hsiao (Anderson & Hsiao, 
 
44 One might distinguish between complexity of the dynamics (lag order of the model) and how long any effects 
last for (persistence). Since I am more interested in the former, I make reference to lag order of education 
spending (the variable being modelled). 
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1981; 1982) estimator.45 However, a drawback of this approach in the context of an ECM is 
taking differences of variables that have already been differenced, might foreseeably 
eliminate any short-run effects of interest, such as those attributable to the first-differenced 
size of government variable – the ‘cyclical’ effect of key importance in this chapter. These 
two methods can be employed in Stata using the “xtivreg, fe” (2SLS within estimator) and 
“xtivreg, fd” (2SLS first-differenced estimator) commands and options, respectively. 
 
A third option, and my preferred approach, is to employ a 2SLS estimator with my existing 
dynamic (ECM) specification, and manually cater for unobserved country and year fixed 
effects by using country and year dummies in the estimation procedure. For what it is worth, 
by explicitly considering individual effects instead of them merely being ‘washed out’ by the 
time-demeaning transformation, one can compute estimates of country-specific, time-
invariant behaviour (heterogeneity). A single instrument (second lag of the AR term or yit-2) 
along with all other controls and fixed effects can be used in the first-stage regression to 
model the lagged level dependent variable (yit-1). The second-stage regression then uses the 
predicted lagged level dependent variable and all other controls and fixed effects for 
estimation purposes. 
 
Assuming education spending is not highly persistent, because a highly persistent series 
would warrant three or more lags to expunge the endogenous component of the affected 
variable, using the second lag as suitable IV for the first lag, makes intuitive sense and means 
the equation to be estimated is exactly identified.46 Although the preferred approach produces 
consistent estimates, they may not be efficient because they do not consider all possible 
moment conditions (i.e., only one instrument is used as opposed to using multiple IVs). 
However, despite it being conventional to report Hansen over-identification test results, as 
well as the number of instruments included, when applying a dynamic panel (System-GMM) 
estimator, as a word of caution, one should steer clear of using many IVs or moment 
conditions (Kennedy, 2008, p. 291).47 The 2SLS approach I adopt is a suitable robustness 
 
45 In an ECM framework, the variable to be instrumented is the lagged level dependent variable (y i,t-1) as opposed 
to the first-differenced lagged dependent variable (∆yi,t-1). As suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981; 1982), a 
common choice of instrument is the second lag of the level dependent variable (yi,t-2) (Kennedy, 2008, p. 291). I 
adopt this IV convention with respect to instrumenting for the lagged level dependent variable. 
46 When employing a FEIV estimator, I use the Stata command “ivregress 2sls … i.cid i.year, vce(robust)” with 
both country (i.cid) and year (i.year) fixed effects specified. I use this approach so that a formal test for 
autocorrelation by Arellano and Bond (1991) can be implemented in Stata with the programme “abar” by 
Roodman (2009b). 




check in the presence of possible dynamic panel bias, and because I only use one IV, there is 
no need to test for over-identification. 
 
Dealing with Outliers 
 
There are papers in the education or social spending literature that have used methods, such as 
DFBETAs (difference in betas with and without outliers) or Cook’s distance measure (based 
on the predicted values), to identify and help deal with outliers (see, for example, Kaufman & 
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Brown & Hunter, 1999). Insofar as the baseline models are concerned, 
I routinely use a robust estimator, that down-weights extreme or outlier observations in the 
estimation procedure, a process akin to applying a WLS estimator. However, insofar as the IV 
models are concerned, these use a conventional 2SLS estimator, that does not routinely 
account for outliers. One way to remediate is to identify and exclude observations (cases) for 
which the associated residuals from the IV regression are more than 3 standard deviations 
either side of the mean residual. Bear in mind, these observations are chosen based on being 
‘conditional’ outliers because they are selected based on the residuals from the fitted 
regression. The upside of this approach is that outliers are chosen based on a number of 
variables instead of choosing them based on one variable (i.e., education spending) only. 
Therefore, in conjunction with the IV models, I test for robustness of the empirical patterns by 
both including and excluding the few outlier observations. 
 




There are several good reasons why I use ratio measures for my inquiry in this chapter. 
Firstly, the use of ratio measures for the outcome variables of interest (E/Y and E/G) and 
explanatory variable of interest (G/Y) ties in with the measures used in the previous chapter. 
Nonetheless, there is some contention in the literature concerning the use of ‘ratio’ versus 
‘real’ variables as the outcome measures in studies of fiscal cyclicality. Although Arze del 
Granado et al. (2013, p. 16) accept that some studies use ratios (i.e., education spending as a 
share of GDP) as dependent variables, they follow the approach adopted by Jaimovich and 
Panizza (2007) by using “rates of growth of real expenditures”. They go on to say that 
Kaminsky et al. (2004), and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) “highlight the fact that nothing 
useful can be inferred about cyclicality from the sign of a fiscal variable expressed in percent 
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of GDP” (Arze del Granado et al., 2013, p. 16). Granted, this statement is based on the fact 
that a ratio measure has two components (numerator and denominator) that can vary, 
potentially revealing a positive or negative sign for the derivative thereof (see Arze del 
Granado et al., 2013, p. 22, Endnote 9). However, if the variables of interest on the left- and 
right-hand side are both measured in the same ratio terms (E/Y is a function of G/Y, ceteris 
paribus), then this problem is effectively negated, because GDP (Y) is controlled for on both 
sides of the regression equation. Interestingly, a specification that uses either the national 
effort measure or budget share measure on the left-hand side, and size of government (G/Y) 
and GDP per capita on the right-hand side, is the same as the specification used by other 
papers, for example, such as the one by Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo (2001) for Latin 
American countries, albeit their left-hand side variable was health and education (social) 
spending. Similar examples of my intended specification (but ignoring cyclical effects) are 
those by Baqir (2002), Busemeyer (2009a), and Akanbi and Schoeman (2010). 
 
Secondly, it could be argued that a ratio measure is a better comparative measure of the ‘size’ 
of education spending (share measures allow for more meaningful comparisons across 
countries to be made of the national effort or budget share allocation towards education). 
Ratio measures are arguably a better way to conduct comparative inquiry because they are 
units-free and do not rely on complicated procedures or assumptions to be made about their 
computation. For example, choosing the same base year, the method of chain-weighting 
applied, the type of deflator to be used and so forth are all complicating issues when trying to 
arrive at a comparative ‘real’ measure of education spending. In summary, knowing exactly 
what ‘real’ means in any particular context can be a very disputatious issue. However, 
knowing how the ‘shares’ of spending might cycle for different types of countries would seem 
like a more worthwhile exercise. 
 
Thirdly, there is a more subtle implication of using ratios when it comes to speaking about 
‘nominal’ versus ‘real’ variables and changes in these variables. There seems to be a 
conceptual problem (or misunderstanding, at the very least) about the use of ‘ratio’ versus 
‘real’ measures for empirical purposes. To elucidate, a national effort measure of spending (in 
pure ratio terms) is given by E/Y. Under the assumption the same deflator is applied to the 
numerator (E) and denominator (Y) of this ratio, such as a general economy-wide GDP 
deflator, one is actually making the same interpretation of changes in these magnitudes 
because, mathematically speaking, the units-free ratio must be the same in both nominal and 
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 ). In other words, assuming the same deflator is applied to both 
parts of the fraction, ratio measures have an attractive (units-free) property despite possible 
misgivings about their usefulness. However, the difficulty arises when we speak about using 
different deflators in the numerator and denominator (for example, using an economy-wide 
deflator for Y, but an arguably more appropriate services-sector-specific deflator for E). This 
would quite reasonably lead to different ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ ratios being computed, with 
different interpretations arising from their application. The complicating factor then becomes 
identifying the ‘correct’ deflator to be used, even more so when considering education 
spending magnitudes for which suitable education-specific deflators are very rarely available 
for a wide range of countries – see, for example, Rothstein and Miles (1995) for a good 
discussion of this point. What this often means is papers purporting to be using ‘real’ 
measures of education spending are, more often than not, using the wrong deflators anyway or 
deflators that are not sector-specific, making their findings just as ‘flawed’ as any other paper 




In terms of testing for whether or not cointegration exists (testing for cointegration between 
variables rather than checking for a unit root in a specific variable), when using an ECM, one 
would be interested in knowing whether or not the coefficient on the lagged level dependent 
variable on the right-hand side (a type of AR term) is significantly different from zero. Under 
the null hypothesis that β3 or θ3 from Equation (1) or (2), respectively, equals zero, rejecting 
the null means cointegration exists (the process is deemed stationary), and shows the 
 
48 A ‘real’ measure that has undergone a within-country inflation adjustment using a GDP deflator or a consumer 
price index (CPI) deflator, may very well overstate the level of real education expenditure. Hanushek and Rivkin 
(1997), and Rothstein and Mishel (1997) discuss suitable deflators for education. The best approach would be to 
apply a specific education services deflator, but this type of deflator is either not available or only available for a 
relatively few wealthy countries, and only over a relatively short timeframe – certainly not suitable for my global 
panel-data analysis purposes. The next best option would be to apply some or other services-sector deflator, 
similar in spirit to the approach adopted by Rothstein and Miles (1995). One might distinguish between four 
possible deflators (from most preferred to least preferred) when computing a ‘real’ measure of education 
spending: education services; services-sector; CPI and GDP deflators. Owing to problems of obtaining suitable 
data for the first two deflators, the last two deflators (CPI and GDP or economy-wide deflators) are typically 
used by econometricians, with the latter (GDP deflator) being most commonly applied, for practical data 
reasons. However, although not the case in this chapter because I use ‘ratio’ measures on both sides of the 
regression equation, for interest sake, with regards to studies purporting to use ‘real’ measures of education 
spending that have been computed using a GDP (or, by the same token, CPI) deflator, the following caveat or 
general principle, of sorts, would need to be borne in mind: 
 
If GDP deflator = Education Services deflator, then real education spending is correctly deflated (no deflation bias results) 
If GDP deflator > Education Services deflator, then real education spending is over deflated or understated (downward deflation bias results) 




proportion of re-equilibration (hence, the negative sign) back towards the long-run tendency 




Incorporating one-way or two-way fixed effects might be of interest in the modelling process. 
There are two types of fixed effects that might be deemed necessary to consider. Country 
fixed effects (country-specific, time-invariant effects) are best considered using a suitable 
fixed-effects estimator or by explicitly including a set of country dummies in the estimation 
procedure. Country fixed effects essentially capture heterogeneity or time-invariant behaviour 
in education spending across countries, and are useful to model those components of spending 
that remain relatively fixed over time or, more importantly, control for the possible biasing 
effect of omitted time-invariant factors that might be correlated with the included regressors.  
 
Although using a political democracy variable on the right-hand side would control for slowly 
time-varying effects, they would not necessarily cater for time-invariant effects, per se, hence, 
the importance of considering country fixed effects. Most past studies of national-level 
education spending almost routinely consider such effects, and not without good reason. For 
example, political-institutional factors, in particular, that change very little over time, might 
play a very important role, and would ideally be captured using a country-specific dummy 
variable. Another way to think of the interpretation of significant country fixed effects in each 
case is to say they are possibly indicative of education spending comprising a significant 
portion of ‘fixed’ costs, such as recurrent expenditure that remains relatively stable from one 
year to the next (e.g., barring year-on-year inflation adjustments even Ministry of Education 
payroll or salaries might comprise a large fixed, time-invariant component). Put differently, 
 
49 It would be interesting to point out the following. A Dickey-Fuller test entails fitting a linear model of the 
form 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡. However, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, used to eradicate or 
remedy a problem of serial correlation in this model, entails rather fitting a linear model of the form ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 +
𝛽𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜉1Δ𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝜉2Δ𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝜉𝑘Δ𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑡. Testing that Beta (β) – the coefficient attached to the 
AR term or, for my purposes, the lagged logged level dependent variable on the right-hand side – in the latter 
‘augmented’ model is equal to zero is tantamount to testing whether Rho (ρ) in the former model is equal to one, 
and is equivalent to saying the variable 𝑦𝑡  follows a unit root process (see Stata Time-Series Reference Manual 
Release 15, p. 158). Insofar as functional form is concerned, the latter (augmented) model is similar in 
specification to the standard ECM, which explains why checking for the significance of the parameter attached 
to the AR term is important for establishing whether a single cointegrated (stationary) process exists. I do 
acknowledge the fact the ADF equation is univariate and the ECM test for cointegration generally contains at 
least one X variable. Also, whether I specify ∆yit as a function of yit-1 or yit as a function of yit-1, ceteris paribus, 
the specification is mathematically the same and produces the same coefficient estimates and standard errors, 
except the coefficient attached to the lagged level dependent variable is greater by a magnitude of 1 in the case 
of the latter. Bear in mind, with the ECM specification, the estimated coefficient on the lagged level dependent 
variable comprises the error-correction speed of adjustment parameter (rate of re-equilibration). 
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significant country fixed effects, means the education sector might broadly be characterised as 
a ‘fixed-states’ sector in the sense there are components of education spending that are not 
responsive to changes in the size of government or are, at the very least, very slowly time-
varying. 
 
Time fixed effects (year-specific, country-invariant effects) are another useful dimension to 
consider, not least because issues related to common behaviour across countries (cross-
sectional correlation or cross-section dependence) might very well impose a biasing effect on 
the coefficient of interest if such effects are, indeed, correlated with government spending. In 
essence, they potentially capture ‘common shocks’ or common effects (i.e., resulting from a 
global recession or spillover effects) that occur across countries. In this way, by using a set of 
year dummies in the estimation procedure, one can control for the possible biasing effect of 
omitted country-invariant factors that might be correlated with the included regressors. 
 
However, there are two possible noteworthy limitations of considering year effects in the 
context of this chapter. First, since this chapter basically assumes common or homogeneous 
slopes, one has arguably already imposed a degree of commonality on the data-generating 
process across countries. This brings into question what effect year dummies might be picking 
up on. Second, since any year effects are implicitly assumed to be ‘country-invariant’ in 
nature (homogeneous common effects), one could argue this is not necessarily a realistic 
assumption to make because the ‘common shocks’ assumption is not going to apply in the 
same way to all countries in question. For example, the recent global financial crisis (GFC) 
did not necessarily affect all middle-income countries in the same way, especially with 
respect to public spending patterns, because some of these countries may well have been 
better insulated against the financial and economic consequences of such an event, meaning 
their fiscal behaviour might plausibly vary heterogeneously. In this case, it would make sense 








50 Considering the role of common (year) effects in a more flexible estimation environment, by using a suitable 
heterogeneous parameter (MG) estimator is the subject of inquiry in Chapter 5. 
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4.4 Data Collection and Description of the Data 
 
4.4.1 Data Collected 
 
Table 15 presents the data collected for Chapter 4. Because the World Bank acts as a 
repository of sorts for data from various sources, for the original sources of these variables, 
please refer to the World Bank sources in the references list. For example, although one can 
source education spending data from the World Bank’s Education Statistics (EdStats) 
database, these data come from the UIS database. The names and details of all variables are 
given in Table 15. 
 
In addition to considering all countries, Appendices B and D list the names of countries 
comprising the 21OECD countries, middle-income countries, richer countries and poorer 
countries samples. The 21 ‘core’ OECD countries have remained the same over the entire 
study time period, 1989 to 2015, and are the same as those used by Busemeyer (2007) in his 
study of OECD democracies from roughly 1981 to 2001. Two outcome measures of education 
spending are considered, namely, the national effort and budget share measures (psegdptot 
and psegovtot, respectively). The explanatory variable of interest in each case is total 
government spending (gov1). The baseline and IV models use either 4 controls (gdppc1, 
trade, fiscbal2 and debt2) or 10 controls (gdppc1, trade, fiscbal2, debt2, xconst, pop024, 
urban, hci, pop65 and military).  
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psegdptot Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2551 1989-2015 World Bank EdStats 
psegovtot Public spending on education, total (% of total government expenditure) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2255 1989-2015 World Bank EdStats 
Explanatory Variables of Interest 
gov1 General government total expenditure (IMF, % of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4237 1989-2015 World Bank TCdata360 
Control Variables 
gdppc1 GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international dollars) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4803 1990-2015 World Bank WDI 
trade Trade or exports plus imports of goods & services (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4785 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
fiscbal2 Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4184 1990-2015 World Bank DPG 
debt2 General government gross debt (IMF, % of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3796 1989-2015 World Bank TCdata360 
xconst Political constraint on the executive: 1 (least) to 7 (most) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4149 1989-2015 Gurr’s Polity IV Project 
pop024 Population ages 0-24 (% of total population) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4714 1990-2015 World Bank EdStats 
urban Urban population (% of total population) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 5799 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
hci Human capital index (PWT 9.0) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3703 1989-2014 Penn World Table 9.0 
pop65 Population ages 65 and above (% of total population) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 5234 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
military Military expenditure (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 3870 1989-2015 World Bank WDI 
 
Notes: EdStats refers to the World Bank’s Education Statistics database (see World Bank, 2017a). TCdata360 refers to the World Bank’s TCdata360 database (see World Bank, 
2017b). WDI refers to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (see World Bank, 2017c). DPG refers to the World  Bank’s Development Prospects Group: A 
Cross-Country Database of Fiscal Space (see World Bank, 2017d). Founder Ted Robert Gurr’s Polity IV Project refers to the Polity IV Dataset used (see Center for Systemic Peace, 
2016). The pop024 variable is the sum of pop014 and pop1524 variables available from the EdStats database. See Feenstra et al. (2015) for the Penn World Table 9.0 source. 
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4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
  
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 16 show the pooled (overall) statistics, as well as 
the overall, between and within standard deviations for the variables used in this chapter. 
Three interesting features of the data are noticeable. One, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the relatively smaller average number of time-series observations – roughly half the 
number in most cases – for the two education spending measures is indicative of a dataset that 
is more strongly unbalanced. Two, with respect to a number of the variables (psegdptot, 
psegovtot, gov1, gdppc1, trade, fiscbal2 and debt2), irrespective of which sample is 
considered, outlier observations would seem to be a particular problem (see the respective 
statistics for the maximum, minimum and overall standard deviation). There are a number of 
ways this could be dealt with (e.g., use of a robust estimator; a ‘heuristic’ method such as 
picking observations more than 3 standard deviations from the mean; Cook’s distance 
measure and DFBETA influence statistics to test the ‘leverage’ effect of X on Y). For my 
purposes, I use a robust estimator and a heuristic method to deal with outliers (see the 
Research Methodology section). Three, although the political constraint on the executive 
government (xconst) is, strictly speaking, an ordinal measure, ranging from 1 to 7, it can be 
treated as a continuous measure for empirical purposes. 
 
Tests of Correlation 
 
The various correlation matrices for all variables by sample are presented in Tables 17 to 21. 
They comprise ‘raw’ pairwise correlations and not partial pairwise correlations, where the 
former (latter) comprises an unconditional (conditional) pairwise correlation. In simple terms, 
an unconditional pairwise correlation means the other covariates are not controlled for when 
computing the correlation between two (continuous) measures. The correlations are computed 
on a casewise or listwise deletion basis and not on a pairwise deletion basis. What this means 
is correlation statistics are based on the total number of complete rows (no missing values for 
any variable), which equals the sample size (see the notes to each table). 
 
Not only do the two education spending measures (psegdptot and psegovtot) correlate 
significantly and to varying degrees with the associated government spending explanatory 
variable of interest (gov1) and controls (gdppc1, trade, fiscbal2, debt2, xconst, pop024, urban, 
hci, pop65 and military), but many of the controls also correlate to a greater or lesser degree 
with government spending. In other words, although the controls are deemed important 
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‘determinants’ of education spending, they are also correlated with government spending, so 
omitting them from a regression specification of fiscal cyclicality is likely to impose a biasing 
effect. This is the rationale for including them as additional regressors in my various model 
specifications. Also, one will notice there are many significant inter-correlations (correlations 
between various explanatory variables), but very few of these correlations seem large enough 
to impose a severe collinearity problem (multicollinearity), at least based on pairwise 
correlations. Strictly, performing pairwise correlations does not rule out the possibility of 
perfect multicollinearity if a linear combination of more than two variables exists. 
 
The sign and significance of the correlations of interest, psegdptot and gov1 or psegovtot and 
gov1, accord with the positive significant and negative significant expectations, respectively, 
across all samples. Even the correlations with respect to each spending measure and the 
control variables very often report sensible interpretations. For example, public debt (debt2) is 
negatively associated with both measures as debt imposes a constraint on both forms of 
education spending. Youth-aged population (pop024) is mostly positively associated with the 
budget share measure because larger youth populations are associated with prioritisation of 
the total budget allocation in favour of education. However, the significant negative 
correlation for the national effort measure might be indicative of progressively richer 
countries having smaller youth populations. 
 
Conditional Pairwise Scatterplots 
 
Appendix M shows the conditional pairwise scatterplots for each of the two outcome 
measures by sample. Since this chapter is most interested in cyclical (short-run) effects, the 
log-difference national effort or budget share measure is plotted against the log-difference 
size of government conditional on all other explanatory variables. The line of best fit 
represents the linear prediction of this relationship. In most cases, an approximately linear 
relationship is exhibited, meaning the application of linear panel-data methods is appropriate. 
What these plots show is that cyclical effects are evidenced, but these patterns seem to be 
better evidenced for the richer cohorts (21 OECD and richer countries), with no evidence of 
significant cyclical effects for the poorest cohort (poorer countries). Bear in mind, although 
these conditional scatterplots incorporate (heteroskedasticity) robust standard errors, which 
are only relevant for assessing significance of the slope estimate and does not otherwise affect 
the scatter plot, they do not explicitly cater for outlier observations when estimating the 
coefficients of interest. Outliers may very well affect the precision with which the parameters 
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of the fitted regression lines can be estimated. What these plots also show is changes in the 
size of government are positively (negatively) related to changes in the national effort (budget 
share) measure of education spending, consistent with the prediction from the previous 
chapter that, as countries grow and develop, their national effort (budget share) towards 





Table 16: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Statistic psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 trade fiscbal2 debt2 xconst pop024 urban hci pop65 military 
 ALL COUNTRIES 
Mean 4.505 14.849 31.938 15111 86.996 -2.299 57.015 4.790 49.977 55.788 2.342 7.073 2.433 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 2.007 5.036 17.871 18507 52.290 13.715 49.714 2.133 13.687 24.901 0.694 4.814 3.210 
Std. Dev. (Between) 1.988 4.566 13.175 18625 46.836 5.706 38.888 1.924 13.230 24.736 0.677 4.685 2.577 
Std. Dev. (Within) 1.109 2.742 12.195 4551 21.717 12.383 33.032 0.908 3.451 3.363 0.165 1.113 2.235 
Minimum 0.781 2.563 0.000 247 0.021 -505.442 0.000 1 20.160 5.342 1.028 0.697 0.000 
Maximum 44.334 47.279 539.233 137164 531.737 122.188 789.833 7 73.288 100.000 3.734 26.342 117.388 
Countries 193 181 190 195 193 191 186 165 184 215 143 195 166 
Years 13.2 12.5 22.3 24.6 24.8 21.9 20.4 25.1 25.6 27.0 25.9 26.8 23.3 
Observations 2551 2255 4237 4803 4785 4184 3796 4149 4714 5799 3703 5234 3870 
 21 OECD COUNTRIES 
Mean 5.352 12.245 45.116 37269 71.044 -2.411 68.383 6.952 30.715 77.289 3.164 15.563 1.760 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 1.165 2.552 8.153 8875 35.467 4.690 38.339 0.213 3.760 9.676 0.371 2.677 0.802 
Std. Dev. (Between) 1.105 2.477 7.470 7631 33.952 3.280 31.868 0.218 3.091 9.529 0.360 2.119 0.741 
Std. Dev. (Within) 0.528 1.085 3.697 4818 12.508 3.417 21.406 0.000 2.242 2.645 0.119 1.698 0.347 
Minimum 1.934 5.595 28.012 20167 15.924 -32.129 9.683 6 22.431 47.391 1.911 10.519 0.351 
Maximum 8.627 19.690 68.393 65072 221.981 18.458 249.114 7 44.617 97.858 3.734 26.342 5.375 
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Years 21.3 20.9 26.0 26.0 27.0 25.4 25.7 27.0 26.0 27.0 26.0 27.0 27.0 
Observations 447 439 547 546 566 534 539 566 546 567 546 567 567 
 MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Mean 4.477 16.172 30.639 7493 85.657 -2.832 52.993 4.484 53.730 49.848 2.199 5.617 2.216 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 2.054 5.396 20.581 5460 43.290 17.233 40.798 2.034 10.006 19.240 0.521 3.127 1.724 
Std. Dev. (Between) 2.131 4.683 13.868 4884 37.481 6.732 30.732 1.813 9.345 18.919 0.494 3.006 1.394 
Std. Dev. (Within) 0.994 3.169 15.548 2681 21.492 15.721 28.062 0.978 3.664 3.928 0.180 0.882 0.988 
Minimum 0.781 4.964 0.000 704 0.021 -505.442 0.000 1 24.039 12.977 1.035 1.739 0.000 
Maximum 14.539 44.802 539.233 50640 531.737 122.188 454.864 7 71.738 91.751 3.411 20.027 19.432 
Countries 100 95 105 106 103 105 101 90 100 107 72 103 89 
Years 12.0 11.1 22.0 25.2 25.2 21.6 19.8 25.3 25.8 27.0 25.9 26.7 23.1 
Observations 1195 1050 2306 2670 2599 2273 1998 2274 2575 2887 1864 2754 2060 
 RICHER COUNTRIES 
Mean 5.077 11.900 45.811 40297 86.054 -2.198 63.943 6.947 30.750 74.852 3.109 15.445 1.731 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 1.543 2.630 8.288 12944 54.937 4.775 30.856 0.224 3.672 20.139 0.378 2.384 0.865 
Std. Dev. (Between) 1.607 2.504 8.596 11836 50.963 3.345 26.943 0.229 3.060 20.341 0.364 1.988 0.857 
Std. Dev. (Within) 0.571 1.121 3.650 5808 19.870 3.461 17.225 0.000 2.137 2.263 0.131 1.383 0.354 
Minimum 0.914 5.009 17.764 20167 19.360 -32.129 6.455 6 23.091 14.289 1.911 10.519 0.123 
Maximum 8.627 17.926 68.393 97438 391.497 18.458 180.063 7 44.617 100.000 3.734 22.410 5.375 
Countries 25 23 21 21 22 21 21 19 20 30 20 21 20 
Years 18.7 18.6 25.0 25.9 25.5 24.5 24.7 26.9 26.0 27.0 26.0 27.0 25.9 
Observations 468 428 526 544 561 515 518 512 520 810 520 567 517 
 POORER COUNTRIES 
Mean 4.138 16.451 24.711 4880 74.813 -2.427 63.982 4.400 59.892 40.411 1.864 3.935 2.081 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 2.316 5.085 9.402 4641 41.925 6.636 61.754 1.893 7.644 19.544 0.492 1.452 2.573 
Std. Dev. (Between) 2.099 4.520 7.883 4459 37.749 3.841 45.500 1.531 7.128 19.225 0.469 1.355 2.843 
Std. Dev. (Within) 1.422 3.089 5.017 1272 18.907 5.579 44.628 1.109 2.870 4.122 0.157 0.546 1.430 
Minimum 0.805 2.563 0.000 247 0.309 -46.235 0.000 1 31.174 5.342 1.028 1.601 0.000 
Maximum 44.334 36.737 82.081 25312 321.632 122.188 789.833 7 73.288 91.751 3.411 10.927 39.607 
Countries 79 78 81 81 81 81 80 79 81 82 67 82 77 
Years 13.1 12.1 22.1 25.1 24.9 21.7 19.2 24.9 25.9 27.0 26.0 27.0 23.2 
Observations 1037 945 1787 2035 2020 1754 1537 1965 2094 2210 1742 2210 1790 
 






Table 17: Correlation Matrix for All Countries 
 
 psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 trade fiscbal2 debt2 xconst pop024 urban hci pop65 military 
psegdptot 1             
psegovtot 0.434*** 1            
gov1 0.572*** -0.433*** 1           
gdppc1 0.269*** -0.281*** 0.530*** 1          
trade 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.0568** 0.233*** 1         
fiscbal2 0.0618** 0.197*** -0.140*** 0.313*** 0.163*** 1        
debt2 -0.0918*** -0.230*** 0.146*** 0.0410 -0.00799 -0.299*** 1       
xconst 0.281*** -0.250*** 0.509*** 0.231*** -0.0474* -0.192*** 0.00937 1      
pop024 -0.268*** 0.453*** -0.705*** -0.695*** -0.167*** 0.00809 -0.0231 -0.577*** 1     
urban 0.261*** -0.253*** 0.494*** 0.698*** 0.0785*** 0.182*** 0.00948 0.335*** -0.684*** 1    
hci 0.344*** -0.347*** 0.635*** 0.600*** 0.188*** 0.00388 -0.0274 0.573*** -0.845*** 0.652*** 1   
pop65 0.288*** -0.478*** 0.755*** 0.551*** 0.0514** -0.0944*** 0.115*** 0.631*** -0.908*** 0.577*** 0.782*** 1  
military 0.0903*** -0.0421 0.0985*** 0.147*** -0.0328 0.0849*** 0.0838*** -0.296*** 0.0504** 0.166*** -0.0129 -0.110*** 1 
 
Notes: The sample size is 1524. Significance levels are as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 18: Correlation Matrix for 21 OECD Countries 
 
 psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 trade fiscbal2 debt2 xconst pop024 urban hci pop65 military 
psegdptot 1             
psegovtot 0.620*** 1            
gov1 0.443*** -0.400*** 1           
gdppc1 0.364*** 0.496*** -0.162*** 1          
trade 0.220*** 0.117** 0.124** 0.367*** 1         
fiscbal2 0.341*** 0.511*** -0.216*** 0.514*** 0.142*** 1        
debt2 -0.388*** -0.533*** 0.133*** -0.157*** -0.0984** -0.450*** 1       
xconst -0.0121 0.184*** -0.256*** 0.101** 0.161*** 0.0789 0.0185 1      
pop024 0.180*** 0.437*** -0.237*** -0.104** 0.0324 0.118** -0.523*** -0.0733 1     
urban 0.303*** 0.250*** 0.0115 0.161*** -0.0517 0.163*** 0.0413 0.0187 -0.0408 1    
hci 0.263*** 0.478*** -0.281*** 0.618*** -0.00975 0.280*** -0.0720 0.152*** -0.0346 0.535*** 1   
pop65 -0.125** -0.427*** 0.300*** -0.00275 -0.133*** -0.114** 0.554*** -0.0396 -0.871*** 0.0858* -0.0291 1  
Military -0.0868* -0.120** 0.0416 -0.221*** -0.537*** -0.221*** -0.0739 -0.310*** 0.298*** -0.0193 -0.106** -0.111** 1 
 







Table 19: Correlation Matrix for Middle-Income Countries 
 
 psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 trade fiscbal2 debt2 xconst pop024 urban hci pop65 military 
psegdptot 1             
psegovtot 0.723*** 1            
gov1 0.575*** -0.0733* 1           
gdppc1 0.0220 -0.0513 0.138*** 1          
trade 0.353*** 0.231*** 0.223*** -0.0124 1         
fiscbal2 0.0483 0.147*** -0.0697* 0.125*** 0.147*** 1        
debt2 -0.0491 -0.148*** 0.0902** -0.292*** 0.0117 -0.264*** 1       
xconst 0.175*** -0.000346 0.222*** 0.149*** -0.0772** -0.186*** -0.0126 1      
pop024 -0.0155 0.224*** -0.331*** -0.557*** -0.00464 0.0482 0.186*** -0.352*** 1     
urban 0.0650* -0.0184 0.171*** 0.665*** -0.259*** 0.148*** -0.168*** 0.196*** -0.426*** 1    
hci 0.133*** -0.173*** 0.384*** 0.403*** 0.158*** -0.0264 -0.122*** 0.340*** -0.707*** 0.360*** 1   
pop65 0.0284 -0.267*** 0.396*** 0.407*** -0.00949 0.0156 -0.137*** 0.306*** -0.881*** 0.390*** 0.643*** 1  
military -0.0119 -0.241*** 0.274*** -0.115*** -0.0922** 0.0407 0.126*** -0.260*** 0.0655* -0.0837** -0.0998*** 0.00610 1 
 
Notes: The sample size is 668. Significance levels are as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 20: Correlation Matrix for Richer Countries 
 
 psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 trade fiscbal2 debt2 xconst pop024 urban hci pop65 military 
psegdptot 1             
psegovtot 0.625*** 1            
gov1 0.473*** -0.359*** 1           
gdppc1 0.298*** 0.563*** -0.292*** 1          
trade 0.0340 0.0789 -0.0766 0.512*** 1         
fiscbal2 0.288*** 0.496*** -0.257*** 0.545*** 0.144*** 1        
debt2 -0.225*** -0.469*** 0.259*** -0.316*** -0.0977* -0.491*** 1       
xconst -0.00218 0.184*** -0.242*** 0.123** 0.191*** 0.0873* 0.00892 1      
pop024 0.0642 0.276*** -0.182*** -0.0370 0.0297 0.0192 -0.305*** -0.109** 1     
urban 0.386*** 0.185*** 0.204*** 0.272*** 0.140*** 0.198*** -0.0243 -0.0139 -0.123** 1    
hci 0.353*** 0.545*** -0.212*** 0.617*** 0.0729 0.314*** -0.186*** 0.135** -0.0588 0.497*** 1   
pop65 0.0234 -0.278*** 0.302*** -0.114** -0.193*** -0.0185 0.294*** -0.0370 -0.825*** 0.130** -0.0387 1  
military -0.134** -0.131** -0.0109 -0.299*** -0.632*** -0.277*** 0.120** -0.310*** 0.297*** 0.00530 -0.0858 -0.0394 1 
 






Table 21: Correlation Matrix for Poorer Countries 
 
 psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 trade fiscbal2 debt2 xconst pop024 urban hci pop65 military 
psegdptot 1             
psegovtot 0.746*** 1            
gov1 0.641*** 0.0627 1           
gdppc1 0.220*** 0.0452 0.287*** 1          
trade 0.329*** 0.203*** 0.258*** 0.219*** 1         
fiscbal2 0.0613 0.140*** -0.00739 0.0318 0.132*** 1        
debt2 -0.229*** -0.300*** 0.00663 -0.219*** -0.0133 -0.178*** 1       
xconst 0.267*** 0.172*** 0.195*** 0.332*** -0.0457 -0.121*** -0.122*** 1      
pop024 -0.0906** 0.0385 -0.195*** -0.803*** -0.0993** 0.101** 0.142*** -0.490*** 1     
urban 0.121*** -0.0379 0.240*** 0.732*** -0.0554 0.0878** -0.121*** 0.319*** -0.554*** 1    
hci 0.298*** 0.0797** 0.331*** 0.779*** 0.212*** -0.00388 -0.186*** 0.451*** -0.788*** 0.642*** 1   
pop65 0.104*** -0.0245 0.186*** 0.728*** -0.00427 -0.0295 -0.0942** 0.421*** -0.883*** 0.563*** 0.715*** 1  
military 0.0444 -0.199*** 0.302*** -0.120*** -0.0419 0.00575 0.147*** -0.166*** 0.109*** -0.174*** -0.0687* -0.131*** 1 
 






















The relevant tabular results (see Tables 22 to 27) follow in the text and associated figures etc. 
are presented in the appendices (see Appendices N to R). In what follows, when speaking 
about the richer cohorts, I am making reference to the 21 OECD countries and richer 
countries samples. By the same token, when speaking about the poorer cohorts, I am speaking 
about the middle-income countries and poorer countries samples. I proceed by reporting and 
commenting on the important findings from each pair of tables, comprising the baseline 
models (Tables 22 and 23), the IV models (Tables 24 and 25) and the IV models excluding 
outlier observations (Tables 26 and 27). The shaded regression results from Tables 22 to 27 
(and Appendix P) are of most importance in this chapter. In all tables, two different 
specifications, with four controls and ten controls are presented. The choice of four controls is 
based on using a specification more closely resembling the one used by Afonso and Jalles 
(2013), and Arze del Granado et al. (2013). An alternative specification with ten controls is 
also used throughout as a way to deal with one possible source of endogeneity (omitted 
variables that are likely to also be correlated with size of government). Two-way fixed effects 
are assumed to be part of the data-generating process, so country and year dummies are used 
in all model specifications, but are not reported to save space.51 For the interested reader who 
may be curious about how exactly the various differential variables, and lags and differences 
thereof were pre-generated, Appendix O gives a representative example for the Netherlands 
and Norway of how these variables were computed. Note that, in this chapter, I made use of 
pre-generated interaction variables as opposed to simply using factor-variable interaction 
notation in the Stata command-line code, which was done for reasons of simplifying the 





51 To this end, preliminary inquiry revealed that, regardless of sample chosen, cyclical patterns of education 
spending were generally not exhibited when using various pooled estimators, but were well-evidenced when 
country and/or year fixed effects were included. 
52  Bear in mind, these ‘cyclical’ effects comprise mean differences – the differential slope coefficients show by 
how much the mean relationship between the national effort or budget share and size of government during 
periods of cyclical downturn (‘bad’ times) differs when compared against the mean relationship during periods 
of cyclical upturn (‘good’ times). By doing so, one is able to gauge whether or not there are cyclical differences 
in the fundamental relationship in question, ceteris paribus. No mean difference implies acyclical behaviour; a 
positive mean difference implies counter-cyclical behaviour and a negative mean difference implies procyclical 
behaviour (see Footnote 40).  
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4.5.2 Results and Findings 
 
For the baseline models (Tables 22 and 23), a robust two-way fixed-effects estimator with 
four or ten controls is used. A robust estimator is used to deal with outlier observations. 
Although the results for the country and year fixed effects are not reported to save space, the 
Wald result (p-value) for a joint test of significance is included when reporting the baseline 
models. The null hypothesis is that the applicable parameters are jointly equal to zero. Across 
all samples tested, country fixed effects or heterogeneity always comes out highly significant. 
Although, strictly speaking, country fixed effects capture time-invariant effects, there are a 
number of control variables that might be considered rather slowly time-varying, such as 
youth population, elderly population, urbanisation ratio, and, in particular, political constraint 
score, meaning, the use of panel fixed effects plausibly ‘soaks up’ or absorbs much of the 
variation explained by these factors, resulting in them very often having insignificant effects. 
However, the evidence concerning year fixed effects to capture common effects or common 
(global) shocks is better evidenced for the richer cohorts as shown by the applicable Wald test 
p-values – an interesting point to bear in mind for Chapter 5. 
 
Across all specifications and samples tested, a significant (negative) parameter attached to the 
lagged level dependent variable (AR term) is estimated, indicative of a cointegrated 
(stationary) process. For the most part, long-run (cyclical) effects are not exhibited across 
most samples. Although the signs attached to the empirical estimates of the β4 and θ4 
coefficients (see Table 14) loosely accord with the positive and negative expected signs, 
respectively, no significant differences in the long-run (levels) relationship are reported (β5 
and θ5 are not significant) as expected. The aforementioned finding concerning the long-run 
effects is not altogether surprising, given cyclical differences are short-run in nature, hence, 
the focus on the parameter attached to the short-run (growth) variable. 
 
Cyclical effects are particularly well evidenced for the log-difference (short-run) size of 
government variable across all samples, except the poorer countries sample. The signs 
attached to the empirical estimates of the β6 and θ6 coefficients (see Table 14) accord with the 
positive and negative expected signs, respectively. More importantly, significant effects 
during periods of cyclical downturn (‘bad’ times) are well evidenced as shown by the 
negative and significant estimates for both the β7 and θ7 coefficients across both outcome 
measures and all samples tested, except the poorer countries sample. These effects show that 




To remedy for possible dynamic panel bias – a source of endogeneity that arises when 
estimating a dynamic model in the context of country fixed effects – a robustness check is 
conducted that makes use of a (two-way fixed-effects) FEIV 2SLS estimator. For the IV 
models including outliers (Tables 24 and 25), the second lag of the level dependent variable 
is used as suitable instrument for the first lag of the same variable. For both the national effort 
and budget share measures, evidence of cointegration is not exhibited for the two richer 
cohorts in both cases, but is still evidenced for the other samples tested. However, short-run 
(cyclical) effects are now only exhibited for the two richer cohorts for both education 
spending measures and middle-income countries for the budget share measure. Although the 
results for the IV models weaken the conclusions about cointegration and cyclical effects 
somewhat, it must be borne in mind these models do not cater for outlier observations in any 
way. 
 
As a general comment, the scatterplots of the residuals for both the baseline and IV model 
variants (Appendices Q and R, respectively) to see if there is any ‘pattern’ left in the residuals 
shows no visual evidence of serial correlation. A plot of the residuals in the current period (et) 
against the residuals in the previous period (et-1) for each outcome measure and sample tested, 
shows a reasonably random allocation centred around zero. More formally, although the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation (Arellano & Bond, 1991) using the Stata programme 
“abar” cannot be performed after using the robust estimator, it can be used after the 
“ivregress” command in Stata. For the IV models including outliers, the p-value for the 
associated test statistic, using either one or two lags, most often does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation across all samples. 
 
Two additional observations, regarding variation of the residuals and outlier observations, can 
be made. Firstly, what seems to be a tighter grouping of residuals for the richer cohorts makes 
some sense because these two samples (21 OECD and richer countries) are more likely to 
comprise countries similar in education spending patterns than would be the case for samples 
comprising all countries or middle-income and/or poorer countries. Bear in mind, samples of 
data that lack sufficient variation might hamper the estimation of (significant) parameters. 
Secondly, scatterplots of the residuals, whether for the baseline or IV models, seem to show 
outlier or extreme observations, in particular for the two richer cohorts. Although there only 
appear to be a few outliers in most cases, they could nonetheless have a harmful effect. The 
baseline models use a robust estimator to down-weight extreme observations in the estimation 
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sample. However, since the IV models ostensibly use a conventional least-squares approach, 
it would be of interest to take account of possible outliers when effecting IV estimation.  
 
As an additional robustness check, I use the residuals from the IV model in each case to 
identify and exclude outliers based on the simple heuristic that extreme observations are 
defined as being greater than 3 standard deviations either side of the mean residual. For the IV 
models excluding outliers (Tables 26 and 27), extreme observations are excluded from the 
respective sample when effecting IV estimation. In short, outliers can have a particularly 
harmful effect on the estimates, even when extreme observations are only few in number. 
This phenomenon is shown very well when comparing the results for the IV models both 
including and excluding outliers. 
 
One can gauge the extent of the outlier problem for each sample and model, by taking the 
difference between the total number of observations (bottom row of each table) from Tables 
24 and 26, and Tables 25 and 27, respectively. Extreme observations are limited to no more 
than a handful of observations, except in the case of the all countries sample, where outliers 
can exceed 10 observations. The cointegrating parameter and short-run (cyclical) effects of 
interest now come out more strongly significant. The parameter attached to the lagged level 
dependent variable in each case, seems to be particularly sensitive to few outlier observations. 
Although the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation for the two richer cohorts using 1 lag 
shows possible evidence of serial correlation, this does not seem to be the case when 2 lags 
are considered. It could be argued that, since the IV models implicitly consider 2 lags in the 
2SLS process, 2 lags are effectively considered as part of the AR process, meaning 
autocorrelation is not necessarily a problem. Therefore, for the IV models, excluding few 
outliers only strengthens conclusions about cointegration and significant cyclical effects for 
both measures of education spending, particularly so for the two richer cohorts. In summary, 
what including (versus excluding) outliers in the 21 OECD and richer countries samples, for 
example, does show is that a few extreme observations can have a particularly detrimental 
effect on the size and significance of the estimate of the cointegrating parameter. Moreover, 
regardless of cointegration, since this chapter is about ‘cyclicality’ a lack of evidence in 
support of cointegration does not rule out the fact that short-run (cyclical) patterns of 
behaviour may still be evidenced, which seems to be the case for the estimate of interest in 
this chapter (the coefficient attached to the first-differenced size of government variable 




Table 22: Dynamic Models of the National Effort Measure and Cyclical Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: psegdptot, change (∆) All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
National effort (psegdptot), lagged level (t-1) -0.241*** -0.251*** -0.197*** -0.215*** -0.267*** -0.292*** -0.099*** -0.167*** -0.295*** -0.418*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.035) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.041) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) # Bad times dummy 0.007 0.008 -0.039* -0.040* 0.043 0.051 -0.011 -0.012 0.011 0.057 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.025) (0.037) (0.045) 
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy -0.077 -0.205*** -0.458*** -0.361*** -0.111 -0.188* -0.619*** -0.522*** 0.023 -0.163 
 (0.047) (0.053) (0.101) (0.104) (0.087) (0.110) (0.093) (0.111) (0.097) (0.124) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) 0.139*** 0.128*** 0.054 0.066 0.098* 0.107 0.064 0.131 0.141** 0.117 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.063) (0.071) (0.051) (0.070) (0.073) (0.084) (0.058) (0.081) 
Gov., change (∆) 0.169*** 0.275*** 0.552*** 0.511*** 0.140* 0.162 0.799*** 0.747*** 0.184** 0.102 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.117) (0.121) (0.077) (0.104) (0.117) (0.130) (0.080) (0.101) 
Bad times dummy -0.026 -0.029 0.154* 0.154* -0.155* -0.172* 0.048 0.053 -0.044 -0.195 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.083) (0.086) (0.091) (0.104) (0.091) (0.097) (0.116) (0.141) 
Constant 0.197 -0.095 -1.037 -0.863 1.175*** -0.115 -1.220* -1.362 0.440 -1.237 
 (0.188) (0.445) (0.706) (1.064) (0.402) (1.324) (0.722) (1.156) (0.518) (2.158) 
           
Income per capita, lagged level (t-1) -0.057** -0.017 0.100* 0.069 -0.128*** -0.039 0.102* 0.119 -0.073 -0.104 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.060) (0.067) (0.045) (0.078) (0.057) (0.073) (0.067) (0.098) 
Income per capita, change (∆) -0.387*** -0.315*** 0.050 -0.076 -0.612*** -0.169 0.217 0.061 -0.457** -0.643*** 
 (0.075) (0.086) (0.161) (0.177) (0.149) (0.207) (0.154) (0.197) (0.186) (0.247) 
Trade, lagged level (t-1) 0.026 0.024 0.034 0.019 0.040 -0.010 0.025 -0.000 0.031 0.038 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.046) 
Trade, change (∆) -0.032 -0.028 -0.039 -0.064 -0.055 -0.040 0.008 0.001 0.014 0.171*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.052) (0.054) (0.046) (0.057) (0.055) (0.062) (0.050) (0.061) 
Fiscal balance, lagged level (t-1) 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance, change (∆) -0.002** -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Gross public debt, lagged level (t-1) -0.014** -0.025*** -0.005 0.009 -0.041** -0.047** -0.008 0.006 -0.007 -0.022 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) 
Gross public debt, change (∆) 0.017 0.019 0.059** 0.055* 0.010 0.021 0.045* 0.046 0.019 0.045 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.037) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) 
           
Political constraint, lagged level (t-1)  0.006  0.026  0.005  -0.005  0.013 
  (0.004)  (0.041)  (0.007)  (0.046)  (0.009) 
Political constraint, change (∆)  -0.006  0.000  -0.016  0.000  0.005 
  (0.005)  (.)  (0.011)  (.)  (0.010) 
Youth population, lagged level (t-1)  0.111*  -0.016  0.372  -0.026  0.608 
  (0.061)  (0.089)  (0.233)  (0.091)  (0.401) 
Youth population, change (∆)  0.442  -0.218  0.774  -0.354  6.974*** 
  (0.288)  (0.658)  (1.039)  (0.742)  (2.443) 
Urban population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.102*  0.059  -0.356***  0.004  -0.353** 
  (0.057)  (0.092)  (0.116)  (0.098)  (0.140) 
Urban population, change (∆)  -2.074***  0.218  -1.843  1.134  -1.605 
  (0.798)  (1.099)  (1.593)  (1.709)  (1.929) 
Human capital index, lagged level (t-1)  -0.041  -0.223  0.172  -0.235  0.479* 
  (0.094)  (0.157)  (0.189)  (0.240)  (0.269) 
Human capital index, change (∆)  0.729*  -1.878*  -0.287  -1.047  0.387 
  (0.442)  (1.022)  (0.818)  (1.179)  (1.027) 
Elderly population, lagged level (t-1)  0.055  0.021  0.405***  0.083  0.310* 
  (0.040)  (0.074)  (0.100)  (0.080)  (0.168) 
Elderly population, change (∆)  0.106  0.266  -0.460  0.497  0.098 
  (0.240)  (0.421)  (0.511)  (0.424)  (0.835) 
Military spending, lagged level (t-1)  0.011  -0.027  0.062*  -0.006  0.132*** 
  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.036) 
Military spending, change (∆)  0.055***  0.076*  0.116***  0.091**  0.188*** 
  (0.019)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.042) 
           
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Tests for Parameter Equality           
Wald test p-value (differential coefficients) 0.264 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.066 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.794 0.093 
Wald test p-value (country fixed effects) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Wald test p-value (year fixed effects) 0.023 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.594 0.000 0.000 0.153 0.019 
           
R-squared 0.428 0.484 0.592 0.611 0.364 0.433 0.627 0.622 0.332 0.466 
RMSE 0.0728 0.0627 0.0334 0.0337 0.0933 0.0859 0.0321 0.0326 0.1077 0.1028 
F-value 5.42*** 5.92*** 7.67*** 6.84*** 2.90*** 2.78*** 8.25*** 6.27*** 2.42*** 3.03*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries 155 120 21 21 78 60 20 19 72 58 
Years 10.2 10.2 17.1 17.1 8.9 8.4 16.6 16.5 8.9 8.1 
Observations 1587 1229 360 360 694 502 332 314 641 467 
 
Notes: See Appendix N for additional table notes. Robust regression standard errors are given in parentheses. 













Table 23: Dynamic Models of the Budget Share Measure and Cyclical Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: psegovtot, change (∆) All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
Budget share (psegovtot), lagged level (t-1) -0.327*** -0.336*** -0.295*** -0.318*** -0.339*** -0.317*** -0.279*** -0.280*** -0.358*** -0.447*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.041) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) # Bad times dummy 0.006 0.017 -0.023 -0.021 0.037 0.041 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.043 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.033) (0.025) (0.026) (0.036) (0.046) 
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy -0.178*** -0.310*** -0.373*** -0.289*** -0.091 -0.251** -0.332*** -0.394*** 0.022 -0.047 
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.104) (0.107) (0.091) (0.114) (0.099) (0.113) (0.096) (0.127) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) -0.168*** -0.171*** -0.206*** -0.238*** -0.196*** -0.144** -0.141** -0.120 -0.145** -0.269*** 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.063) (0.070) (0.054) (0.069) (0.069) (0.079) (0.057) (0.083) 
Gov., change (∆) -0.564*** -0.323*** -0.052 -0.072 -0.614*** -0.285*** -0.144 -0.351*** -0.689*** -0.778*** 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.121) (0.123) (0.081) (0.109) (0.125) (0.133) (0.080) (0.104) 
Bad times dummy -0.016 -0.057 0.092 0.078 -0.134 -0.142 0.012 0.027 -0.009 -0.154 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.087) (0.088) (0.095) (0.107) (0.098) (0.099) (0.115) (0.143) 
Constant 1.852*** 1.629*** 0.264 0.823 2.657*** 1.003 -0.322 0.017 1.800*** 0.308 
 (0.226) (0.460) (0.731) (1.080) (0.483) (1.370) (0.745) (1.152) (0.593) (2.209) 
           
Income per capita, lagged level (t-1) -0.060** -0.009 0.112* 0.069 -0.129*** -0.038 0.161*** 0.103 -0.076 -0.113 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.062) (0.069) (0.049) (0.082) (0.061) (0.074) (0.067) (0.100) 
Income per capita, change (∆) -0.182** -0.137 0.222 0.176 -0.584*** -0.386* 0.449*** 0.069 -0.324* -0.276 
 (0.079) (0.087) (0.167) (0.181) (0.157) (0.213) (0.165) (0.201) (0.184) (0.251) 
Trade, lagged level (t-1) 0.006 -0.005 0.011 0.026 0.010 -0.059 -0.037 -0.083** 0.029 -0.037 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.030) (0.038) (0.034) (0.046) 
Trade, change (∆) -0.075*** -0.040 -0.033 -0.042 -0.102** -0.177*** -0.002 -0.063 -0.067 -0.047 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.054) (0.055) (0.048) (0.059) (0.058) (0.063) (0.049) (0.062) 
Fiscal balance, lagged level (t-1) 0.002* -0.000 -0.003** -0.004*** 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance, change (∆) -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Gross public debt, lagged level (t-1) -0.017** -0.018** 0.011 0.022* -0.042** -0.030 0.001 0.010 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) 
Gross public debt, change (∆) 0.071*** 0.020 0.068** 0.067** -0.032 -0.033 0.041 0.041 0.030 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.038) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.036) 
           
Political constraint, lagged level (t-1)  -0.004  -0.005  -0.002  0.040  -0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.042)  (0.007)  (0.047)  (0.009) 
Political constraint, change (∆)  -0.000  0.000  -0.020*  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.006)  (.)  (0.011)  (.)  (0.011) 
Youth population, lagged level (t-1)  0.091  -0.008  0.375  0.021  0.800* 
  (0.062)  (0.093)  (0.239)  (0.094)  (0.410) 
Youth population, change (∆)  -0.586**  -0.459  1.333  -0.955  8.590*** 
  (0.291)  (0.677)  (1.069)  (0.760)  (2.495) 
Urban population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.136**  0.083  -0.281**  -0.005  -0.368** 
  (0.058)  (0.094)  (0.120)  (0.099)  (0.143) 
Urban population, change (∆)  -1.131  0.763  -2.318  2.362  -4.094** 
  (0.811)  (1.124)  (1.638)  (1.737)  (1.959) 
Human capital index, lagged level (t-1)  0.075  -0.114  0.194  -0.102  0.844*** 
  (0.096)  (0.159)  (0.195)  (0.245)  (0.277) 
Human capital index, change (∆)  0.447  -1.822*  -0.888  -0.232  0.339 
  (0.447)  (1.045)  (0.837)  (1.197)  (1.041) 
Elderly population, lagged level (t-1)  0.023  -0.078  0.192*  0.053  0.148 
  (0.041)  (0.078)  (0.103)  (0.083)  (0.171) 
Elderly population, change (∆)  0.236  0.341  -0.487  0.136  -1.005 
  (0.243)  (0.435)  (0.526)  (0.435)  (0.861) 
Military spending, lagged level (t-1)  -0.003  -0.013  0.002  -0.007  0.055 
  (0.013)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.036) 
Military spending, change (∆)  0.066***  0.082*  0.031  0.137***  0.177*** 
  (0.019)  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.046)  (0.043) 
           
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Tests for Parameter Equality           
Wald test p-value (differential coefficients) 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.056 0.170 0.040 0.008 0.008 0.908 0.296 
Wald test p-value (country fixed effects) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test p-value (year fixed effects) 0.168 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.648 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.407 0.034 
           
R-squared 0.568 0.569 0.537 0.554 0.482 0.463 0.594 0.670 0.520 0.571 
RMSE 0.0757 0.0630 0.0346 0.0344 0.0974 0.0881 0.0342 0.0331 0.1067 0.1044 
F-value 9.51*** 8.32*** 6.12*** 5.40*** 4.71*** 3.18*** 7.16*** 7.85*** 5.25*** 4.69*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries 153 117 21 21 79 60 19 18 73 56 
Years 10.2 10.3 17.1 17.1 8.7 8.3 17.4 17.3 8.7 8.3 
Observations 1564 1206 359 359 691 497 331 312 638 462 
 
Notes: See Appendix N for additional table notes. Robust regression standard errors are given in parentheses. 












Table 24: Dynamic FEIV (2SLS) Models of the National Effort Measure and Cyclical 
Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: psegdptot, change (∆) All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
National effort (psegdptot), lagged level (t-1) -0.358*** -0.469*** -0.087 -0.101 -0.403*** -0.540*** -0.126* -0.023 -0.323*** -0.587*** 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.100) (0.098) (0.066) (0.087) (0.070) (0.113) (0.087) (0.093) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) # Bad times dummy -0.015 -0.003 -0.053* -0.061* 0.030 0.040 -0.036 -0.033 -0.030 -0.015 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.048) 
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy -0.002 -0.067 -0.414*** -0.376*** -0.046 -0.097 -0.306* -0.486*** -0.030 -0.125 
 (0.085) (0.099) (0.146) (0.135) (0.119) (0.133) (0.156) (0.132) (0.128) (0.149) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) 0.299*** 0.381*** 0.190** 0.290*** 0.239*** 0.405*** 0.176 0.159 0.356*** 0.360*** 
 (0.057) (0.074) (0.094) (0.107) (0.080) (0.118) (0.110) (0.121) (0.094) (0.119) 
Gov., change (∆) 0.162** 0.229** 0.654*** 0.643*** 0.186* 0.266** 0.726*** 0.817*** 0.243** 0.293** 
 (0.076) (0.100) (0.156) (0.147) (0.095) (0.127) (0.182) (0.166) (0.110) (0.142) 
Bad times dummy 0.049 0.017 0.210* 0.244* -0.120 -0.136 0.152 0.142 0.104 0.057 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.120) (0.125) (0.099) (0.117) (0.135) (0.141) (0.128) (0.152) 
Constant 0.398 1.223 -1.903* -2.529* 1.170* 0.947 -1.038 -0.349 -0.254 -1.375 
 (0.399) (0.883) (1.085) (1.414) (0.644) (1.616) (1.135) (1.919) (0.873) (2.818) 
           
Income per capita, lagged level (t-1) -0.100** -0.042 0.130 0.133 -0.143** -0.064 0.078 0.108 -0.050 0.053 
 (0.043) (0.052) (0.081) (0.092) (0.066) (0.096) (0.086) (0.116) (0.099) (0.100) 
Income per capita, change (∆) -0.226* 0.088 0.192 0.118 -0.691*** -0.257 0.053 0.149 -0.323 0.114 
 (0.127) (0.163) (0.220) (0.229) (0.202) (0.284) (0.223) (0.256) (0.255) (0.318) 
Trade, lagged level (t-1) 0.040 0.002 0.018 0.001 0.089** -0.000 -0.015 -0.071 0.039 0.015 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) (0.048) (0.040) (0.052) (0.041) (0.048) 
Trade, change (∆) 0.008 -0.016 -0.047 -0.022 0.020 -0.070 0.018 0.017 0.067 0.042 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.072) (0.077) (0.067) (0.064) (0.074) (0.086) (0.070) (0.068) 
Fiscal balance, lagged level (t-1) 0.002* 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance, change (∆) -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.005* 0.004 0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gross public debt, lagged level (t-1) -0.014 -0.034** -0.020 -0.012 -0.061** -0.086*** -0.038* -0.022 -0.008 -0.054 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.033) 
Gross public debt, change (∆) 0.026 0.012 0.023 0.041 -0.043 -0.062 -0.044 0.027 0.035 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) (0.036) (0.040) 
           
Political constraint, lagged level (t-1)  0.006  0.012  0.013  -0.054  0.007 
  (0.007)  (0.068)  (0.010)  (0.101)  (0.010) 
Political constraint, change (∆)  0.006  0.000  0.008  0.000  0.001 
  (0.009)  (.)  (0.012)  (.)  (0.011) 
Youth population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.075  0.190  0.087  0.198  0.266 
  (0.140)  (0.162)  (0.259)  (0.188)  (0.516) 
Youth population, change (∆)  0.901  -1.505*  -0.183  -1.527  7.112*** 
  (0.752)  (0.848)  (0.988)  (1.131)  (2.629) 
Urban population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.282***  -0.307*  -0.326**  -0.471**  -0.233 
  (0.108)  (0.174)  (0.164)  (0.226)  (0.171) 
Urban population, change (∆)  -1.152  -1.562  -2.564  -4.121  -0.747 
  (1.290)  (1.926)  (1.934)  (3.520)  (2.236) 
Human capital index, lagged level (t-1)  0.052  0.464  -0.196  0.352  0.600* 
  (0.136)  (0.284)  (0.232)  (0.485)  (0.319) 
Human capital index, change (∆)  0.665  -1.382  0.621  -1.112  1.472* 
  (0.625)  (1.938)  (0.834)  (2.446)  (0.817) 
Elderly population, lagged level (t-1)  0.047  0.124  0.392***  0.130  0.094 
  (0.070)  (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.117)  (0.217) 
Elderly population, change (∆)  -0.000  -0.828  -1.094*  -0.736  -0.173 
  (0.390)  (0.815)  (0.564)  (0.871)  (0.934) 
Military spending, lagged level (t-1)  0.095***  -0.049  0.080*  -0.049  0.242*** 
  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.071) 
Military spending, change (∆)  0.221***  0.007  0.203***  -0.019  0.331*** 
  (0.079)  (0.071)  (0.056)  (0.083)  (0.101) 
           
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Tests for Serial Correlation           
Arellano-Bond test p-value (1 lag) 0.485 0.580 0.230 0.179 0.877 0.675 0.409 0.111 0.694 0.164 
Arellano-Bond test p-value (2 lags) 0.437 0.129 0.947 0.993 0.095 0.070 0.500 0.889 0.753 0.170 
           
R-squared 0.319 0.392 0.398 0.430 0.361 0.440 0.390 0.424 0.320 0.471 
RMSE 0.0926 0.0839 0.0484 0.0472 0.0951 0.0867 0.0486 0.0480 0.1098 0.0963 
Chi-squared 8655*** 32647*** 391*** 968*** 15343*** 5674*** 399*** 27449*** 11685*** 2798*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries 146 113 21 21 72 54 19 18 67 53 
Years 9.3 9.5 15.4 15.4 8.1 7.9 15.7 15.7 8.0 7.5 
Observations 1361 1071 324 323 582 428 299 282 534 395 
 
Notes: See Appendix N for additional table notes. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance 












Table 25: Dynamic FEIV (2SLS) Models of the Budget Share Measure and Cyclical 
Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: psegovtot, change (∆) All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
National effort (psegovtot), lagged level (t-1) -0.417*** -0.560*** -0.068 -0.102 -0.474*** -0.560*** -0.124 -0.066 -0.399*** -0.710*** 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.135) (0.117) (0.077) (0.102) (0.110) (0.122) (0.128) (0.122) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) # Bad times dummy -0.012 -0.012 -0.061* -0.068** 0.020 0.022 -0.060 -0.070* -0.028 -0.040 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.052) 
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy -0.006 -0.063 -0.521** -0.498*** -0.176 -0.374** -0.291 -0.548*** -0.053 -0.107 
 (0.097) (0.117) (0.203) (0.178) (0.132) (0.146) (0.235) (0.188) (0.137) (0.166) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) -0.096* -0.093 0.087 0.161 -0.200*** -0.122 0.058 0.142 -0.004 -0.260** 
 (0.053) (0.068) (0.137) (0.158) (0.072) (0.101) (0.171) (0.169) (0.093) (0.116) 
Gov., change (∆) -0.588*** -0.429*** 0.195 0.203 -0.504*** -0.208 0.138 0.337 -0.640*** -0.580*** 
 (0.087) (0.116) (0.223) (0.203) (0.111) (0.143) (0.276) (0.235) (0.123) (0.158) 
Bad times dummy 0.045 0.052 0.241* 0.265** -0.077 -0.074 0.244* 0.286* 0.113 0.139 
 (0.057) (0.062) (0.126) (0.134) (0.104) (0.133) (0.141) (0.150) (0.127) (0.166) 
Constant 2.678*** 3.395*** -1.275 -2.464 3.766*** 2.423 -0.433 -1.827 1.692 -2.048 
 (0.715) (0.885) (1.331) (1.669) (0.965) (1.964) (1.514) (2.139) (1.429) (2.645) 
           
Income per capita, lagged level (t-1) -0.121** -0.048 0.088 0.090 -0.167** -0.065 0.053 0.102 -0.040 0.085 
 (0.051) (0.057) (0.099) (0.102) (0.077) (0.116) (0.116) (0.128) (0.112) (0.121) 
Income per capita, change (∆) -0.149 0.146 0.392 0.297 -0.639*** -0.399 0.185 0.376 -0.129 0.299 
 (0.129) (0.173) (0.247) (0.254) (0.231) (0.319) (0.283) (0.292) (0.247) (0.321) 
Trade, lagged level (t-1) 0.008 -0.034 0.068 0.028 0.041 -0.038 0.037 -0.033 0.004 -0.062 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.048) (0.046) (0.038) (0.048) (0.063) (0.055) (0.039) (0.049) 
Trade, change (∆) -0.049 -0.067 -0.012 0.003 -0.024 -0.096 0.057 0.025 -0.016 -0.048 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.067) (0.075) (0.054) (0.067) (0.085) (0.097) (0.060) (0.069) 
Fiscal balance, lagged level (t-1) 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.009*** 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance, change (∆) -0.000 0.002 0.007** 0.008** -0.002 -0.001 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gross public debt, lagged level (t-1) -0.010 -0.029* -0.006 0.005 -0.054** -0.055* -0.031 -0.008 -0.003 -0.038 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.029) (0.022) (0.035) 
Gross public debt, change (∆) 0.048* 0.034 0.071 0.087** -0.075 -0.084 -0.024 0.073 0.035 0.013 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.054) (0.049) (0.046) (0.035) (0.039) 
           
Political constraint, lagged level (t-1)  -0.007  0.044  0.005  0.035  -0.014 
  (0.007)  (0.076)  (0.011)  (0.115)  (0.010) 
Political constraint, change (∆)  -0.003  0.000  0.003  0.000  -0.017 
  (0.010)  (.)  (0.016)  (.)  (0.013) 
Youth population, lagged level (t-1)  0.070  0.216  0.442  0.233  1.086** 
  (0.114)  (0.173)  (0.301)  (0.203)  (0.453) 
Youth population, change (∆)  0.701  -1.565*  0.133  -1.118  10.550*** 
  (0.757)  (0.949)  (1.182)  (1.213)  (2.866) 
Urban population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.350***  -0.226  -0.407**  -0.319  -0.273 
  (0.119)  (0.250)  (0.174)  (0.288)  (0.172) 
Urban population, change (∆)  -0.141  0.764  -0.081  -1.407  -1.590 
  (1.483)  (2.192)  (2.245)  (3.991)  (2.321) 
Human capital index, lagged level (t-1)  0.307*  0.397  0.075  0.194  1.339*** 
  (0.160)  (0.347)  (0.260)  (0.620)  (0.345) 
Human capital index, change (∆)  0.044  -1.823  -0.247  -2.507  0.166 
  (0.702)  (2.010)  (0.934)  (2.904)  (0.967) 
Elderly population, lagged level (t-1)  0.028  0.198*  0.310***  0.255*  0.211 
  (0.072)  (0.116)  (0.119)  (0.136)  (0.191) 
Elderly population, change (∆)  0.238  -0.396  -0.649  -0.456  0.052 
  (0.420)  (0.903)  (0.603)  (1.000)  (0.984) 
Military spending, lagged level (t-1)  0.111***  -0.041  0.062  -0.052  0.262*** 
  (0.040)  (0.046)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.079) 
Military spending, change (∆)  0.185**  -0.001  0.134*  -0.030  0.316*** 
  (0.076)  (0.073)  (0.068)  (0.086)  (0.094) 
           
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Tests for Serial Correlation           
Arellano-Bond test p-value (1 lag) 0.865 0.223 0.194 0.162 0.780 0.920 0.273 0.129 0.962 0.120 
Arellano-Bond test p-value (2 lags) 0.230 0.056 0.391 0.484 0.123 0.028 0.342 0.678 0.634 0.159 
           
R-squared 0.428 0.420 0.276 0.316 0.454 0.443 0.315 0.310 0.479 0.532 
RMSE 0.0928 0.0864 0.0523 0.0510 0.0967 0.0931 0.0536 0.0520 0.1085 0.0988 
Chi-squared 39501*** 41441*** 284*** 552*** 55454*** 43454*** 253*** 9563*** #*** #*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries 144 111 21 21 71 53 19 18 67 53 
Years 9.2 9.4 15.4 15.3 8.0 7.9 15.7 15.6 7.8 7.3 
Observations 1328 1042 323 322 570 418 298 281 524 387 
 
Notes: See Appendix N for additional table notes. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance 












Table 26: Dynamic FEIV (2SLS) Models of the National Effort Measure and Cyclical 
Effects Excluding Outliers 
 
Dependent Variable: psegdptot, change (∆) All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
National effort (psegdptot), lagged level (t-1) -0.310*** -0.381*** -0.185*** -0.199*** -0.353*** -0.483*** -0.185*** -0.128** -0.268*** -0.514*** 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.057) (0.058) (0.055) (0.071) (0.047) (0.064) (0.060) (0.072) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) # Bad times dummy -0.006 0.007 -0.041* -0.030 0.041 0.069** -0.004 0.001 -0.016 0.022 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.042) 
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy -0.018 -0.094 -0.487*** -0.432*** -0.044 0.022 -0.348** -0.504*** -0.059 -0.118 
 (0.069) (0.078) (0.123) (0.113) (0.104) (0.109) (0.151) (0.117) (0.107) (0.124) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) 0.263*** 0.342*** 0.239*** 0.309*** 0.194*** 0.313*** 0.212** 0.202* 0.280*** 0.277*** 
 (0.042) (0.059) (0.086) (0.103) (0.065) (0.089) (0.107) (0.107) (0.077) (0.087) 
Gov., change (∆) 0.191*** 0.307*** 0.595*** 0.592*** 0.154* 0.173* 0.661*** 0.704*** 0.249*** 0.286*** 
 (0.058) (0.073) (0.145) (0.135) (0.080) (0.096) (0.173) (0.138) (0.085) (0.101) 
Bad times dummy 0.016 -0.023 0.163* 0.117 -0.147* -0.219** 0.027 0.004 0.057 -0.069 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.088) (0.095) (0.086) (0.101) (0.103) (0.103) (0.115) (0.132) 
Constant 0.485 1.153 -2.328** -2.605** 1.101* 0.819 -1.341 -0.911 -0.453 0.553 
 (0.313) (0.810) (0.911) (1.244) (0.601) (1.415) (0.939) (1.542) (0.775) (2.392) 
           
Income per capita, lagged level (t-1) -0.105*** -0.052 0.162** 0.106 -0.120** -0.058 0.106 0.106 -0.016 0.010 
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.064) (0.069) (0.060) (0.090) (0.065) (0.079) (0.091) (0.094) 
Income per capita, change (∆) -0.214* -0.044 0.168 0.081 -0.592*** -0.060 0.119 0.170 -0.366 -0.153 
 (0.115) (0.130) (0.207) (0.216) (0.178) (0.243) (0.217) (0.231) (0.236) (0.273) 
Trade, lagged level (t-1) 0.033 -0.001 0.010 -0.001 0.064* -0.032 -0.033 -0.092** 0.050 0.035 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.046) (0.036) (0.043) 
Trade, change (∆) -0.005 0.013 -0.047 -0.039 0.014 -0.047 -0.007 0.000 0.075 0.101 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.068) (0.072) (0.063) (0.064) (0.070) (0.079) (0.067) (0.069) 
Fiscal balance, lagged level (t-1) 0.002 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005* -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance, change (∆) -0.003** -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gross public debt, lagged level (t-1) -0.013 -0.031*** 0.003 -0.011 -0.060*** -0.076*** -0.030* -0.017 -0.000 -0.077*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.028) 
Gross public debt, change (∆) 0.016 -0.003 0.040 0.029 -0.039 -0.046 -0.042 0.011 0.033 -0.016 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.032) (0.031) (0.044) (0.042) (0.036) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036) 
           
Political constraint, lagged level (t-1)  0.007  0.036  0.015  0.005  0.007 
  (0.006)  (0.059)  (0.010)  (0.073)  (0.008) 
Political constraint, change (∆)  0.008  0.000  0.009  0.000  0.003 
  (0.009)  (.)  (0.013)  (.)  (0.010) 
Youth population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.024  0.090  0.215  0.063  0.083 
  (0.145)  (0.107)  (0.236)  (0.111)  (0.453) 
Youth population, change (∆)  1.254**  -1.665**  0.085  -1.820*  6.373** 
  (0.532)  (0.762)  (0.830)  (0.971)  (2.481) 
Urban population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.321***  -0.151  -0.402***  -0.247*  -0.413*** 
  (0.096)  (0.133)  (0.145)  (0.142)  (0.141) 
Urban population, change (∆)  -0.623  0.733  -1.626  0.437  -0.499 
  (1.144)  (1.074)  (1.780)  (1.752)  (2.050) 
Human capital index, lagged level (t-1)  0.046  0.387  -0.083  0.048  0.479* 
  (0.121)  (0.239)  (0.206)  (0.315)  (0.256) 
Human capital index, change (∆)  0.581  0.426  0.336  1.007  1.345* 
  (0.595)  (1.418)  (0.814)  (1.770)  (0.807) 
Elderly population, lagged level (t-1)  0.121*  0.123  0.435***  0.148  0.135 
  (0.069)  (0.091)  (0.095)  (0.103)  (0.187) 
Elderly population, change (∆)  0.073  0.050  -1.250**  0.214  -0.971 
  (0.344)  (0.480)  (0.532)  (0.454)  (0.871) 
Military spending, lagged level (t-1)  0.048**  -0.015  0.104***  -0.003  0.191*** 
  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.047) 
Military spending, change (∆)  0.108***  0.074  0.216***  0.070  0.224*** 
  (0.032)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.052) 
           
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Tests for Serial Correlation           
Arellano-Bond test p-value (1 lag) 0.101 0.313 0.007 0.006 0.874 0.468 0.060 0.000 0.050 0.915 
Arellano-Bond test p-value (2 lags) 0.015 0.226 0.246 0.111 0.160 0.069 0.446 0.218 0.144 0.094 
           
R-squared 0.369 0.423 0.527 0.537 0.398 0.457 0.499 0.562 0.377 0.507 
RMSE 0.0769 0.0697 0.0347 0.0353 0.0840 0.0777 0.0359 0.0339 0.0950 0.0838 
Chi-squared 42141*** 58388*** 475*** 1170*** 2857*** #*** 411*** 35698*** 12149*** 2824*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries 146 113 21 21 72 54 19 18 67 53 
Years 9.2 9.4 15.2 15.3 8.0 7.9 15.6 15.6 7.9 7.4 
Observations 1339 1057 320 321 574 424 297 280 527 390 
 
Notes: See Appendix N for additional table notes. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance 












Table 27: Dynamic FEIV (2SLS) Models of the Budget Share Measure and Cyclical 
Effects Excluding Outliers 
 
Dependent Variable: psegovtot, change (∆) All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
Budget Share (psegovtot), lagged level (t-1) -0.334*** -0.447*** -0.260*** -0.215*** -0.396*** -0.462*** -0.197** -0.191** -0.265*** -0.569*** 
 (0.049) (0.058) (0.067) (0.081) (0.065) (0.084) (0.082) (0.078) (0.075) (0.096) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) # Bad times dummy -0.011 0.002 -0.029 -0.026 0.036 0.052 -0.016 -0.018 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.045) 
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy -0.049 -0.149 -0.665*** -0.560*** -0.128 -0.271** -0.199 -0.629*** -0.032 -0.104 
 (0.081) (0.092) (0.163) (0.141) (0.117) (0.128) (0.169) (0.144) (0.113) (0.136) 
Gov., lagged level (t-1) -0.090** -0.098* 0.065 0.154 -0.192*** -0.127 -0.180 0.186 -0.002 -0.247** 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.124) (0.125) (0.063) (0.090) (0.109) (0.136) (0.078) (0.098) 
Gov., change (∆) -0.564*** -0.416*** 0.160 0.147 -0.586*** -0.316*** -0.274 0.199 -0.667*** -0.601*** 
 (0.066) (0.087) (0.212) (0.176) (0.094) (0.118) (0.181) (0.205) (0.094) (0.115) 
Bad times dummy 0.043 -0.000 0.119 0.099 -0.120 -0.166 0.072 0.078 0.037 0.034 
 (0.047) (0.056) (0.093) (0.094) (0.091) (0.117) (0.104) (0.102) (0.107) (0.142) 
Constant 2.283*** 3.355*** -1.357 -1.576 3.284*** 3.139* 1.036 0.135 0.469 -0.336 
 (0.485) (0.836) (1.215) (1.426) (0.863) (1.735) (1.183) (1.764) (1.047) (2.307) 
           
Income per capita, lagged level (t-1) -0.109*** -0.063 0.164** 0.083 -0.140** -0.115 0.049 0.074 0.037 0.053 
 (0.040) (0.051) (0.078) (0.083) (0.068) (0.103) (0.090) (0.096) (0.098) (0.116) 
Income per capita, change (∆) -0.211* -0.016 0.354 0.338 -0.699*** -0.423 0.157 0.415 -0.185 0.101 
 (0.119) (0.142) (0.233) (0.233) (0.191) (0.264) (0.256) (0.255) (0.239) (0.274) 
Trade, lagged level (t-1) 0.012 -0.031 0.008 0.016 0.029 -0.081** -0.087** -0.086** 0.034 -0.024 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.033) (0.041) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.041) 
Trade, change (∆) -0.058 -0.062 -0.034 -0.030 -0.040 -0.108* -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.005 
 (0.038) (0.042) (0.058) (0.063) (0.049) (0.064) (0.065) (0.071) (0.057) (0.066) 
Fiscal balance, lagged level (t-1) 0.003** 0.003** 0.004 0.006** 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.005* 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance, change (∆) -0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.007*** -0.003 -0.001 0.004* 0.008*** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gross public debt, lagged level (t-1) -0.015 -0.029** 0.008 0.010 -0.050** -0.047* -0.027 -0.019 0.009 -0.056* 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) 
Gross public debt, change (∆) 0.044* 0.025 0.067* 0.085** -0.098** -0.111** -0.029 0.041 0.031 0.003 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.044) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) 
           
Political constraint, lagged level (t-1)  -0.006  0.082  0.005  -0.031  -0.010 
  (0.007)  (0.067)  (0.011)  (0.087)  (0.008) 
Political constraint, change (∆)  -0.003  0.000  0.001  0.000  -0.014 
  (0.010)  (.)  (0.016)  (.)  (0.012) 
Youth population, lagged level (t-1)  0.003  0.066  0.339  0.039  0.740* 
  (0.108)  (0.118)  (0.274)  (0.124)  (0.393) 
Youth population, change (∆)  0.666  -2.048***  0.169  -2.826***  8.910*** 
  (0.747)  (0.788)  (1.006)  (0.873)  (2.583) 
Urban population, lagged level (t-1)  -0.339***  -0.269*  -0.437***  -0.428***  -0.412*** 
  (0.108)  (0.141)  (0.160)  (0.149)  (0.141) 
Urban population, change (∆)  0.389  2.413*  -0.257  0.298  -1.045 
  (1.411)  (1.251)  (2.093)  (1.957)  (2.123) 
Human capital index, lagged level (t-1)  0.310**  0.381  0.228  0.675*  1.153*** 
  (0.137)  (0.264)  (0.223)  (0.348)  (0.283) 
Human capital index, change (∆)  0.160  0.084  -0.618  1.895  0.197 
  (0.678)  (1.458)  (0.941)  (1.782)  (0.963) 
Elderly population, lagged level (t-1)  0.070  0.176  0.324***  0.135  0.239 
  (0.063)  (0.107)  (0.105)  (0.113)  (0.174) 
Elderly population, change (∆)  0.179  0.392  -0.757  0.383  -0.380 
  (0.382)  (0.568)  (0.567)  (0.551)  (0.941) 
Military spending, lagged level (t-1)  0.076***  -0.001  0.071  -0.017  0.196*** 
  (0.025)  (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.034)  (0.060) 
Military spending, change (∆)  0.095**  0.083*  0.128**  0.074  0.217*** 
  (0.038)  (0.050)  (0.064)  (0.051)  (0.062) 
           
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Tests for Serial Correlation           
Arellano-Bond test p-value (1 lag) 0.005 0.476 0.080 0.008 0.245 0.505 0.027 0.001 0.007 0.891 
Arellano-Bond test p-value (2 lags) 0.026 0.049 0.861 0.489 0.050 0.016 0.669 0.276 0.077 0.095 
           
R-squared 0.495 0.469 0.487 0.503 0.514 0.505 0.535 0.567 0.533 0.576 
RMSE 0.0771 0.0733 0.0358 0.0365 0.0837 0.0830 0.0367 0.0334 0.0937 0.0863 
Chi-squared 65230*** 37470*** 434*** 815*** 63025*** 3640*** 355*** 15884*** #*** 4998*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries 144 111 21 21 71 53 19 18 67 53 
Years 9.1 9.3 15.1 15.2 7.9 7.8 15.5 15.4 7.7 7.2 
Observations 1307 1029 318 319 560 413 294 277 516 383 
 
Notes: See Appendix N for additional table notes. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance 





Another way to think about the three inequality propositions from the previous chapter is to 
say that, controlling for the state of economic development, with public sector expansion, the 
national effort (budget share) measure should rise (fall). Put differently, the national effort 
(budget share) measure should be positively (negatively) related to the size of the public 
sector. These relationships are mostly supported for the samples tested. Although cyclicality 
is a short-run phenomenon, an ECM specification is preferred because cyclicality with respect 
to both short-run (differenced) and long-run (lagged) variables can be tested, and it has the 
added advantage of saying something about cointegration between these variables. 
 
The expectation is that periods of economic contraction (‘bad’ times) sees a reduction in the 
prioritisation afforded education from the budget allocation, when compared to periods of 
economic expansion (‘good’ times). Using a novel cyclical specification, a reduction in the 
‘elasticity’ of the national effort or budget share measure with respect to size of government – 
smaller positive or larger negative, respectively – is evidenced. For instance, what the 
findings show is the effect an increase in the size of government has on the national effort or 
budget share measure during periods of cyclical downturn is reduced accordingly as 
compared to periods of cyclical upturn. 
 
Interestingly, an increase in the size of government during periods of economic contraction is 
quite plausible. A reduction in economic activity (Y) implies the ‘size’ of government (G/Y) 
rises, even without an increase in current levels of government spending (G). Even to 
maintain current levels of government spending, given that revenue collected from taxes is 
expected to fall during an economic downturn, for governments that do have access to 
international credit markets, they rely on debt accumulation to ‘spend their way’ out of a 
recession. In other words, countries are more likely to run budget deficits during periods of 
economic contraction, a policy prescription consistent with Keynesian fiscal policy action, 
and debt accumulation becomes the mechanism through which these deficits are financed. 
This is one reason why controlling for the gross public debt stock is important. 
 
A process of reprioritising government spending away from education during periods of 
cyclical downturn makes sense in that education, like most (if not all) public goods, is not 
entirely a ‘fixed-states’ sector. Given aggregate education spending comprises current 
expenditure, capital expenditure and transfers, although there are numerous components that 
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might reasonably be deemed slow to adjust (e.g., current expenditure such as salaries and 
wages of full-time permanent state-paid teachers; capital expenditure such as school 
infrastructure spending that has already been committed to), there are also numerous 
‘variable’ components (e.g., current expenditure on fixed-term, contract, relief and part-time 
teaching appointments/positions; stationery and resource spending; school maintenance and 
cleaning services; school feeding schemes; capital expenditure not yet committed to or 
flexibility in the term structure of such capital expenditure; transfers in the form of per-pupil 
school subsidies etc.) that can be re-negotiated, delayed, curtailed or terminated to allow these 
portions of spending to be shifted to other areas of more immediate public financing need. 
 
Regardless of the exact mechanism, which would be difficult to know with certainty (Arze del 
Granado et al., 2013, p. 21), whether due to socio-political pressures that compel 
policymakers to do so (discretionary fiscal policy) or the operation of automatic stabiliser 
mechanisms already in place, the empirical results are suggestive of a reprioritisation away 
from education during periods of recession, particularly well evidenced for the two richer 
cohorts of countries. The intuition here relates to other areas of public financing (i.e., welfare-
type spending) being in greater immediate need and, hence, more highly prioritised during 
bad times. This notion of countercyclical behaviour of welfare spending for richer-type 
countries is consistent with the finding of Afonso and Jalles (2013) regarding social security 
and welfare spending for OECD countries. 
 
The trade-off between education and welfare spending is thought to occur predominantly in 
richer (developed) countries, where ‘safety-net’ mechanisms are common features of welfare-
state economies, the richest Western countries being preeminent examples thereof. It makes 
intuitive sense that highly significant short-run cyclical effects should be best evidenced for 
the 21 OECD and richer countries, less so for middle-income countries, and not at all for 
poorer countries, bearing in mind the last sample includes a number of low-income countries 
from Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the poorest countries are not expected to have well-developed 
welfare systems, it is understandable that short-run (cyclical) patterns supportive of the 
hypotheses are not evidenced for this cohort of countries. Said another way, using two 
different outcome measures, the fundamental relationship between education spending and 








4.6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
 
The findings of this chapter contrasted with two key papers of interest (Afonso and Jalles, 
2013; Arze del Granado et al., 2013). As pointed out earlier, making direct comparisons 
between my results and those of the two papers would be difficult because of differences in 
the specification and methods used. Nonetheless, notable differences in the substantive 
findings concerning the cyclicality of education spending were evidenced. To recap, Afonso 
and Jalles (2013) found education spending was acyclical for both developing and developed 
countries. However, Arze del Granado et al. (2013) found education spending was procyclical 
in developing countries, but acyclical in developed countries. In contrast, with particular 
reference to developed countries, I found significant (pro)cyclical effects. 
 
Insofar as the hypotheses were concerned (see Table 14), using an ECM, the finding was that 
of acyclical behaviour across all samples tested for the long-run effects. However, cyclical 
(short-run) effects were particularly well evidenced for the richer cohorts (21 OECD and 
richer countries), less well evidenced for middle-income countries and not evidenced for 
poorer countries. It makes sense that cyclical effects were best exhibited for the short-run 
(differenced) variables in an ECM because economic cycles are, by definition, short-term in 
nature. Using a novel cyclical specification, a reduction in the ‘size’ (in a continuous number 
scale sense) of the coefficients for both the national effort and budget share specifications – 
smaller positive and larger negative, respectively – were evidenced during periods of cyclical 
downturn (recession). 
 
Conceptually, for countries where these aforementioned changes were evidenced, describing 
such behaviour as ‘procyclical’ seems sensible because, during periods of economic 
contraction, the national effort towards education or government’s budget share allocation to 
education, are reduced, meaning education might still be prioritised, but to a significantly 
lesser extent. For example, during a cyclical downturn, for a one percent increase in the size 
of government, the national effort (budget share) measure is still likely to rise (fall), but by a 
smaller (larger) percentage relative to periods of cyclical upturn. Loosely speaking, in 
countries where cyclical patterns are evidenced, education receives a smaller share of any 




My findings were different to the two papers for several reasons. One, cyclical effects were 
best evidenced for the two richer cohorts. Two, there was some evidence to suggest 
procyclical behaviour for middle-income countries (budget share measure), but acyclical 
behaviour for the poorest cohort (poorer countries). Three, in contrast to the conclusion 
espoused by Arze del Granado et al. (2013, p. 16), the degree of cyclicality might be viewed 
as being higher the higher (not the lower) the level of economic development. The key reason 
for this conclusion is that richer countries are more likely to face greater constraints with 
respect to the number of components to finance from the public purse, meaning increasingly 
hard choices must be made about which public goods to prioritise during periods of cyclical 
downturn. In this sense, a finding of (negative) cyclical effects for education spending 
resonates with that of Afonso and Jalles (2013) who found counter-cyclical effects for social 
security and welfare spending, where these forms of spending increase during periods of 
economic recession. 
 
What this all means is a reprioritisation away from education and in favour of welfare is very 
likely to occur during periods of recession. Regardless of the exact mechanism in operation 
(discretionary fiscal policy or automatic stabiliser), country governments are likely to 
reprioritise spending towards other areas of more immediate need, such as welfare spending, 
during a recession. In summary, education may always and everywhere be prioritised 
(positive relationship between the national effort measure and size of government), but the 
extent to which prioritisation happens varies over the economic cycle, such that, significant 
negative effects were best evidenced for the richest countries during periods of cyclical 
downturn. One explanation for this finding is that richer countries have arguably well-
developed welfare states, meaning education and welfare are plausibly ‘competing’ public 
goods over the economic cycle.  
 
4.6.2 Avenues for Further Research 
 
There are two obvious avenues for further research, both of which can be addressed in 
Chapter 5. The first avenue involves adopting a different methodological approach that, in 
effect, makes more use of the time-series information for each country, but then computes 
averages of the coefficient estimates. This is the basic intuition behind using a mean-group 
(MG) estimator – a ‘second-generation’ panel-data approach – that might be thought of as 
putting more emphasis on the time-series variation for each country separately, and not 
merely estimating ‘pooled’ effects of interest for a sample of countries. Using a MG approach 
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would represent a novel contribution to our understanding of the levels relationship between 
each of the two measures of education spending and size of government. 
 
The second avenue concerns the role of ‘common effects’ and how best to cater for such 
effects when modelling the data-generating process. Common effects might play a role in 
shaping the spending patterns of countries, especially those types of countries more closely 
aligned or integrated on some or other regional or economic basis, or countries that might 
explicitly or implicitly adhere to some or other policy alignment agenda. But, how best to 
incorporate such effects is debateable. In this chapter, the effects of common or global shocks 
were assumed to be homogeneous across countries, an implicit assumption of much applied 
research. However, this is not necessarily a realistic assumption to make, because common 
processes of behaviour might occur across smaller groups of countries, for example, meaning 
an element of heterogeneity of these common effects needs to be considered. Put another way, 
in addition to allowing for heterogeneous parameter estimation, a MG approach allows time-
specific effects to enter the regression equation in a more heterogeneous fashion across 






























The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) expounded upon heterogeneity by using economic and 
political categorisations of countries to model the mean levels of the national effort and 
budget share measures of education spending. The formulation of three inequality 
propositions allowed us to say something about the size of government in richer versus poorer 
countries, supporting the Wagnerian assertion that, as countries grow and develop (as 
countries become richer), the size of their respective public sectors grow too. But, these 
inequality propositions are only indicative of a particular state of being, and do not necessarily 
say anything about the long-run relationship between the national effort (or budget share) 
measure and size of government. Although there are implicit long-run relationships in the 
levels ECM terms from Chapter 4, the long-run parameters may differ across countries 
(heterogeneous long-run parameters). Therefore, the subject of inquiry in this chapter is to 
model the ‘levels’ (long-run) behaviour of education spending with respect to the overall size 
of the public sector, under the assumption of heterogeneous parameters. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, there is reason to expect differences in education spending 
among low-, middle- and high-income (OECD) countries. But, to motivate a study of this 
kind, what are the dynamics at play? Differences might be related to economic structure 
(sectoral decomposition of the economy), the ability to raise income from taxes and, perhaps, 
demand for education at various levels. For instance, poorer countries are more likely to have 
a greater share of agriculture out of total economic activity, which could constrain 
government’s ability to raise income from taxes – a problem less likely to occur in richer 
countries. The idea of poorer countries being fiscally or supply-side constrained in raising the 
necessary income from taxes to fund public education was discussed as part of Chapter 3. 
Moreover, in a day-and-age of promoting universal primary education, especially in poorer 
countries, there is more likely to be lower demand for public education (and associated 
spending) beyond primary school, meaning public funding of secondary and tertiary 
education is likely to be lower in poorer countries. For this reason, it would not be too 
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surprising to find that private (household) spending on secondary and tertiary education might 
actually be higher (per capita) in poorer versus richer countries. 
 
From a practical, econometric point of view, there have been numerous papers in the 
education-spending literature that have either used the national effort or budget share measure 
in the levels (or log levels) as the dependent variable for some or all of their results reported 
(see, for example, Baqir, 2002; Avelino et al., 2005; Busemeyer, 2008; Akanbi & Schoeman, 
2010; Fosu, 2010; Jensen, 2011). However, most of these papers have relied on using 
methods that ostensibly work under the (implicit) assumption of homogeneous slopes. I say 
“implicit” because these papers do not necessarily expound upon the fact that a ‘common 
slopes’ assumption is being applied to all panels (countries) comprising the sample of interest. 
As stated in the previous chapter, I classify these methods as first-generation panel-data 
methods. But, this chapter seeks to apply a second-generation approach by using two variants 
of the mean-group (MG) estimator, namely the standard MG estimator by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995), which assumes cross-section independence, and the augmented mean-group (AMG) 
estimator by Eberhardt and Teal (2010), which allows for cross-section dependence. Both 
allow for the estimation of heterogeneous parameters (intercepts and slopes). This is arguably 
a novel approach to apply when modelling the (log) levels of the two measures of education 
spending of interest. 
 
5.1.2 Problem and Focus 
 
Chapter 3 established three inequality propositions comprising two (aggregate) measures of 
education spending (the national effort and budget share measures) and size of government. It 
focused on heterogeneity in the levels of education spending with respect to economic and 
political categorisations of countries. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) then 
combined these three measures by investigating the cyclicality of education spending and size 
of government. Although Chapter 4 uses an ECM, which includes both long-run and short-run 
variables on the right-hand side, the focus was on the short-run (cyclical) effects or an inquiry 
about short-run comparative dynamics. But, neither of these chapters allowed for 
heterogeneity in the levels relationship between education spending and size of government. 






5.1.3 Research Question and Objective 
 
Once again, this chapter considers the relationship between (total) public spending on 
education and (total) government spending with the view to answering a different question 
vis-à-vis the previous empirical chapter. Under the assumption that the long-run parameters 
may differ across countries, is the level of the national effort (budget share) measure of 
education spending positively (negatively) related to the size of government? This question 
can be tackled by applying a MG estimator. The objective of this chapter is to test whether or 
not there are significant positive or negative effects for different samples comprising richer 
and poorer countries. Using variables in natural logarithms (log levels) one can then say 
something about the long-run relationship between education spending and size of 
government. 
 
5.1.4 Methodological Assumptions 
 
Unlike the previous chapter which used a modelling framework that incorporates both long-
run and short-run effects, this chapter considers only long-run effects, but with a difference. 
The previous chapter explicitly assumed heterogeneous intercepts (country and year fixed 
effects) and implicitly assumed homogeneous slopes. However, this chapter assumes 
heterogeneous parameters (all parameters are allowed to vary by panel or country). There is 
also another more subtle modification to the chosen specification, which means that year 
effects are no longer assumed to be homogeneously distributed. For instance, a strict 
‘common effects’ or global shocks assumption might be too restrictive. Where formal tests 
indicate the presence of cross-section dependence in the error process, one can include a 
variable comprising the cross-section averages of the year effects (the common dynamic 
process) in each and every panel-specific regression, thereby allowing year effects to be more 




There are two noteworthy limitations that might impede the implementation of the MG 
estimator as applied in this chapter. First, more strongly unbalanced panel data with respect to 
the measures of education spending being modelled, in particular, coupled with a T dimension 
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ranging between 10 and 20 observations,53 limits the number of explanatory variables that can 
realistically be included. This practical limitation means a lack of degrees of freedom in some 
or more of the panel-specific regressions might impede the drawing of meaningful inferences. 
Therefore, a more parsimonious specification needs to be applied insofar as the observable 
components included are concerned. Again, from a practical perspective, problems related to 
a lack of degrees of freedom to effectively estimate panel-specific regressions would further 
be exacerbated if one were to apply the common correlated effects mean-group (CCEMG) 
estimator, which augments the panel-specific regression equation by making use of additional 
regressors in the form of the cross-section averages of the dependent and explanatory 
variables, instead of the preferred AMG estimator, making use of only a single additional 
explanatory variable. 
 
Second, the MG estimator, as applied in this chapter, does not account for the fact that some 
coefficients may be the same across panels (Pesaran et al., 1999, p. 621). In other words, since 
this chapter concerns the long-run coefficients, I am choosing not to constrain the long-run 
parameters to be the same across panels, as would be the case with the pooled mean-group 
(PMG) estimator – I choose not to ‘pool’ the slope parameters. Once again, from a practical 
perspective, applying more advanced MG estimators to my panel data proved problematic, 
hence, the reliance on the more conventional set of estimators as programmed in Stata by 
Eberhardt (2012).54  
 
 
53 A panel time-series or MG estimator might be thought of as being appropriate for panel data comprising 
moderate to large N and T dimensions. On the one hand, macro panel data comprising moderate N and moderate 
T dimensions might typically refer to about 15 observations in each case – see, for example, the Stata help file 
for Eberhardt’s (2012) “xtmg” user-written programme. On the other hand, with reference to their two empirical 
applications, Pesaran et al. (1999, pp. 621-622) refer to both N = 24 and T = 32 as being “quite large”, and both 
N = 10 and T = 17 as being “quite small”, respectively. What these descriptions serve to show is that there is no 
consensus on what ‘small’, ‘moderate’ and ‘large’ actually mean with respect to the panel-data dimensions of 
interest, but might be more specific to the application at hand. Nonetheless, even with these descriptions in mind, 
there is arguably little doubt that panel data with, say, 30 observations in both dimensions, might still prove 
problematic when applying a MG estimator, especially if the time-series dimension for a number of countries 
sampled is plagued with numerous time gaps. 
54 For example, the Stata user-written programmes “xtpmg” by Blackburne and Frank (2007), and “xtwest” by 
Persyn and Westerlund (2008), both of which focus on cointegration, could either not be consistently applied or 
could not be applied at all for the samples of countries considered, largely because of the numerous time gaps 
associated with the data for education spending in many of the countries. Furthermore, in addition to the 
probable degrees of freedom problems already mentioned with respect to employing a CCEMG estimator in 
more strongly unbalanced panel data contexts with relatively shorter T dimension (as in the present case), using 
the Stata user-written programme “xtdcce2” (formerly called “xtdcce”) by Ditzen (2018), apart from being a 
‘dynamic’ (distinct from ‘static’ as warranted in this chapter) estimator is also problematic because it assumes N, 
T → ∞, certainly not the case with respect to one or both of these panel-data dimensions in all samples. The 
asymptotic assumption does not imply all applications of these methods have to have ‘large N and T’ – though if 




5.1.6 Original Contribution 
 
Hitherto, papers modelling the national effort or budget share measure of education spending 
as the dependent variable using a regression framework, have done so using a homogeneous 
slopes assumption. Although most papers explicitly make allowance for country and/or year 
fixed effects (heterogeneous intercepts), they have typically not allowed for heterogeneous 
slopes to be estimated. However, there is a method to do so (the MG estimator), popularised 
by Pesaran and Smith (1995). The original contribution of this chapter is the methodological 
‘innovation’ to be applied to our understanding of the long-run (levels) relationship between 
each of two measures of education spending and size of government, and entails the use of a 
suitable macro-panel or panel time-series estimator. Although the method itself is not new, the 
application of a heterogeneous parameter estimator to the specific problem at hand, provides 
for a novel insight. 
 
5.1.7 Structure of the Chapter 
 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 conducts a brief review of a 
corpus of the empirical literature with the view to highlighting a methodological gap with 
respect to the relationship between education spending and size of government. Section 5.3 
outlines the research methodology by explaining the method employed, empirical model 
specifications, hypotheses, robustness checks and other methodological considerations. 
Section 5.4 presents the data collected and description of the data. Section 5.5 comprises the 
analysis and discussion. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
 




Since this chapter relies on a methodological innovation to model education spending 
patterns, it would make sense to briefly review the empirical literature about the methods 
applied to this end. In doing so, I consider a corpus of the existing literature with the view to 
highlighting a suitable gap. The use of a heterogeneous parameter estimator, with respect to 
the slope parameter(s), in particular, has not been widely applied in the education-spending 




5.2.2 Review of the Empirical Literature 
 
Table 28 presents a number of studies in chronological order; the dependent variable being 
modelled (national effort and/or budget share measure) and the primary method(s) in each 
case. These studies span a substantial body of the empirical literature over an extended period 
of time (roughly, the past 40 years). I only present studies using the national effort and/or 
budget share measure on the left-hand side (dependent variable) because these are the two 
outcome measures of key interest in this thesis. Despite most of these studies relying on the 
modelling of the national effort measure, the methods applied, whether panel-data or cross-
section methods, share a common ‘theme’: they all make use of an estimator that assumes 
homogeneous slopes. 
 
All of the methods listed, except the seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) 
method, comprise homogeneous parameter estimation with respect to the slope parameter(s). 
For the papers making use of panel data, this entails the pooling of time-series and cross-
section data to estimate the respective slope parameter. For the papers making use of cross-
section data, the (implicit) assumption is that the respective slope parameter is homogeneous 
for all cross-sectional units (across countries). The SUR estimator, as originally proposed by 
Zellner (1962), jointly estimates a series of single-equation regressions for different functional 
areas of government spending (different dependent variables), for example, by making use of 
the same set of explanatory variables in each case. In this way, one can estimate a slope 
parameter for each country and spending component in a panel-data application (see Table 3 
in Afonso & Alves, 2017, p. 349). Under certain assumptions (i.e., no correlation between the 
errors across equations or the same set of explanatory variables), SUR estimates are 













Table 28: Summary of Outcome Measures and Methods in the Empirical Literature 
 
Source Dependent Variable Primary Method(s) 
Zymelman (1976) National Effort Cross-section regression 
Verner (1979) National Effort; Budget Share Cross-sectional correlation analysis 
Tilak (1989) National Effort Cross-section regression 
Castles (1989) National Effort Cross-section regression 
Tilak (1990) National Effort; Budget Share Cross-sectional correlation analysis 
Ram (1995) National Effort1 Cross-section regression 
Castles (1999) National Effort Correlations; coefficient of variation; cross-section regression 
Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo (2001) National Effort; Budget Share2 ECM with PCSEs & two-way fixed effects 
Baqir (2002) National Effort; Budget Share Cross-section regressions; fixed-effects estimation 
Avelino et al. (2005) National Effort Fixed-effects models; Prais-Winsten & ECM methods 
Stasavage (2005) National Effort; Budget Share Pooled OLS & fixed-effects estimators 
Busemeyer (2007) National Effort TSCS models (with and without fixed effects) 
Castles (2007) National Effort3 Correlations; coefficient of variation; cross-section regression 
Schmidt (2007) National Effort Bivariate correlations; scatter plots 
Busemeyer (2008) National Effort Cross-section regression; fixed-effects estimation and GMM 
Huber et al. (2008) National Effort4 Prais-Winsten (GLS) estimator with PCSEs 
Iversen & Stephens (2008) National Effort Pooled panel-data estimation; Prais-Winsten method 
Busemeyer (2009a) National Effort Panel-data ECM 
Akanbi & Schoeman (2010) National Effort 2SLS fixed-effects model 
Fosu (2010) Budget Share SURE 
Jensen (2011) National Effort TSCS models (with and without fixed effects) 
Baskaran & Hessami (2012) National Effort5 System-GMM 
Afonso & Jalles (2013) National Effort Two-step robust system-GMM 
Afonso & Alves (2017) National Effort Panel-data & SURE methods 
 
Notes: Reference to the national effort or budget share measure is irrespective of the chosen functional form and 
may comprise one of several outcome measures tested in the respective paper. 1 refers to K-12 or primary and 
secondary school spending. 2 refers to public spending on health and education, either as % of GDP or as % of 
total government spending. 3 refers to social expenditure as % of GDP. 4 refers to public spending on health and 
education as % of GDP. 5 refers to sector-level spending (primary, secondary and tertiary education spending as 
% of GDP). ECM refers to error-correction model or mechanism. PCSEs refers to panel-corrected standard 
errors. OLS refers to ordinary least squares. TSCS is time-series cross-section, and refers to (two-dimensional) 
panel data. GMM refers to generalised method of moments estimation. GLS refers to generalised least-squares 
estimation. SURE refers to seemingly unrelated regression estimation.  
 
Conceptually, SURE is similar in some sense to MG estimation. But, instead of estimating 
separate equations comprising dependent-variable-specific regressions by OLS, one now 
estimates separate equations comprising panel-specific regressions by OLS (and then takes 
averages of the panel-specific parameter estimates). In much the same way as the SURE setup 
allows for non-zero correlations between the contemporaneous errors in the separate 
equations, the CCEMG and AMG estimators make allowance for correlation in the errors 
across panel members, otherwise known as cross-section dependence. The substantive reason 
why I use MG estimation instead of SUR estimation is the number of equations to be 
estimated, where the latter is limited to estimating, say, 5 to 10 equations, whereas the former 









5.3 Research Methodology 
 
5.3.1 Explanation of the Method 
 
This chapter applies a suitable macro-panel estimator. The MG approach allows for 
heterogeneous parameters (intercepts and slopes) to be estimated. In very simple terms, all 
MG estimators follow a similar two-step procedure. The first step entails performing N panel-
specific OLS regressions to produce panel-specific coefficient estimates. The second step 
entails computing unweighted or weighted averages (to account for outliers and compute 
robust coefficient averages) of the panel-specific coefficient estimates. Taking averages 
allows one to take into account the distribution of the estimated coefficients across countries, 
where Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that consistent estimates of the averaged parameters 
will be produced (Pesaran et al., 1999, p. 621). The associated standard errors are computed 
according to the procedure outlined in Pesaran and Smith (1995). When computing 
unweighted coefficient averages, the associated standard errors are computed using the 
following formula: 𝑆𝐸𝛣 = √
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
[∑ (?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ], where N is the number of panels (groups 
or countries); ?̂?𝑖 are the respective panel-specific estimates and ?̂? is the simple (unweighted) 
average of the coefficients across all panels. The standard error is simply the square root of 
the variance formula given by Blackburne and Frank (2007, p. 200). This is how the 
conventional standard errors are computed in the standard (unweighted) implementation of 
the MG estimator; however, when weighted averages are taken, weights are applied to the 
standard errors, meaning robust coefficient averages and robust standard errors are 
computed.55 From a macro-panel perspective, MG-type estimators might be thought of as 
making more use of the time-series dimension of the panel data, hence, reference being made 
to them as a class of panel time-series estimators. 
 
The standard MG estimator by Pesaran and Smith (1995) or AMG estimator by Eberhardt and 
Teal (2010) are the methods of choice in this chapter. The distinguishing feature of these two 
estimators is how they deal with correlation across panel members or cross-section 
 
55 It would be worthwhile to note that, regardless of whether or not unweighted or weighted (outlier-robust) 
averages are taken, the panel-specific estimates and associated standard errors computed in the first step of the 
estimator are identical, because the ‘robust’ option is only applied in the second step of the MG estimator to 
compute the coefficient averages. In practice, the robust regression command (“rreg”) is used in Stata to do so. 
Therefore, it is only the coefficient averages and associated standard errors (not the panel-specific estimates and 
their associated standard errors) that vary. Since I want to remedy for possible outliers, I specify the ‘robust’ 
option in the command line in Stata when implementing the MG estimator; hence, I routinely compute 
(weighted) coefficient averages and standard errors that are robust to outliers in all models. 
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dependence (Eberhardt, 2012, p. 61). The standard MG estimator works under the assumption 
of cross-section independence, and makes no allowance for (unobserved) correlation across 
panels in the data-generating process. However, the AMG estimator allows for cross-section 
dependence. There are two aspects related to cross-section dependence that are worthwhile 
mentioning. In the first instance, typically for regression purposes, one might be more 
concerned about how possible unobserved common effects are exhibited in the error process 
of the model, so testing the residuals (as proxies for the errors) from the model would be of 
most interest, and is the approach I adopt in this chapter. In the second instance, where the 
included regressors are correlated with the unobserved common effects, coefficient estimates 
will not be consistent (see Pesaran, 2006, pp. 968-969), and an estimator that remedies for 
such an eventuality is needed. 
 
One might consider using the CCEMG estimator, which makes use of cross-section averages 
of the dependent and explanatory variables (Pesaran, 2006, p. 969) on the right-hand side as 
additional regressors (i.e., 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡) to account for the unobserved common factor (𝑓𝑡) 
(Eberhardt, 2012, p. 61). CCEMG estimates of the panel-specific coefficients are said to be 
consistent as N, T → ∞, jointly, and are asymptotically unbiased as N → ∞ when both T is 
fixed and T → ∞ (Pesaran, 2006, p. 969). However, a drawback of this approach is the 
reliance on a host of additional regressors, meaning degrees of freedom problems are more 
likely to surface when working with panel data having a smaller T dimension and/or many 
time gaps. In other words, the CCEMG estimator is one that is typically better applied to 
panel data with a larger and more complete T dimension. 
 
The AMG estimator is a suitable alternative candidate to remedy for endogenous unobserved 
common effects. It makes use of estimated coefficients on the first-differenced time dummies 
as a single additional regressor in each panel-specific regression, and comprises the ‘common 
dynamic process’ or the evolution of unobserved common factors across all countries, over 
time (Eberhardt & Teal, 2010, p. 7; Eberhardt, 2012, p. 64).56 Although originally developed 
for the purposes of estimating cross-country production functions with unobservable total 
factor productivity in mind, the method has wide-ranging application. For example, when 
modelling education spending, unobserved (common) factors (e.g., global shocks or spillover 
 
56 In practice, for the AMG estimator, a pooled (homogeneous parameters) regression model augmented with 
year dummies is estimated using OLS applied to the first differences of all the variables (i.e., FD-OLS). The 
coefficients attached to the (first-differenced) year dummies are then collected and used as a separate variable in 
each panel-specific regression. However, the CCEMG estimator uses cross-section averages (by year) of each 
variable, which results in a set of new variables to be used as additional regressors on the right-hand side. 
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effects that are assumed to have heterogeneous effects on country policymaking; common 
social and economic policies for particular regions or economic unions; leader-follower 
behaviour in cross-country policymaking) might not only play an important role in shaping 
spending patterns, but are plausibly also correlated with the included regressors being used to 
explain education spending. In summary, where post hoc testing of the panel-specific (fitted) 
residuals from the standard MG estimator are shown to exhibit cross-section dependence, the 
AMG estimator is used to remedy for this eventuality, and produce consistent panel-specific 
estimates, which in turn are averaged across panels. 
 
5.3.2 Empirical Model Specification 
 
The empirical models to follow make use of a more parsimonious specification, for reasons 
already mentioned, vis-à-vis those used in the previous two empirical chapters. The panel-
specific regressions comprise either the national effort or budget share measure as the 
dependent variable; an intercept (country-specific, time-invariant ‘fixed’ effects to allow for 
unobserved country-specific heterogeneity); size of government (the key explanatory variable 
of interest); GDP per capita (an important control for an empirical specification of Wagner’s 
law) and a linear time trend (to cater for all other unobservable time-varying variables and 
their associated effects). 
 
I specify four equations. Equations (1) and (2) represent the standard MG estimator as applied 
to both outcome measures separately, and works under the assumption of cross-section 
independence. Equations (3) and (4) represent the AMG estimator as applied to both outcome 
measures separately, and allows for cross-section dependence in the data-generating process. 
Equations (3) and (4) augment Equations (1) and (2) by adding an additional variable (the 
common dynamic process). Omitting this variable is assumed to bias the coefficient attached 
to the size of government when cross-section dependence is shown to exist in the fitted 
residuals (as proxies for the errors) when formal tests show a violation of the error-
independence assumption across panels. Using the AMG estimator allows for the presence of 
unobserved common effects that are assumed to be correlated with the included regressors, 
where such effects are also assumed to be heterogeneously distributed across countries.57 Said 
differently, ft (the common dynamic process variable) does not vary across countries (it does 
 
57 One might distinguish between ‘exogenous’ unobserved common effects, in which only the standard errors 
associated with the coefficient estimates would be inefficient, and ‘endogenous’ unobserved common effects, in 
which the coefficient estimates themselves would be biased. I assume the latter, and make allowance for 
unobserved common effects to enter the estimating equation in a heterogeneous manner. 
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vary over time), but λi (the coefficients on the common dynamic process variable) do vary 
across countries (they do not vary over time) – see Equations (3) and (4). Although the 
models specified are said to be more “parsimonious” in their setup, they do, in many respects, 
encompass a number of important features of the assumed data-generating process. Note that 
lowercase symbols or notation used in Equations (1) to (4) are representative of the panel-
specific equations, but uppercase symbols or notation would be representative of the 
coefficient averages across all panels (countries).     
 
Standard MG Estimator (Cross-Section Independence Assumed): 
 
If 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∼ N(0, 𝜎
2), cov(𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑗𝑡) = 0, where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (errors are independent across panels; errors 
are not contemporaneously correlated), and cov(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0 (there are no omitted variables 
assumed to be correlated with the explanatory variable of interest), then 
 
National Effort:   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                 (1) 
Budget Share:      𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                 (2) 
 
Augmented MG Estimator (Allowing for Cross-Section Dependence): 
 
If 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∼ N(0, 𝜎
2), cov(𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑗𝑡) ≠ 0, where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (errors are not independent across panels, but 
are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated), and cov(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 (endogenous 
unobserved common effects are assumed), then 
 
National Effort:   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑖𝑓𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                   (3) 




All variables are in natural logarithms; 
Lower-case symbols are used to signify panel-specific variables; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 is either the national effort or budget share measure of total education spending; 
𝛼∗𝑖 is the panel-specific intercept in each equation; 
𝛽∗ and 𝜃∗ are the panel-specific coefficient estimates for the respective variables; 
𝜆∗𝑖 is the panel-specific coefficient estimate for the common dynamic process variable; 
𝑥1𝑖𝑡 refers to the size of government variable; 
𝑥2𝑖𝑡 refers to the GDP per capita variable; 
𝑥3𝑖𝑡 refers to the linear time-trend variable; 
𝑓𝑡 is the common dynamic process variable; 
The number of countries is given by i = 1, 2, …, N; 
The number of years is given by t = 1, 2, …, T; 






Chapter 3 suggests the national effort (budget share) measure is positively (negatively) related 
to the size of government. Chapter 4 seems to support this hypothesis insofar as the long-run 
effects are concerned, albeit Chapter 4 was more concerned with the short-run (cyclical) 
effects associated with the abovementioned relationships. More formally, when the dependent 
variable is the national effort measure, we might expect the average of 𝛽1𝑖 or 𝛽4𝑖 > 0 
(𝛣1or 𝛣4 > 0); when the budget share measure is the dependent variable, we might expect the 
average of 𝜃1𝑖  or 𝜃4𝑖 < 0 (𝛩1or 𝛩4 < 0), regardless of which estimator is being employed 
(see the Empirical Model Specification section). However, what might be of more particular 
interest in this chapter is not so much the sign of these relationships, but whether or not the 
significance and size thereof is different across different samples, categorised as richer versus 
poorer countries. 
 
5.3.4 Robustness Checks 
 
The two primary robustness checks are part of the estimation procedure, and comprise a 
couple of ways to check the robustness of the results in this chapter. In conjunction with the 
two different estimators employed, using different samples and changing the specification to 
include a dynamic term are two ways in which I undertake robustness checking. I briefly 
explain these two approaches next.  
 
Different Samples of Countries 
 
As was the case in the previous chapter, in addition to an ‘all countries’ sample, I also use the 
same two samples of richer countries (21 OECD countries, and my own compilation of 
richest countries from North America, Nordic countries and Western Europe) and poorer 
countries (all lower and upper middle-income countries, and my own compilation of poorest 
countries from Central America, South America, Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia that 
mainly include low-income and some middle-income countries). For a list of countries that 
comprise these samples, refer to Appendices B and D. Therefore, using different samples of 






Change in Specification 
 
I consider one particular change in specification as a robustness check in this chapter. Since 
this chapter relies on estimating static models using the log levels of the variables, one might 
be inclined to include a dynamic term for robustness purposes for a couple of reasons. In the 
first instance, if education spending does indeed follow an autoregressive of order one (AR1) 
process, including a LDV on the right-hand side would be expected to expunge any serial 
correlation in the error that would likely be present if a purely ‘static’ specification is used. 
Despite concerns about possible endogeneity of the LDV, especially if the series being 
modelled is more highly persistent (beyond 1 lag), this is nonetheless a useful way to perform 
a robustness check for the inclusion of ‘dynamics’ in the model framework. In other words, 
including a simple LDV, which captures the lag order of education spending, is a test of 
whether or not autocorrelation is due to a lack of dynamics in the chosen specification. In the 
second instance, including a dynamic term on the right-hand side might reduce the size and 
significance of the coefficient attached to the size of government, but one would not 
necessarily expect the empirical patterns with respect to the levels effects in the static model 
to be totally confounded. Using a dynamic specification is a test of this hypothesis. 
 
5.3.5 Other Methodological Considerations 
 
Dealing with Outliers 
 
As previously noted, there are numerous cases of outlier or more extreme observations 
present in all five samples (see Appendix S). For this reason, all results reported comprise 
robust estimates, meaning more deviant observations receive a lower weighting in the 
estimation sample, similar to applying a WLS estimator. Therefore, for the purposes of 
applying a MG estimator in this chapter, weighted averages of the panel-specific coefficient 
estimates are routinely computed and reported. In practice, what this means is the “rreg” 
command is used in Stata in the second step of the MG procedure in order to compute robust 
coefficient averages as opposed to computing simple (unweighted) coefficient averages. This 
is done by regressing the panel-specific estimates on a column of ones (an intercept) using the 






Testing for Nonstationarity 
 
Insofar as univariate testing (the testing of each single panel time-series variable) is 
concerned, a drawback of performing formal unit-root tests is that most of these tests require 
strongly balanced panel data. On the one hand, a host of methods now exist insofar as first-
generation panel unit-root tests (PURTs) (e.g., Maddala & Wu, 1999; Harris & Tzavalis, 
1999; Levin et al., 2002; Im et al., 2003) and second-generation PURTs (e.g., Bai & Ng, 
2002, 2004; Pesaran, 2007; Pesaran et al., 2013) are concerned, where the latter (second-
generation) methods also take problems of cross-section dependence into consideration. But, 
these methods could generally not be applied to my data.58 
 
However, on the other hand, Fisher-based PURTs, in the form of the more conventional 
(augmented) Dickey-Fuller (Dickey & Fuller, 1979; 1981) and Phillips-Perron (Phillips & 
Perron, 1988) tests, that perform separate unit-root tests on each panel and then combine the 
p-values to gauge whether or not a panel series has a unit root, were able to be performed on 
all samples and variables. These tests both work under the assumption that T → ∞, a 
drawback in applications with a relatively shorter T dimension. Both tests account for serial 
correlation in the error process of the underlying series being tested, by specifying the lag-
order truncation in the test equation (i.e., routinely set to 2 lags). Although the ADF test does 
so by way of including various lags of the (differenced) dependent variable on the right-hand 
side, possibly imposing further degrees of freedom problems in (panel) series with a shorter T 
dimension, the Phillips-Perron test does so by making a nonparametric adjustment to the 
associated test statistic. Both tests do not require strongly balanced panel data (there can be 
gaps at the beginning, end or even middle of the time-series dimension), and are conducted 
under the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots – the series or process is 
nonstationary or I(1). The alternative hypothesis is that at least one panel is stationary or I(0). 
Regardless, a proviso applies. Any conclusions drawn need to be tempered somewhat because 
the alternative hypothesis speaks of at least one panel (country) being stationary, meaning the 
notion of stationarity is based on this fact only. This is quite important as rejecting the null 
hypothesis does not imply no nonstationarity in all panels. 
 
 
58 For example, with respect to the Im-Pesaran-Shin PURT in Stata (“xtunitroot ips”), this could not be applied 
across all samples and variables. Either “no observations” or “insufficient observations” was reported for most of 




I use the Phillips-Perron version of the Fisher-based PURT.59 The test is performed both 
without and with a trend term to see if the results change qualitatively. I choose a lag length of 
2 throughout, which is more ‘conservative’ and would seem reasonable given the more 
strongly unbalanced dataset. For example, choosing too few lags (1) means any serial 
correlation that remains in the errors will likely bias the test statistic, but choosing too many 
lags (say, 3 or 4) is more likely to reduce the power of the test (1 – probability of committing 
a Type II error, where an error of the second type is accepting a false null). Moreover, 2 lags 
quite closely approximate the Newey and West (1994) ‘heuristic’ of 4(T/100)2/9 in most of my 
samples considered. A lag order between 2 and 3 is needed on this basis. Since more lags 
rather than fewer lags imposes power problems and because 2 lags are computationally less 
‘expensive’ than choosing, say, 3 or 4 lags, I opt for 2 lags throughout.60 The test reports four 
statistics. For simplicity, I make reference to the inverse chi-squared (P) and modified inverse 




Testing to see if the separate variables contain a unit root is one thing, but some linear 
combination of these variables may be cointegrated, hence, reference being made to the 
‘cointegrating’ regression in a multiple linear regression model. For instance, either all the 
variables are assumed to be I(0) or, if all the variables are I(1), they are assumed to be 
cointegrated. Once again, I make use of the Phillips-Perron (1988) procedure, and apply this 
to the residuals obtained from the panel-specific regressions because this is one test that can 
be usefully applied to all of the samples.61 Despite the Phillips-Perron test originally being 
conceived of as a unit-root test or test for the nonstationarity of separate (single) variables, it 
 
59 The Phillips-Perron PURT is performed in Stata using the “xtunitroot fisher” command with “pperron” time-
series test option and lag-order truncation (2) specified. For the interested reader, there are other tests for 
nonstationarity or cointegration in Stata that could be considered, for example, “xtwest” (see Persyn & 
Westerlund, 2008) and “xtpedroni” (see Neal, 2014), respectively, but these tests could most often not be 
operationalised on my strongly unbalanced panel dataset. Eberhardt (2011a) gives a good synopsis of some new 
Stata tools for analysing panel data, most of which cannot be operationalised (e.g., “xtwest”) because of too 
many time gaps with respect to the outcome measures of interest, in particular. 
60 It might also be worthwhile to note that, when conducting the preliminary inquiry, the user-written Stata 
programme “xtscc” by Hoechle (2007), employing the Driscoll-Kraay procedure to compute spatial correlation 
consistent standard errors, routinely used a lag order of 2 in all cases. 
61 An alternative approach was to use the variance-ratio test for cointegration proposed by Westerlund (2005), as 
routinely implemented in Stata using the “xtcointtest westerlund” command. But, this procedure could not be 
consistently applied across all samples largely because of how unbalanced the panel data is for most of the 
samples. A similar problem was encountered with the test for cointegration proposed by Kao (1999) in Stata 
using the “xtcointtest kao” command. For example, when testing for cointegration between lnpsegdptot lngov1 
and lngdppc1 or lnpsegovtot lngov1 and lngdppc1 using the Westerlund variance-ratio test, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration was rejected at the 1% level or lower, and in favour of the alternative hypothesis that some 
panels are cointegrated for the 21 OECD countries and richer countries samples, but it could not be performed on 
all countries, middle-income countries and poorer countries samples. 
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can also be used to test for a unit root in the fitted residuals from a multiple regression (the 
‘cointegrating’ regression). However, because one is now testing the fitted residuals, the 
standard or conventional critical values for this test may be wrong. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no paper reporting a set of critical values, certainly not critical values for 
Fisher-based PURTs that can be easily applied to the residuals from a fitted regression for 
panel data (or residuals from the panel-specific fitted regressions) that is more strongly 
unbalanced. 
 
One of the seminal papers on residual-based tests for cointegration in panel data by Kao 
(1999) is more concerned with finite sample properties, empirical size and power of various 
test statistics as opposed to producing a set of simulated critical values for these tests as a 
point of comparison. Although there are other papers that report critical values for the testing 
of the fitted residuals from a single equation multiple linear regression, such as Phillips and 
Ouliaris (1990), and MacKinnon (2010), these are suitable for time-series models only and 
cannot simply be applied to panel-data models. Nonetheless, the correct critical values would 
most probably need to be larger (with smaller associated p-values), meaning gauging whether 
cointegration exists based on the size of the p-values from the conventional test statistic(s) 
might be a ‘heuristic’ approach to adopt. Once again, bear in mind the alternative hypothesis 
is that at least one panel of residuals is stationary, so when dealing with panel data, this 




A common assumption of panel-data models is that the errors are independent across panel 
members (countries). A violation of this assumption implies cross-section dependence in the 
unobserved component of the data-generating process, and raises concerns about the 
consistency of parameter estimates if the errors are indeed correlated with the included 
regressors. Therefore, instead of merely assuming endogenous common effects that are 
homogeneously distributed (and routinely including year dummies in the estimation 
 
62 I do acknowledge that knowing exactly which critical values are appropriate when conducting a residual-based 
test for cointegration is made even more problematic in a panel-data context. Fisher-based tests applied to panel 
data not only make use of methods to combine the p-values obtained from the testing of each panel’s time series 
of residuals, but also make additional assumptions about whether N is finite or infinite in conjunction with T → 
∞. Choi (2001) gives a good synopsis of unit-root tests for panel data, with a focus on methods combining p-
values; however, these are tests of the separate variables in a regression model (unit-root tests), and not tests of 
the fitted residuals from a regression model (cointegration tests), for which the distributional assumptions of the 
two types of test settings may not be the same. A more recent panel cointegration test using the fitted residuals is 
that proposed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2017), but this is a procedure applicable to the (pooled) 
CCEMG estimator, an approach not adopted in this chapter. 
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procedure, as I did in the previous two chapters and is often the approach adopted in the 
empirical literature), I now formally test for cross-section dependence in the fitted residuals 
(as proxy for the error process). Where shown to be present, I remedy accordingly by using 
the AMG estimator, which has the added advantage of allowing common effects to be more 
heterogeneously distributed across panels. Three tests for cross-section dependence are 
performed on the residuals obtained from the panel-specific regressions. 
 
There are several Stata programmes, testing for cross-sectional correlation or cross-section 
dependence, which could not be implemented on my panel data because of time gaps in the 
education-spending variables, in particular, and other explanatory variables. However, there 
are several Stata programmes that can be usefully applied across all samples.63 The 
unbalanced block-design version of Friedman’s (1937) ANOVA nonparametric (ranking 
method) test – a way of essentially testing for the equality of rankings across panels – as 
proposed by Skillings and Mack (1981) is a first test employed. For interest sake, the 
Friedman test is one of several test procedures implemented in Stata when using the user-
written programme by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006). The other two tests employed are 
those proposed by Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran (2015). The null hypothesis for all three tests is 
no cross-sectional correlation; no cross-section dependence; strict cross-section independence 
(Pesaran, 2004) or weak cross-section dependence (Pesaran, 2015); the residuals are 
independently distributed. The alternative hypothesis is exactly the opposite, and amounts to 
saying that cross-section dependence is exhibited in the data-generating process of the 
residuals being tested. 
 
The practical example given in Field (2009, p. 574) gives a good illustration of how 
Friedman’s ANOVA (and, for that matter, any test for cross-sectional correlation) works, by 
presenting a simple table of data. Conceptually, the setup and implementation of a test for 
cross-sectional correlation in the residuals can be explained as follows. For example, consider 
 
63 The Pesaran (2007) CD or cross-section dependence test as operationalised in Stata with user-written 
programme “pescadf” by Lewandowski (2007); the Pesaran (2004) CD test as operationalised in Stata by De 
Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) with their user-written programme “xtcsd” or associated user-written programme 
“xtcd” by Eberhardt (2011b), and the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test as operationalised in Stata with user-written 
programme “xtcips” by Sangiacomo (2018), could either not be performed or not be performed consistently 
across all samples. Note that the “pescadf” and “xtcips” programmes are PURTs that allow for cross-section 
dependence. However, the Skillings and Mack (1981) test as operationalised in Stata with user-written 
programme “skilmack” by Chatfield and Mander (2009); the Pesaran (2015) CD test as operationalised in Stata 
with user-written programme “xtcd2” by Ditzen (2016), and the Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran (2015) CD tests as 
operationalised in Stata with user-written programme “xtcdf” by Wursten (2017), were able to be performed 
across all samples, which makes for a consistent way to conduct testing for cross-section dependence across all 
samples of regression results.  
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a matrix of data of the residuals from a regression, for which the rows comprise the panel 
members (countries) and the columns comprise the various ‘treatments’ (years). For each 
country (each row), the residual observations are ranked from smallest (1) to largest (N); for 
each country, each value of the residuals is replaced with a number designating its rank in the 
time-series observations. The ranks for each year (each column) are then summed across all 
panels, and then squared, giving the squared sum of ranks for each column of the data matrix 
(for each year). If the squared sum of ranks for each column (year) were (statistically) similar, 
this would be indicative of the residuals being as good as ‘randomly’ assigned across panel 
members each year, in which case, one would conclude the residuals are independently 
distributed, with no cross-sectional correlation or no systematic pattern in the residuals being 
exhibited across countries, over time. However, if the squared sum of ranks were 
(statistically) different (a rejection of the null hypothesis), this would be an indication of the 
residuals not being ‘randomly’ assigned across countries by year, in which case, one would 
conclude the residuals are not independently distributed; cross-sectional correlation exists or a 
systematic pattern of behaviour in the residuals is exhibited across countries, over time. 
 
5.4 Data Collection and Description of the Data 
 
5.4.1 Data Collected 
 
Table 29 presents the data collected for this chapter. Since all four variables are obtainable 
from the World Bank, refer to the World Bank sources in the references list for the original 
sources of these variables. For example, although one can source education-spending data 
from the World Bank’s Education Statistics (EdStats) database, these data come from the UIS 
database. The names and details of all variables are given in Table 29. 
 
In addition to an ‘all countries’ sample, Appendices B and D list the names of countries 
making up the four samples of countries, namely 21 OECD countries, middle-income 
countries, richer countries and poorer countries. As before, the 21 ‘core’ OECD countries are 
those used by Busemeyer (2007), and comprise a stable set of the richest, democratic 
countries over the time period, 1989 to 2015. The national effort (psegdptot) and budget share 
(psegovtot) measures are the separate dependent variables of interest. The key explanatory 
variable of interest is the size of government (gov1). One observable control variable is also 
included, namely GDP per capita (gdppc1). The natural logarithm of these four level-form 
variables (log levels) are used in all regressions. 
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psegdptot Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2551 1989-2015 World Bank EdStats 
psegovtot Public spending on education, total (% of total government expenditure) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 2255 1989-2015 World Bank EdStats 
Explanatory Variable of Interest 
gov1 General government total expenditure (IMF, % of GDP) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4237 1989-2015 World Bank TCdata360 
Control Variable 
gdppc1 GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international dollars) Continuous (Interval or Ratio) 4803 1990-2015 World Bank WDI 
 
Notes: EdStats refers to the World Bank’s Education Statistics database (see World Bank, 2017a). TCdata360 refers to the World Bank’s TCdata360 database (see World Bank, 
2017b). WDI refers to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (see World Bank, 2017c). 
158 
 
5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 30 presents the salient descriptive statistics. They are the same as the respective 
descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 4. A noticeable feature of the means of these level-
form variables (including GDP per capita) is their similarity to the results and inequality 
propositions postulated in the first empirical chapter: richer countries tend to spend more 
(less) than poorer countries in national effort (budget share) terms and richer (higher GDP per 
capita) countries tend to have larger public sectors than do poorer (lower GDP per capita) 
countries. However, although the means of the four variables are different across samples, 
there is overlap with most of them. Of interest then in this chapter is knowing how changes in 
the size of government affect these measures of education spending in the long run, for which 
the log levels of these variables are modelled in an ostensibly static model. 
 
Test for Equality of Populations 
 
Table 31 presents the results of a test for equality of populations. Owing to the fact that many 
of the countries have missing data for one or more of the four variables, I use a nonparametric 
test for the equality of populations (i.e., an equality-of-populations rank test), by asking 
whether or not the samples of data (by country) are jointly drawn from the same population? 
The Kruskal-Wallis procedure is an appropriate independent samples test for data on multiple 
groups (data for more than two panels or countries), and works under a null hypothesis of 
joint equality of distributions.64 In all cases, the null hypothesis is rejected, showing that the 
mean (and associated distribution) of the panel-specific variables are not jointly drawn from 
the same population distribution for each sample considered. This result lends support, in 
some sense, to examining about heterogeneous parameters when considering the long-run 




64 One can distinguish between independent and dependent samples tests. From a nonparametric (ranking-
methods) perspective, the Mann-Whitney or Wilcoxon rank-sum test is an independent samples test for two 
groups. The Kruskal-Wallis test is an independent samples test for more than two groups (a joint-samples test). 
However, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a dependent (matched) samples test for two groups, whereas the 
Friedman test is a matched samples test for more than two groups. The null hypothesis for all of these tests 
amounts to saying, “no difference.” It should be apparent why the Kruskal-Wallis test is more appropriate for my 
purposes here, because the samples of data for each country do not comprise ‘matched’ samples. But, the reason 
why the Friedman test is arguably more appropriate when testing for cross-section dependence is because the 
panel-specific residuals might best be thought of as ‘matched’ samples of randomly assigned ranks, meaning the 
sum of ranks and squared sum of ranks should be more or less similar, hence, not rejecting the null hypothesis is 
tantamount to saying the assumption of cross-section independence holds (is not violated).  
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Primitive Pairwise Scatterplots 
 
Appendix S presents the ‘primitive’ or crude pairwise (pooled) scatterplots of education 
spending by size of government, where both variables in each case are given in log levels. For 
the most part, the simple pairwise scatterplots of the national effort (budget share) measure by 
size of government depict the expected positive (negative) relationship. As previously noted 
elsewhere, there are also many cases of outlier observations in all five samples, which means 
routinely employing a procedure to compute robust coefficient (average) estimates is 
warranted. 
 
Univariate Nonstationarity Testing 
 
If one refers to the unit-root test results (Appendix T) for the four separate series considered 
in this chapter (lnpsegdptot, lnpsegovtot, lngov1 and lngdppc1), the order of integration of 
these (log-level) series by sample for the Phillips-Perron test results where a trend is included, 
seem to show a particular pattern. Note that I focus on these results because a linear trend is 
included in all the main regressions in this chapter to capture unobserved time-varying effects, 
so including a trend in the test equation when testing the separate variables is an indication of 
this fact, in the sense that I am more interested in knowing whether or not the separate 
variables are approximately trend-stationary series. For instance, at the 1% level of 
significance the null of nonstationarity can be rejected for all four series for all countries, 
middle-income countries and poorer countries, except lngdppc1 for poorer countries, which 
can only be rejected at the 10% level. However, the null cannot be rejected for all four series 
for 21 OECD countries and richer countries, meaning there is insufficient evidence to 
conclude all four of the series from these two samples are deemed at least trend stationary. 
The tests for nonstationarity in all five samples tend to suggest the equations are balanced. To 
be clear, saying a series is I(1) instead of I(0) means, conditional on, say, the 10% level, there 
is not enough evidence; it is not beyond a reasonable doubt to suggest the series is stationary. 
Not being able to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity could plausibly be as a result of 
a lower power of the test. Put simply, if one cannot reject the null hypothesis, this is merely 
saying there is not enough evidence to suggest otherwise and/or the test is less powerful at 





Bear in mind that these results are merely indicative, and certainly not definitive of 
stationarity (or nonstationarity) amongst all panels of the separate series, because a test for 
nonstationarity in panel data uses a null hypothesis of nonstationarity amongst ALL panels; 
alternative hypothesis being at least ONE panel is stationary. What does this really mean? For 
example, when testing a single (panel) variable for a unit root, where the panel series 
comprises 50 panels each with 20 time-series observations, if at least one (and only one) panel 
is actually stationary (the rest are nonstationary), is this really a definitive result concerning 
the stationarity of the entire panel series? Therefore, with this in mind, the intuition would be 
to conduct an additional robustness check using a specification with first-differences of all the 
variables, which hopefully induces stationarity, to see if these results are noticeably different 



























Table 30: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Statistic psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 
 ALL COUNTRIES 
Mean 4.505 14.849 31.938 15111 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 2.007 5.036 17.871 18507 
Std. Dev. (Between) 1.988 4.566 13.175 18625 
Std. Dev. (Within) 1.109 2.742 12.195 4551 
Minimum 0.781 2.563 0.000 247 
Maximum 44.334 47.279 539.233 137164 
Countries 193 181 190 195 
Years 13.2 12.5 22.3 24.6 
Observations 2551 2255 4237 4803 
 21 OECD COUNTRIES 
Mean 5.352 12.245 45.116 37269 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 1.165 2.552 8.153 8875 
Std. Dev. (Between) 1.105 2.477 7.470 7631 
Std. Dev. (Within) 0.528 1.085 3.697 4818 
Minimum 1.934 5.595 28.012 20167 
Maximum 8.627 19.690 68.393 65072 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
Years 21.3 20.9 26.0 26.0 
Observations 447 439 547 546 
 MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Mean 4.477 16.172 30.639 7493 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 2.054 5.396 20.581 5460 
Std. Dev. (Between) 2.131 4.683 13.868 4884 
Std. Dev. (Within) 0.994 3.169 15.548 2681 
Minimum 0.781 4.964 0.000 704 
Maximum 14.539 44.802 539.233 50640 
Countries 100 95 105 106 
Years 12.0 11.1 22.0 25.2 
Observations 1195 1050 2306 2670 
 RICHER COUNTRIES 
Mean 5.077 11.900 45.811 40297 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 1.543 2.630 8.288 12944 
Std. Dev. (Between) 1.607 2.504 8.596 11836 
Std. Dev. (Within) 0.571 1.121 3.650 5808 
Minimum 0.914 5.009 17.764 20167 
Maximum 8.627 17.926 68.393 97438 
Countries 25 23 21 21 
Years 18.7 18.6 25.0 25.9 
Observations 468 428 526 544 
 POORER COUNTRIES 
Mean 4.138 16.451 24.711 4880 
Std. Dev. (Overall) 2.316 5.085 9.402 4641 
Std. Dev. (Between) 2.099 4.520 7.883 4459 
Std. Dev. (Within) 1.422 3.089 5.017 1272 
Minimum 0.805 2.563 0.000 247 
Maximum 44.334 36.737 82.081 25312 
Countries 79 78 81 81 
Years 13.1 12.1 22.1 25.1 
Observations 1037 945 1787 2035 
 
Notes: See Table 29 for a description of each variable. Years refers to the average number of year (time-series) 











Table 31: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Equality of Populations 
 
Statistic psegdptot psegovtot gov1 gdppc1 
 ALL COUNTRIES 
Chi-squared 2002 1725 3563 4604 
d.f. 192 180 189 194 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries (groups) 193 181 190 195 
 21 OECD COUNTRIES 
Chi-squared 341 359 442 347 
d.f. 20 20 20 20 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries (groups) 21 21 21 21 
 MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Chi-squared 946 746 1786 2294 
d.f. 99 94 104 105 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries (groups) 100 95 105 106 
 RICHER COUNTRIES 
Chi-squared 380 347 405 381 
d.f. 24 22 20 20 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries (groups) 25 23 21 21 
 POORER COUNTRIES 
Chi-squared 765 611 1275 1921 
d.f. 78 77 80 80 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries (groups) 79 78 81 81 
 
Notes: The chi-squared and chi-squared adjusted for ties were the same in each and every case. The decimal 
places have been dropped from the test statistic reported. Countries (groups) refers to the number of countries 
considered for each variable, where the time-series observations for each country comprise the sample groups to 
be tested. Therefore, the grouping criterion for each variable is the panel (country) identifier. 
 




This section focuses on the tables of regression results in the text (Tables 32 and 33) and 
associated figures etc. presented in the appendices (Appendices U, V and W). The shaded 
regression results from Tables 32 and 33 are of most importance in this chapter. As before, 
richer cohort refers to the 21 OECD countries and richer countries samples. Similarly, poorer 
cohort refers to the middle-income and poorer countries samples. I proceed by firstly 
commenting on the key regression results and findings (Table 32 and notes in Appendix U). I 
then comment on some regression diagnostic tests, comprising various scatterplots to visually 
inspect or check for autocorrelation, linearity and homoskedasticity in the static model 
(Appendix V). Next, I comment on the main results and findings of a change in specification 
(Table 33 and notes in Appendix U) to see if the substantive empirical patterns are noticeably 
different, and to see if including ‘dynamics’ in the modelling framework remedies possible 




5.5.2 Results and Findings 
 
Table 32 presents the substantive results for the static model. Most noticeably, on the one 
hand, the national effort measure is always and everywhere positively (and statistically 
significantly) related to the size of government, regardless of sample and estimator employed. 
This general finding accords with the expectation that the average of 𝛽1𝑖 or 𝛽4𝑖 > 0 
(𝛣1or 𝛣4 > 0) when the national effort measure is modelled on the left-hand side (dependent 
variable). On the other hand, the budget share measure is mostly negatively (and statistically 
significantly) related to the size of government, regardless of sample and estimator employed. 
This general finding accords with the expectation that the average of 𝜃1𝑖  or 𝜃4𝑖 < 0 
(𝛩1or 𝛩4 < 0) when the budget share measure is modelled as the dependent variable. With 
respect to testing for cointegration, given the very low p-values reported, this would seem to 
suggest the variables in each regression are cointegrated. However, this does not necessarily 
mean the size of government variable has a significant effect in all samples tested if a problem 
of cross-section dependence is taken into account. 65 
 
There are a number of points worth mentioning with regards to the testing for cross-section 
dependence. Firstly, for only a handful of times out of the 40 test results reported in Tables 32 
and 33 did the three tests not report a similar result using, say, the 10% level of significance 
as a guideline.66 Secondly, where evidence of cross-section dependence in the error process 
(residuals) is exhibited using the same benchmark level of significance for all three separate 
tests, using the AMG estimator remedied the problem. Thirdly, never for the poorer countries 
 
65 As an additional robustness check, I ran all the static models from Table 32 using a specification with first-
differenced variables. With reference to the applicable results – the robust coefficient average on the size of 
government – from each model by sample, based on whether a problem of cross-section dependence is 
evidenced in the fitted residuals, the results reported from the regressions of differenced variables were either 
almost identical or qualitatively similar, except for the MG estimates of the budget share measure for the 21 
OECD and richer countries samples. When using first-differenced variables instead of the levels, estimates that 
are dissimilar for the relationship between the budget share measure and size of government for the richer 
cohorts might be suggestive of no meaningful long-run relationship between these two variables. The only 
anomaly was the AMG estimate of the national effort measure for richer countries, which was somewhat smaller 
in absolute size and not significant (the sign did not change though). Moreover, the most noticeable problem 
with using first-differenced variables was the estimation of larger standard errors (relative to the use of level-
form variables), which means a lack of precision would probably plague this robustness check. However, in 
more general terms, this additional robustness check suggests the relationship between education spending and 
size of government is cointegrated for the samples tested, except for the budget share measure and size of 
government for the richer cohorts. 
66 Strictly speaking, it would not be correct to say the three tests ‘concur’ (because their respective p-values are 
often noticeably different), but rather, when choosing a particular level of significance (i.e., the 10% level), all 
three tests yield a similar result, more often than not, insofar as rejecting (or not being able to reject) the null 
hypothesis of no cross-section dependence is concerned.   
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sample is a problem of cross-section dependence evidenced, whether the static or dynamic 
model specification is considered, where the latter only includes one additional explanatory 
variable (the LDV). Fourthly, and possibly most important, a clearer pattern of cross-section 
dependence in the residuals is evidenced (at the 5% level or lower) for the richer cohorts 
when the national effort measure is the dependent variable. This is not the case when the 
budget share measure is the dependent variable. This raises an interesting question about 
which measure is more likely to be deemed a ‘benchmark’ or ‘headline’ measure of education 
spending insofar as the richest countries are concerned: the national effort measure or the 
budget share measure? These results would seem to imply the former (national effort) 
measure arguably incorporates a degree of (unobserved) common behaviour in shaping 
education-spending patterns.67 
 
Bearing in mind that, where a problem of cross-section dependence is exhibited in the 
residuals produced using the standard MG estimator, one should ideally ignore these 
regression results (the assumption of cross-section independence is violated), and should 
rather refer to the results reported using the AMG estimator. This being said, an important 
result relates to the budget share measure for the richer cohorts. Where the null hypothesis of 
no cross-section dependence (cross-section independence) cannot be rejected, the regression 
results reported from the standard MG estimator are most applicable. But, although the 
expected negative sign is reported, the coefficient in both cases is not statistically significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Appendix V performs a series of regression diagnostic tests by way of visual inspection 
(scatterplots). In all cases, except possibly for both outcome measures and the richer cohorts, 
no problem of serial correlation is evidenced. In all cases, tests for linearity seem to suggest a 
linear specification is most appropriate; some other non-linear specification does not seem to 
 
67 I conducted a sensitivity analysis of sorts, to see how ‘sensitive’ the estimated effects on the size of 
government variable are to the inclusion of the common dynamic process variable in the specification to cater for 
unobserved common effects (to allow for cross-section dependence). To do this, since cross-section dependence 
in the residuals seemed to be particularly evident for the national effort measure in conjunction with the richer 
cohorts in the ‘static’ (long-run) models of interest, I collected the panel-specific estimates on the size of 
government variable, produced using the MG and AMG estimators, where the latter allows for cross-section 
dependence in the data-generating process, hence, I had two columns of data for each of the richer cohorts. The 
correlation coefficient for both samples (21 OECD and richer countries) of estimates were in excess of 0.7, 
indicating a high degree of correlation. I also ran a simple paired-samples t-test and generally found the null 
hypothesis of no difference could not be rejected at the 10% level. The evidence suggests the estimated effects 
associated with the size of government variable are very similar (they are drawn from the same ‘population’ of 
estimates), regardless of estimator employed (MG or AMG) and sample chosen (21 OECD or richer countries), 
meaning unobserved common effects are not necessarily endogenous or correlated with the size of government 




better fit the applicable data. Problems related to heteroskedasticity (non-constant variance of 
the residuals) does not appear to be a problem, except possibly for a small part of the lower 
range of the residuals for the richer cohorts for both outcome measures, but certainly not so 
the case for the bulk of these residuals. 
 
Table 33 presents the results for a particular robustness check by changing the chosen 
empirical specification to include a dynamic term (LDV) on the right-hand side. What this 
shows is that, any doubts about serial correlation for the richer cohorts, in particular, are 
allayed since the pattern of the residuals now seems to show that incorporating ‘dynamics’ 
into the modelling process, remedies any possible problem of autocorrelation (see Appendix 
W). An important result relates to the substantive patterns exhibited in Table 32. When 
incorporating a dynamic term into the model specification, the substantive results do not 
change in a noticeable way, meaning the static results are robust to the inclusion of (simple) 



























Notes: See Appendix U for additional table notes. Since robust coefficient averages of the panel-specific 
estimates have been computed and reported, the associated standard errors (in parentheses) are outlier-robust 










Dependent Variable: psegdptot, level (t) 
All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG 
Size of  government, level (t) 0.341*** 0.389*** 0.501*** 0.418*** 0.275*** 0.308*** 0.481*** 0.474*** 0.277*** 0.331*** 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.111) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.118) (0.123) (0.095) (0.124) 
Income per capita, level (t) -0.202 -0.028 -0.111 0.031 -0.421 -0.200 0.095 0.325 -0.165 -0.129 
 (0.147) (0.160) (0.296) (0.177) (0.260) (0.222) (0.239) (0.298) (0.305) (0.289) 
Linear trend 0.009** -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.013** 0.000 0.005 -0.004 0.020*** 0.014* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Common dynamic process  1.046***  0.798***  0.878***  0.681**  0.346 
  (0.241)  (0.234)  (0.271)  (0.283)  (0.346) 
Constant 1.903 0.257 1.473 -0.942 4.192* 2.712 -1.239 -4.099 1.405 0.890 
 (1.356) (1.454) (3.326) (2.141) (2.321) (2.171) (2.685) (3.426) (2.423) (2.338) 
Test for Cointegration           
Phillips-Perron (P) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Phillips-Perron (Pm) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           
Tests for Cross-Section Dependence           
Skillings-Mack (p-value) 0.000 0.148 0.001 0.651 0.012 0.694 0.005 0.307 0.745 0.989 
Skillings-Mack (empirical p-value) n/a n/a 0.001 0.658 n/a n/a 0.002 0.306 n/a n/a 
Pesaran (2015) (p-value) 0.141 0.933 0.003 0.476 0.583 0.468 0.035 0.892 0.598 0.301 
Pesaran fast (2004; 2015) (p-value) 0.157 0.828 0.000 0.412 0.713 0.086 0.029 0.718 0.127 0.189 
           
RMSE 0.0959 0.0859 0.0510 0.0402 0.1035 0.0935 0.0537 0.0411 0.1175 0.1009 
Wald Chi-squared 32.51*** 36.46*** 20.40*** 22.36*** 12.48*** 12.83*** 16.67*** 16.10*** 8.81** 7.37** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.025 
Trends significant 0.325 0.211 0.429 0.476 0.329 0.257 0.450 0.579 0.361 0.265 
Countries 154 147 21 21 79 74 20 19 72 68 
Years (Minimum) 5 6 10 10 5 6 5 10 5 6 
Years (Average) 14.0 14.4 20.0 20.0 12.7 13.3 19.4 20.2 12.8 13.3 
Years (Maximum) 24 24 24 24 23 23 24 24 22 22 
Observations 2152 2117 420 420 1006 981 389 384 924 904 
           
           
           
           
Dependent Variable: psegovtot, level (t) 
All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG 
Size of  government, level (t) -0.420*** -0.428*** -0.155 -0.392** -0.523*** -0.522*** -0.147 -0.369** -0.514*** -0.458*** 
 (0.068) (0.062) (0.136) (0.173) (0.102) (0.093) (0.158) (0.170) (0.099) (0.108) 
Income per capita, level (t) -0.092 -0.131 0.146 0.413 -0.227 -0.221 0.384* 0.590* -0.066 0.088 
 (0.138) (0.148) (0.279) (0.332) (0.231) (0.246) (0.208) (0.321) (0.299) (0.313) 
Linear trend 0.007** 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.008 0.007 -0.002 -0.007 0.020*** 0.012 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Common dynamic process  0.629***  0.522**  0.549**  0.421  0.376 
  (0.235)  (0.256)  (0.260)  (0.277)  (0.310) 
Constant 4.689*** 5.196*** 1.558 -0.920 6.238*** 5.798*** -0.723 -2.762 4.564** 3.626 
 (1.279) (1.324) (3.389) (3.829) (2.091) (2.168) (2.471) (3.981) (2.319) (2.337) 
Test for Cointegration           
Phillips-Perron (P) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Phillips-Perron (Pm) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           
Tests for Cross-Section Dependence           
Skillings-Mack (p-value) 0.033 0.200 0.149 0.645 0.203 0.516 0.088 0.309 0.863 1.000 
Skillings-Mack (empirical p-value) n/a n/a 0.149 0.631 0.203 0.495 0.079 0.297 0.844 0.999 
Pesaran (2015) (p-value) 0.710 0.874 0.235 0.430 0.657 0.912 0.150 0.913 0.374 0.131 
Pesaran fast (2004; 2015) (p-value) 0.785 0.562 0.265 0.153 0.865 0.442 0.158 0.810 0.094 0.073 
           
RMSE 0.0979 0.0903 0.0499 0.0417 0.1086 0.0989 0.0525 0.0443 0.1166 0.1031 
Wald Chi-squared 38.54*** 48.17*** 1.57 6.70** 27.40*** 31.95*** 4.27 8.11** 26.83*** 18.17*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.457 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.017 0.000 0.000 
Trends significant 0.276 0.212 0.333 0.381 0.278 0.230 0.316 0.368 0.292 0.221 
Countries 152 146 21 21 79 74 19 19 72 68 
Years (Minimum) 5 6 10 10 5 6 10 10 5 6 
Years (Average) 13.9 14.2 20.0 20.0 12.6 13.1 20.2 20.2 12.7 13.2 
Years (Maximum) 24 24 24 24 22 22 24 24 22 22 
Observations 2110 2080 419 419 995 970 383 383 916 896 
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Notes: See Appendix U for additional table notes. Since robust coefficient averages of the panel-specific 
estimates have been computed and reported, the associated standard errors (in parentheses) are outlier-robust 








Dependent Variable: psegdptot, level (t) 
All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG 
National effort (psegdptot), lagged level (t-1) 0.212*** 0.131*** 0.392*** 0.195** 0.164*** 0.214*** 0.404*** 0.260*** 0.220*** 0.217*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.069) (0.080) (0.063) (0.059) (0.084) (0.095) (0.066) (0.063) 
Size of  government, level (t) 0.344*** 0.378*** 0.458*** 0.243*** 0.346*** 0.325*** 0.435*** 0.177*** 0.351*** 0.369*** 
 (0.061) (0.065) (0.146) (0.080) (0.090) (0.100) (0.167) (0.066) (0.087) (0.133) 
Income per capita, level (t) -0.222 -0.058 -0.044 0.237 -0.319 -0.136 0.116 0.099 -0.274 -0.386 
 (0.148) (0.170) (0.269) (0.274) (0.263) (0.285) (0.273) (0.276) (0.307) (0.282) 
Linear trend 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) 
Common dynamic process  0.435**  0.492***  0.825***  0.320  0.744*** 
  (0.194)  (0.181)  (0.196)  (0.197)  (0.229) 
Constant 1.635 0.192 0.024 -2.526 2.163 1.078 -1.698 -0.724 1.435 1.706 
 (1.458) (1.624) (3.252) (3.312) (2.471) (2.638) (3.554) (3.451) (2.732) (2.522) 
           
Tests for Cross-Section Dependence           
Skillings-Mack (p-value) 0.000 0.046 0.002 0.130 0.316 0.868 0.002 0.118 0.236 0.879 
Skillings-Mack (empirical p-value) n/a n/a 0.002 0.129 0.297 0.871 0.001 0.097 0.225 0.897 
Pesaran (2015) (p-value) 0.004 0.391 0.001 0.194 0.737 0.260 0.005 0.259 0.782 0.777 
Pesaran fast (2004; 2015) (p-value) 0.000 0.335 0.000 0.173 0.267 0.302 0.002 0.261 0.601 0.742 
           
RMSE 0.0732 0.0660 0.0398 0.0332 0.0794 0.0717 0.0403 0.0322 0.0880 0.0800 
Wald Chi-squared 66.75*** 44.45*** 41.77*** 15.78*** 22.93*** 23.85*** 29.99*** 15.01*** 28.30*** 21.21*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Trends significant 0.169 0.212 0.333 0.381 0.167 0.094 0.368 0.526 0.143 0.157 
Countries 124 113 21 21 60 53 19 19 56 51 
Years (Minimum) 6 7 9 9 6 7 9 9 6 7 
Years (Average) 13.4 14.1 18.0 18.0 12.1 12.9 18.2 18.2 12.1 12.7 
Years (Maximum) 24 24 24 24 21 21 24 24 20 20 
Observations 1660 1594 377 377 728 686 346 346 677 647 
           
           
           
           
Dependent Variable: psegovtot, level (t) 
All Countries 21 OECD Countries 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG MG AMG 
Budget share (psegovtot), lagged level (t-1) 0.157*** 0.101** 0.382*** 0.343*** 0.103* 0.131** 0.398*** 0.307*** 0.143** 0.088 
 (0.038) (0.046) (0.084) (0.091) (0.062) (0.065) (0.090) (0.106) (0.059) (0.067) 
Size of  government, level (t) -0.385*** -0.379*** -0.163 -0.346*** -0.359*** -0.457*** -0.178 -0.304* -0.448*** -0.591*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.125) (0.107) (0.096) (0.102) (0.148) (0.164) (0.102) (0.099) 
Income per capita, level (t) -0.084 -0.005 -0.055 0.184 -0.199 0.037 0.096 0.190 -0.003 -0.057 
 (0.149) (0.185) (0.205) (0.266) (0.292) (0.355) (0.177) (0.225) (0.379) (0.419) 
Linear trend 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.013 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) 
Common dynamic process  0.247  0.279  0.538*  0.252  0.468 
  (0.221)  (0.186)  (0.318)  (0.189)  (0.320) 
Constant 3.870*** 3.193* 2.834 0.898 5.752** 3.199 1.347 0.200 4.504 3.823 
 (1.406) (1.794) (2.482) (2.797) (2.739) (3.174) (2.232) (2.774) (3.100) (3.383) 
           
Tests for Cross-Section Dependence           
Skillings-Mack (p-value) 0.102 0.820 0.352 0.509 0.755 0.736 0.393 0.493 0.213 0.750 
Skillings-Mack (empirical p-value) n/a n/a 0.366 0.520 0.777 0.757 0.385 0.503 0.218 0.759 
Pesaran (2015) (p-value) 0.798 0.744 0.876 0.656 0.256 0.463 0.911 0.901 0.796 0.912 
Pesaran fast (2004; 2015) (p-value) 0.991 0.446 0.867 0.620 0.324 0.427 0.978 0.827 0.920 0.896 
           
RMSE 0.0738 0.0675 0.0393 0.0353 0.0820 0.0747 0.0404 0.0364 0.0882 0.0773 
Wald Chi-squared 54.11*** 40.25*** 22.48*** 24.92*** 17.14*** 24.29*** 21.29*** 12.54*** 25.08*** 36.98*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Trends significant 0.174 0.161 0.190 0.143 0.155 0.151 0.263 0.316 0.232 0.137 
Countries 121 112 21 21 58 53 19 19 56 51 
Years (Minimum) 6 7 9 9 6 7 9 9 6 7 
Years (Average) 13.2 13.8 17.9 17.9 11.9 12.5 18.2 18.2 11.8 12.3 
Years (Maximum) 24 24 24 24 19 19 24 24 19 19 





There are several interesting points of discussion emanating from the main results and 
findings. The first concerns the sign of the predicted relationships. The positive (negative) 
relationship between the national effort (budget share) measure and size of government 
accords with what was found in Chapter 3 with respect to different economic (richer versus 
poorer) and political groupings of countries. The signs of these relationships even had support 
in the long-run parameters estimated in Chapter 4. 
 
However, the second point concerns the significance of the predicted relationships. Despite 
statistically significant estimates for most (if not all) samples for the national effort measure, 
evidence for the richer cohorts (21 OECD countries and richer countries) is much less 
convincing with regards to the budget share measure, especially if one considers the residuals 
when applying the standard MG estimator do not exhibit any pattern of cross-sectional 
correlation or cross-section dependence – the results when applying this estimator are the 
applicable ones. There is evidence to suggest the long-run relationship between the budget 
share measure and size of government for the two richer cohorts is not significantly different 
from zero.68 Whether this is due to a lack of precision in estimating the relationship or 
because no relationship, indeed, exists is more difficult to say with certainty. 
 
With regards to the richer cohorts, a finding of significant effects associated with the size of 
government for the national effort measure, but insignificant effects for the budget share 
measure, coupled with strong evidence to suggest cross-section dependence with the former 
(national effort), but not the latter (budget share), is indicative of the national effort measure 
being a more likely ‘benchmark’ or ‘headline’ measure of education spending against which 
richer countries ‘compete’ with or compare themselves against one another. The idea of 
‘common behaviour’ in educational policy outcomes is an interesting one to consider. For 
instance, if richer countries do indeed ‘pick’ their chosen level of national effort towards 
education based on what other richer countries are doing (or even based on what one richer 
country is doing), then this implies a process of common behaviour in public policy 
outcomes. But, it is not necessarily the case that unobserved common effects are correlated 
with the size of government. For example, countries choosing to spending more in national 
 
68 The finding of no significant long-run relationship between the budget share measure and size of government 
for the two richer cohorts in this empirical chapter is also somewhat borne out by the mostly insignificant 
estimates associated with the long-run effects in the previous empirical chapter (Chapter 4) when using a pooled 
(homogeneous) slopes estimator. 
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effort terms simply means a reprioritisation of spending away from some other public good, 
and in favour of education; hence, the size of government could theoretically remain 
unchanged, meaning common behaviour, as envisaged here, is not necessarily endogenous. At 
the very least, the idea of common (spending) behaviour in educational policymaking does 
open up another avenue for further inquiry with respect to the testing of other measures of 
education spending (e.g., spending per pupil measures). 
 
The last point concerns the size of the predicted relationships. For a given increase in the size 
of government in the long run, the national effort measure for richer and poorer cohorts is 
predicted to grow at a similar rate (the coefficient estimates for 𝛣1or 𝛣4 across different types 
of countries are qualitatively similar). For example, even from a statistical point of view, if 
one considers the applicable main regression results from Table 32 (the coefficient attached to 
the size of government variable) for the 21 OECD countries and middle-income countries 
samples (0.418 and 0.275, respectively); their associated standard errors (0.088 and 0.088, 
respectively) and sample sizes (420 and 1006, respectively), a two-sample t-test in Stata 
reveals no difference in these estimates. A similar result is found when testing the richer 
countries and poorer countries samples. However, for the same given increase in the size of 
government in the long run, the budget share measure for the poorer cohorts is predicted to 
fall, whilst that of the richer cohorts is predicted to remain unchanged (for both of the richer 
cohorts, the coefficient estimate for 𝛩1 is not significantly different from zero). Although I 
acknowledge that non-significant results for the richer cohorts do not necessarily imply the 
effects are zero, these results do contrast with those of the poorer cohorts. 
 
One explanation for an insignificant relationship between the budget share measure and size 
of government in richer countries is that they have larger, more mature and stable public 
sectors, for which the budget share is already very low and/or relatively stable around some 
mean level, in part, because of the greater variety of fiscal components to be financed from 
the public purse in these types of countries. By implication, no long-run relationship is 
necessarily expected in richer countries. For one, from a purely descriptive point of view and 
irrespective of variation, the mean levels suggest richer (poorer) countries have larger 









5.6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
 
This chapter presented a set of results comparable to those from the previous empirical 
chapter, in that, the national effort (budget share) measure of education spending is generally 
predicted to be positively (negatively) related to the size of government over the long run, 
where all variables used in the models comprise log levels. However, testing different samples 
of countries revealed a more nuanced result. Although the relationship between the national 
effort measure and size of government was found to be qualitatively similar for richer and 
poorer cohorts of countries, the budget share measure was predicted to fall for the poorer 
cohorts, but remain unchanged for the richer cohorts. However, it must be borne in mind a 
finding of ‘not significant’ for the budget share measure for richer countries is not necessarily 
to say the coefficient of interest is equal to zero. It might be more the case the effect is 
imprecisely estimated and there is not enough evidence, given the data available, to reject the 
null hypothesis that the effect (beta or theta of interest) is equal to zero. 
 
As an extension to what has been found, some interesting questions come to mind that require 
more thought, especially if one were to try and operationalise an inquiry along these lines. Is 
there a maximum (ceiling) or minimum (floor) level of the national effort or budget share 
measure of spending, respectively? And, by implication, is there a maximum achievable size 
of government? By the same token, have richer countries achieved (or are they fast 
approaching) a maximum ‘threshold’ level of the public sector, with poorer countries having 
greater room to expand (or contract) their respective public sectors over time? These types of 
questions cannot be answered unambiguously from the analyses undertaken. For one, 
although quadratic forms can be fitted in a linear regression framework, given the various 
analyses use a more strictly linear regression setup, a maximum or minimum (types of turning 
points) cannot be computed, whether local or global maxima or minima. The only way one 
would be able to do so in a linear analysis would be to make a good case for saying that some 
linear prediction is bounded, in a real-world application, to a domain or range that is 
theoretically restricted to some or other maximum and minimum values. But, this would have 
to be determined a priori, making the empirical exercise of ‘searching’ for maxima and 
minima redundant, anyway. Regardless, the analysis in this chapter does allow me to proffer 




5.6.2 Avenues for Further Research 
 
There are a couple of avenues for further research stemming from this chapter. Firstly, where 
data availability allows, applying a panel time-series method to the relationship between other 
measures of education spending (e.g., per capita or per student measures) and size of 
government might be fruitful. Secondly, there is a potentially interesting avenue for practical 
(applied) research. If one wanted to apply an error-correction (dynamic) framework – similar 
to the specification used in the previous chapter, albeit with a more parsimonious 
specification because of the previously mentioned degrees of freedom problems that are likely 
to exist when estimating separate panel-specific regressions using unbalanced panel data – 
one could apply the “xtmg” programme, but with an IV included, to instrument for an 
endogenous lagged level dependent variable in this dynamic specification. Since an ECM is a 
useful alternative way of testing for cointegration (by checking for a significant error-
correction parameter attached to the lagged level dependent variable), one could not only use 
this dynamic specification to test for cointegration, but also remedy for possible endogeneity 
of the lagged level dependent variable, in the context of using a heterogeneous parameter 
































































This thesis could broadly be categorised as encompassing three empirical topics in 
Comparative Public (Education) Finance. Because it essentially made use of the same panel 
dataset for the modelling of national-level (total) public spending on education, there was an 
overarching methodological limitation that restricted the type of methods that could be 
usefully and consistently applied across all samples of interest in each of the three empirical 
chapters. Given the dependent variables of interest (the national effort and budget share 
measures) consisted of numerous time gaps or missing data values for many countries, and 
these time gaps often appeared at various places throughout the time series (not necessarily at 
the beginning or end, but at various places in the middle of each country’s time series), the 
panel data in question could, in practice, best be described as more strongly unbalanced. This, 
in turn, limited many of the estimators, routines and Stata programmes that could be suitably 
applied. In some sense, the empirical inquiries I undertook had more to say about working 
with a problematic panel dataset, with respect to the outcome variables of interest in 
particular, than anything else. For example, Fisher-based PURTs were effectively the only 
ones that could be consistently applied across my samples. Furthermore, since an asymptotic 
T assumption is implicit in the properties of many estimators and tests, it might be more 
difficult to justify for many of the countries I was interested in, not only because of using a 
time dimension of roughly 25 observations, but also because of many countries having 
missing data values. However, that being said, this is arguably a moot point because, when 
applying a particular method, the researcher often has to make choices about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the method applied. 
 
With this methodological background in mind, a summary of the method applied, key 
findings, reasoning for what was found and what might be important about the findings is 
now presented for each empirical chapter (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Table 34 outlines some of the 
key aspects from each empirical chapter. The table is not meant to be exhaustive in its scope, 
but rather aims to give the reader an overview of the empirical work conducted in each 




Table 34: A Summary Overview of Each Empirical Chapter 
 
 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Chapter title 
Testing for Mean 
Differences in Education 
Spending 
On the Cyclicality of 
Education Spending 
The Levels of Education 
Spending and Size of 
Government 
Description of analysis Heterogeneity Comparative Dynamics Comparative Statics 
Type of panel analysis (Pooled) panel analysis Dynamic panel analysis 
Static panel time-series 
analysis 
Major limitation 
Dependent variable is 
strongly unbalanced 
Dependent variable is 
strongly unbalanced 




LSDV & robust 
estimators 
ECM & FEIV(2SLS) 
ECM using robust & 
OLS estimators 
Static specifications using 
MG & AMG estimators 
Major assumptions 
Cross-section 
independence; allow for 
cross-section dependence; 
heterogeneous intercepts 
& homogeneous slopes 
Allow for cross-section 
dependence; 
heterogeneous intercepts 
& homogeneous slopes 
Cross-section 




Functional form of 
variables 
Level-form ratios (levels 
variables) 





National effort; budget 
share 
National effort; budget 
share 




Economic group, region 
& political democracy 
Size of government Size of government 
Number of controls None; 3 to 8 4 or 10 2 
Major finding(s) 
Richer (Poorer) countries 
spend more in national 
effort (budget share) 
terms. Three inequality 
propositions. 
Cyclical (short-run) 
effects for national effort 
measure best exhibited 
for richer countries; little 
to no cyclical patterns for 
poorer countries. 
National effort (Budget 
share) positively 
(negatively) related to 
size of government. 
Common effects for 
national effort in richer 
countries; budget share 
and size of public sector 
not significantly related 





Chapter 3 applied a LSDV estimator to investigate heterogeneity in the levels of education 
spending. This chapter considered differences in the mean levels of education spending. It 
found evidence in favour of (statistically) significant differences in education spending 
patterns, based on economically (or regionally) and politically distinct groups of countries. 
For instance, controlling for the state of political democracy, richer (poorer) countries were 
found to spend more than poorer (richer) countries in national effort (budget share) terms. 
Because richer countries are less likely to be fiscally- or supply-constrained with respect to 
raising income from taxes, they are more able to spend a greater share of GDP on things like 
education than are poorer countries. However, richer countries are also more likely to have a 
greater variety of fiscal components to be financed from the public purse than are poorer 
countries, which means education’s share of total government spending is likely to be smaller. 
What is important about these findings is they not only add to our understanding of the 
political-economy differences in education spending from a global perspective, but they also 
proffer a set of three inequality propositions that, to the best of my knowledge, have not been 
formulated as such before. These propositions could be applied to other areas of public 
finance, such as military spending or welfare spending. 
 
Chapter 4 applied a dynamic estimator in the form of a basic ECM specification, using only 
first differences and one lag of the variables on the right-hand side instead of using a higher-
order autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification, which would inevitably lead to 
degrees of freedom problems. This chapter could be described as an inquiry into the 
comparative dynamics of education spending. It found evidence in favour of (statistically) 
significant cyclical (short-run) effects for education spending patterns over the economic 
cycle (i.e., ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ times). Cyclical effects were, however, not well evidenced, if 
at all, for poorer samples of countries, which provided a novel insight not necessarily 
documented previously. One explanation for this finding is that richer countries, unlike poorer 
countries, have more diversified public sectors, with a greater number of other fiscal 
components (e.g., welfare) probably vying for education’s share of the fiscal pie. This then 
raises an interesting question about which public goods supposedly ‘compete’ with education 
over the economic cycle. 
 
Chapter 5 took a more long-run view of the relationship between education spending and size 
of government by applying a panel time-series (MG) estimator to the levels of these variables. 
This chapter considered changes in the mean levels of education spending. An inquiry into the 
comparative statics of education spending might aptly describe this chapter. The general 
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finding was that the national effort (budget share) measure is positively (negatively) and 
significantly related to the size of government, ceteris paribus. However, the relationship 
between the budget share measure and size of government was found to be statistically 
insignificant for the two richer samples. Whether this is due to a lack of precision in 
estimating the parameter of interest or there truly is no long-run relationship is hard to tell 
without doing further empirical work. For one, if richer countries do indeed have larger, more 
mature public sectors, and these types of countries already have lower budget share levels that 
are relatively stable, then it would be plausible to find the budget share measure and size of 
government not being related in the long run. 
 
6.2 Avenues for Further Research 
 
There are several avenues for further research that flow out of this thesis (or the empirical 
chapters upon which it is based). Chapter 3 put forward three inequality propositions. The 
third proposition says richer countries are expected to have a larger public sector than do 
poorer countries, where proposition three is implied by the first two propositions. Bearing in 
mind one is using estimates of two national-level measures of education spending (national 
effort and budget share) to say something about differences in the size of government across 
two types of countries, for which only a rough approximation thereof might be arrived at, it is 
the testing of the first two propositions with respect to other components of government 
spending that would be of greatest interest going forward. For instance, what might the 
‘national effort’ and ‘budget share’ measures of military or welfare spending, for example, 
show with respect to size of government for richer versus poorer countries? It would be of 
interest to know whether the empirical patterns established are peculiar to education spending, 
or whether other parts of the government budget allocation behave similarly. 
 
Chapter 4 raises an interesting question about whether or not the public goods of education 
and, for example, welfare are ‘substitutes’ or ‘complements’ over the economic cycle? For 
instance, during periods of economic downturn, if richer countries, with arguably better 
developed and more diversified public sectors, do indeed reprioritise spending away from 
education and in favour of welfare-type programmes (e.g., unemployment benefits), this 
would be suggestive of education and welfare ‘competing’ for public funds over the economic 
cycle. However, these two public goods might indeed be substitutes during periods of 
economic downturn (bad times), but complements during periods of economic upturn (good 
times), the latter meaning more public funds are able to be allocated to both public goods in 
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good times. The sign and significance of the fundamental relationship being different over the 
economic cycle would be more indicative of asymmetric behaviour in the relationship 
between (public spending on) education and welfare. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 5 alludes to an avenue for further research that is less about the actual 
empirical work, and more about modifying a particular Stata programme to allow for the 
application of an IV estimator (conventional 2SLS) under the assumption of heterogeneous 
parameters. Since Eberhardt’s (2012) “xtmg” routine seems most promising for empirical 
work using more strongly unbalanced panel data, it would seem best to try and modify this 
routine. For example, one could employ a 2SLS procedure in conjunction with the standard 
MG or AMG estimator and a dynamic specification. Under the assumption the series being 
modelled is not highly persistent, certainly not beyond, say, 2 lags, one could use the second 
lag of the level dependent variable (yit-2) as suitable instrument for the possible endogenous 
right-hand side AR term (yit-1). In a first-stage application of the first step of the MG 
estimator, panel-specific predicted values of the variable assumed to be endogenous can be 
produced (yit-1_hat), in which yit-2 (the IV) and all other explanatory variables appear on the 
right-hand side of the regression. In a second-stage application of the first step, yit-1_hat and 
all other explanatory variables now appear on the right-hand side of the regression. This 
comprises the 2SLS procedure of instrumentation. The second step of the MG estimator 
(taking coefficient averages) can then be performed as usual. 
 
But, a complicating feature is the use of predicted values in the second-stage application of 
the first step. Ideally, bootstrapped standard errors would need to be computed at this juncture 
prior to the second step of the MG estimator being employed – where this second step 
computes averages (unweighted or weighted) of the panel-specific coefficients – otherwise 
the computed standard errors used in the second step will not necessarily be the correct ones. 
And, therein the avenue for further research, because more work would need to be done to 
Eberhardt’s easily applied Stata programme in order to allow for, say, bootstrapped standard 
errors to be computed when performing the panel-specific regressions. This would allow the 
programme to be applied to problems requiring heterogeneous parameter IV (2SLS) 
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Appendix A: Notes for Table 2 
 
The following gives general descriptions of the variables listed in Table 2. They are defined in order of how they 
are presented in the column categorisations, namely, dependent variables and each of the five dimensions 




Total (aggregate) national-level public spending on education typically refers to all spending on education 
(current, capital and transfers) by general government, and is the most aggregated measure of (public) education 
spending for a country. National effort and Budget share have already been defined elsewhere. Where Real 
spending is denoted, this means the author(s) have supposedly not used a ‘ratio’ measure, but actual ‘real’ 
education spending (i.e., only the “E” part of the fraction or ratio, E/Y). Social spending generally refers to 
education plus health spending, but is sometimes expanded to include social security and/or welfare spending as 
well. It typically refers to social spending as a share of GDP; as a share of total government spending or may be 
quoted in real terms, as mentioned above, unless otherwise stated (e.g., social spending per capita). Spending by 
level (Primary; Secondary; Tertiary), or some combination thereof, is calculated either as a share of GDP; or 
as a share of total government spending; or as a share of total spending on education. Note the acronym 
PSNTPS refers to public spending on primary, secondary and non-tertiary post-secondary education (see 
Busemeyer, 2009a). Spending per capita (Total; Primary; Secondary; Tertiary) refers to either (total) real 
spending per student, or real spending per primary, secondary or tertiary student, expressed as a share of GDP 
per capita. Unless otherwise stated, this measure refers to total education spending per pupil expressed as a share 
of GDP per capita. Spending per pupil (Total; Primary; Secondary; Non-tertiary; Tertiary) is a more 
simplified version of the per capita measure (it excludes the part where the per-pupil measure is divided by GDP 
per capita), and refers to real spending per pupil across all students or for the relevant school-age population 
group or relevant age group of enrolled students. Unless otherwise stated, this measure refers to total education 






For the study by Verner (1979), Central government refers to the share of total educational funds of a country 
spent by the central government. For the study by Cockx and Francken (2016), Natural capital refers to natural 
capital (resources) as a share of total national wealth (i.e., resource dependence). Services sector refers to value-
added net output of the services sector as a share of GDP. Income refers to various measures of national income, 
such as gross domestic product (GDP), gross national product (GNP) or gross national income (GNI). Income 
per capita is national income per head of the population, and is commonly used as a basic measure of economic 
development. Growth refers to economic growth or growth of (real) national income or growth of (real) national 
income per capita. Public sector refers to the ‘size of government’ or total government spending as a share of 
GDP. Secondary spending refers to a component of total public sector spending (i.e., percentage of total 
spending on secondary education). Revenue refers to the total revenues (including taxes) of government as a 
share of GDP. Services employment refers to those employed in the services sector as a share of total 
employment. Fiscal decentralisation refers to the degree to which responsibility for tax-revenue collection and 
fiscal affairs is devolved (i.e., from national-level administration to some or other sub-national level, such as the 
local-government level). Public debt refers to gross public debt, and is typically measured as a share of GDP or 
GNP. This measure is sometimes also used to define periods of debt crisis. Debt service refers to the servicing 
costs associated with the gross public debt burden, and is also usually measured as a share of GDP or GNP. The 
former (public debt) is a ‘stock’ concept; the latter (debt service) is a ‘flow’ concept. Fiscal balance typically 
refers to the deficit (negative balance) or surplus (positive balance) with respect to government’s fiscal position 
as a share of GDP. FDI refers to foreign direct investment as a share of GDP. SAP refers to structural 
adjustment programme, and comprises IMF and World Bank loans made to economically-needy countries in 
accordance with structural adjustment criteria. IMF refers to IMF-supported programmes for development. 
Inflation typically comprises a measure of (changes in) the consumer price index. Unemployment refers to the 
share of the labour force or economically active population (sometimes working-age population is used) that is 
unemployed. Adult literacy or Illiteracy refers to rates of the respective population cohort that are either literate 
or illiterate, respectively. Aid refers to development assistance as a share of GDP. Female LFPR refers to the 
(female) labour force participation rate. Gini refers to a measure of income inequality of a country. Enrolment 
generally means the gross enrolment ratio (either total or by level of education) and refers to enrolment of 
198 
 
students as a share of the applicable population group. Internet users refers to the number of internet users per 
100 people, and comprises a measure of technological advancement or development (see the World Bank, World 




For the paper by Verner (1979), Cabinet size refers to the number of cabinet ministries. Democracy refers to a 
measure of political ‘freedom’ or political ‘rights’ or ‘civil liberties’ (or a combination thereof); constraint on the 
executive branch of government or the entire government in more general terms; multiparty competition; 
majority-voter political system or veto index. These are all different measures of essentially the same thing: they 
show how democratic the nation-state is. Autocracy (or Autocratic legacy) refers to dictatorship, 
authoritarianism, one-party state or a state of military control (a military government). Ideology refers to some 
or other overall partisan political make up of government, as a whole (e.g., Left; Centre; Right). Cabinet shares 
is similar to ideology, but is more focused on ideological (e.g., Left; Centre; Right) shares or seats in cabinet. 
Nonetheless, ideology and cabinet shares are similar types of (partisan-political) measures. Electoral system 
refers to whether or not a proportional representation system is in place (see Lijphart, 1999). Election year or 
Electoral votes are other ways of incorporating an aspect of the electoral system. Corporatism is a measure of 
development in corporatist institutions. Corruption index refers to the corruption control index (see the World 




Total population refers to the total number of people living in a country. Unless stated otherwise, Elderly 
population typically refers to the share of the total population older than 55 to 65 years-of-age (‘retirement’ age 
can vary by source); Youth population refers to the share of the total population younger than 24 to 29 years-of-
age (‘youth’ age can vary by source). The youth population can, for example, even refer to share of the 
population up to primary school-going age (12-14 years-of-age) or up to secondary school-going age (18 years-
of-age) or only of tertiary school-going age (say, 18-25 years-of-age). I use the ‘generic’ categorisation of 
“Youth” to define the school-age population or a subset thereof. Age ratio refers to the elderly share to youth 
share population ratio. Age dependency or dependency rate refers to the elderly and youth populations as a 




Trade refers to imports plus exports (total trade) as a share of GDP. Trade is the measure most often used to 
show ‘trade openness’ across various different types of national-level studies of education spending. KOF index 
refers to a measure of economic globalisation by Dreher (2006). Exchange rate refers to the rate at which one 
currency converts to another or converts to the United States dollar. Capital mobility refers to capital transfers 
or flows of capital per time period as a share of GDP, and says something about capital-account liberalisation 
(openness to international capital markets). ToT is a relative price measure, and refers to the terms of trade, 




Urbanisation is the urbanisation ratio, and refers to population density or share of the total population living in 
urban areas (a more nuanced demographic variable) that I consider to say more about social trends and patterns, 
hence, why it is categorised as a ‘social’ measure. Similarly, Rural population refers to those living in rural 
regions, and sometimes refers more specifically to those comprising the ‘agricultural’ population or share of the 
total population in agriculture in lesser-developed countries (see, for example, Fosu, 2007). Note that agricultural 
population does not necessarily measure employment in agriculture (an ‘economic’ measure), but rather says 
more about the societal trend of being engaged in an agrarian or subsistence lifestyle. Military refers to military 
spending as a share of GDP or, as in the case of all other national-income based measures, GNP or GNI. Union 
density typically refers to the number of union-represented employees as a share of total employment. 
Ethnicity, Language and Religion are socio-cultural factors (subsumed as part of the ‘social’ dimension) and 








Appendix B: List of Countries by GNI per capita Group in 2015 (ypc201521) 
 





Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
























































Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Samoa 































































































Hong Kong SAR, China 
Hungary 
Iceland 






















Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Martin (French part) 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
United Arab Emirates 
Uruguay 























Source: Adapted from the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups for the 2015 calendar year. 
Notes: These groups are adapted from the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups for the 2015 calendar year 
using the World Bank Atlas Method, except for the high-income (OECD) group of countries, which comprises 
21 countries comprising the ‘core’ OECD nations (excludes Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Israel, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia & Turkey, which would 
comprise the broader 35 OECD countries). The numbers in parentheses show the total number of countries in 













Appendix C: List of Countries by 18 Regional Country Groups (region2) 
 












Northern Mariana Islands 
Palau 




















Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Martin (French part) 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 






































Hong Kong SAR, China 
Japan 
Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 

































Syrian Arab Republic 
United Arab Emirates 
West Bank and Gaza 
Yemen, Rep. 
Algeria 


































































































Source: Author’s compilation. 








Appendix D: List of Countries by 2 Regional Country Groups (region3) 
 
Poorer Country Regions 
Central Africa (8) Central America (8) East Africa (12) South America (12) South Asia (8) 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 























































































Richer Country Regions 

































Source: Author’s compilation. 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses show the total number of countries in each sub-group of the respective 
country region. For the poorer country regions, Equatorial Guinea, Chile, Uruguay, Brunei Darussalam, 







































Appendix F: Tests of Association for Education Spending by GNI per capita Country 










































Notes: The dependent variable comprises 10 quantiles of psegdptot or psegovtot. The independent variable 
comprises the 5 GNI per capita country groupings (low-income countries = 1; lower middle-income countries = 
2; upper middle-income countries = 3; high-income non-OECD countries = 4 and high-income OECD countries 
= 5). The values in each cell represent the frequency of occurrence (count data). Pearson’s Chi-square is purely a 
test of whether or not an association exists between the two variables. Cramér’s V gives the strength of the 
association. Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma and Kendall’s tau-b – and respective asymptotic standard errors 










GNI per capita country grouping (21 OECD countries) 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 64 98 47 44 3 256 
2 57 83 58 55 2 255 
3 53 58 76 55 13 255 
4 52 34 73 77 19 255 
5 30 33 73 78 41 255 
6 30 40 70 49 66 255 
7 18 31 71 53 82 255 
8 14 50 44 57 90 255 
9 9 67 46 66 67 255 
10 12 89 54 36 64 255 
Total 339 583 612 570 447 2551 
       
Pearson’s Chi-square = 487.15; p-value = 0.000 
Cramér’s V = 0.218 
Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma = 0.261; ASE = 0.017 




GNI per capita country grouping (21 OECD countries) 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 31 39 54 71 31 226 
2 17 19 29 71 89 225 
3 12 38 55 37 84 226 
4 19 37 44 45 80 225 
5 21 54 39 56 56 226 
6 26 50 58 49 42 225 
7 42 49 53 41 41 226 
8 61 60 55 34 15 225 
9 34 71 86 34 1 226 
10 43 102 58 22 0 225 
Total 306 519 531 460 439 2255 
 
Pearson’s Chi-square = 467.87; p-value = 0.000 
Cramér’s V = 0.228 
Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma = -0.297; ASE = 0.016 




Appendix G: Tests of Association for Education Spending by Richer versus Poorer 









































Notes: The independent variable comprises a sample of 2 country regions (poorer country regions = 0 and richer 













Richer versus Poorer Country Regions 
Total 
0 1 
1 156 33 189 
2 145 10 155 
3 136 17 153 
4 117 15 132 
5 83 45 128 
6 94 61 155 
7 77 75 152 
8 74 83 157 
9 69 55 124 
10 86 74 160 
Total 1037 468 1505 
    
Pearson’s Chi-square = 204.43; p-value = 0.000 
Cramér’s V = 0.369 
Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma = 0.434; ASE = 0.030 
Kendall’s tau-b = 0.274; ASE = 0.020 
    
Deciles of 
psegovtot 
Richer versus Poorer Country Regions 
Total 
0 1 
1 78 49 127 
2 40 76 116 
3 62 87 149 
4 54 83 137 
5 71 45 116 
6 93 39 132 
7 121 40 161 
8 136 9 145 
9 143 0 143 
10 147 0 147 
Total 945 428 1373 
    
Pearson’s Chi-square = 353.48; p-value = 0.000 
Cramér’s V = 0.507 
Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma = -0.604; ASE = 0.025 












































Notes: The dependent variable comprises 10 quantiles of psegdptot or psegovtot. The independent variable 
comprises the two different states of polity for countries (not politically democratic = 0 and politically 












State of Polity 
Total 
0 1 
1 136 96 232 
2 113 131 244 
3 98 149 247 
4 87 154 241 
5 78 173 251 
6 73 172 245 
7 48 204 252 
8 47 207 254 
9 64 185 249 
10 62 191 253 
Total 806 1662 2468 
    
Pearson’s Chi-square = 157.30; p-value = 0.000 
Cramér’s V = 0.252 
Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma = 0.301; ASE = 0.026 
Kendall’s tau-b = 0.191; ASE = 0.017 
    
Deciles of 
psegovtot 
State of Polity 
Total 
0 1 
1 111 107 218 
2 43 179 222 
3 52 170 222 
4 53 167 220 
5 61 162 223 
6 51 172 223 
7 47 177 224 
8 83 136 219 
9 99 115 214 
10 106 103 209 
Total 706 1488 2194 
    
Pearson’s Chi-square = 145.90; p-value = 0.000 
Cramér’s V = 0.258 
Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma = -0.120; ASE = 0.031 





Appendix I: A Summary of Various Changes to the Model Specification (Using the National Effort Measure and LSDV Estimator) 
 
Dependent Variable: psegdptot Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not politically democratic 
-2.031*** -2.183*** -1.764*** -1.866*** -0.991*** -1.072*** -0.568* -0.692* -0.800*** -1.146*** -0.906*** -1.163*** 
(0.216) (0.242) (0.224) (0.258) (0.275) (0.365) (0.296) (0.383) (0.268) (0.293) (0.279) (0.307) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & politically democratic 
-1.412*** -1.543*** -1.379*** -1.448*** -0.578** -0.631** -0.028 -0.102 -0.021 -0.277 -0.042 -0.241 
(0.166) (0.155) (0.176) (0.167) (0.237) (0.288) (0.258) (0.315) (0.257) (0.279) (0.265) (0.288) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & politically democratic BASE 
2.095*** 1.504*** -1.863** -2.243*** -5.403*** -5.626*** -7.503*** -7.711*** -6.685*** -6.649*** -6.539*** -6.743*** 
(0.375) (0.518) (0.760) (0.790) (1.427) (1.549) (1.550) (1.713) (1.241) (1.295) (1.297) (1.370) 
             
R-squared 0.167 0.187 0.201 0.223 0.208 0.229 0.223 0.245 0.353 0.375 0.365 0.384 
F-value 63.60*** 15.33*** 103.09*** 23.20*** 91.08*** 22.81*** 80.33*** 21.89*** 69.88*** 21.30*** 60.49*** 19.72*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AIC 5782 5798 5190 5202 5181 5194 4858 4872 3866 3876 3581 3598 
BIC 5813 5960 5225 5361 5222 5358 4904 5040 3916 4046 3635 3771 
Countries 97 97 86 86 86 86 85 85 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns confounded? No No No No No No Partially Partially Partially Partially Partially Partially 
Observations 1382 1382 1256 1256 1256 1256 1174 1174 1101 1101 1030 1030 
 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are politically democratic. All models use a LSDV estimator and robust standard errors. Models 1A and 1B use 
homogeneous slopes and three controls (pop024, urban and trade). Models 2A and 2B use homogeneous slopes and four controls (pop024, urban, trade and hci). Models 3A 
and 3B use homogeneous slopes and five controls (pop024, urban, trade, hci and pop65). Models 4A and 4B use homogeneous slopes and six controls (pop024, urban, trade, 
hci, pop65 and military). Models 5A and 5B use homogeneous slopes and seven controls (pop024, urban, trade, hci, pop65, military and fiscbal2). Models 6A and 6B use 
homogeneous slopes and eight controls (pop024, urban, trade, hci, pop65, military, fiscbal2 and debt2). See Table 5 for a description of each control variable used. Time 
(year) fixed effects are used in each alternative model (Model *B). The estimates for the various controls and year fixed effects are excluded to save space. Huber/White 
















Appendix J: A Summary of Various Changes to the Model Specification (Using the Budget Share Measure and LSDV Estimator) 
 
Dependent Variable: psegovtot Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not politically democratic 
1.492** 0.985 1.296** 0.737 1.358** 0.499 2.207*** 1.514** 1.962*** 1.269* 1.803*** 1.668** 
(0.612) (0.664) (0.644) (0.700) (0.637) (0.718) (0.661) (0.755) (0.656) (0.749) (0.667) (0.756) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & politically democratic 
3.321*** 2.799*** 2.970*** 2.451*** 3.035*** 2.204*** 3.784*** 3.186*** 3.717*** 3.162*** 3.561*** 3.391*** 
(0.458) (0.499) (0.481) (0.530) (0.518) (0.596) (0.548) (0.628) (0.539) (0.621) (0.552) (0.630) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & politically democratic BASE 
5.333*** 3.726*** -3.448** -4.803*** -3.737 -3.794 -4.396 -4.194 -1.745 -1.109 -1.285 -1.221 
(1.193) (1.443) (1.686) (1.810) (2.738) (2.805) (2.840) (2.923) (2.867) (2.948) (2.897) (2.955) 
             
R-squared 0.222 0.237 0.296 0.311 0.296 0.311 0.331 0.343 0.347 0.360 0.415 0.423 
F-value 113.21*** 20.02*** 110.62*** 23.58*** 100.86*** 24.23*** 91.63*** 23.86*** 92.91*** 27.10*** 96.81*** 31.64*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AIC 7456 7481 6612 6636 6614 6637 6133 6162 6070 6097 5567 5599 
BIC 7487 7641 6648 6793 6655 6800 6178 6327 6120 6267 5621 5772 
Countries 96 96 85 85 85 85 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns confounded? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1299 1299 1175 1175 1175 1175 1099 1099 1091 1091 1024 1024 
 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are politically democratic. All models use a LSDV estimator and robust standard errors. See the notes for Appendix I. 





















Appendix K: A Summary of Various Changes to the Model Specification (Using the National Effort Measure and Robust Estimator) 
 
Dependent Variable: psegdptot Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not politically democratic 
-1.760*** -2.022*** -1.489*** -1.729*** -1.240*** -1.615*** -0.926*** -1.311*** -0.930*** -1.332*** -1.077*** -1.418*** 
(0.199) (0.206) (0.199) (0.208) (0.260) (0.275) (0.274) (0.291) (0.279) (0.297) (0.274) (0.297) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & politically democratic 
-1.178*** -1.403*** -1.111*** -1.310*** -0.844*** -1.188*** -0.455* -0.785*** -0.424* -0.734*** -0.522** -0.797*** 
(0.166) (0.172) (0.165) (0.172) (0.239) (0.252) (0.253) (0.267) (0.256) (0.271) (0.250) (0.268) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & politically democratic BASE 
2.520*** 1.764*** 0.251 -0.321 -1.013 -0.848 -2.635*** -2.416** -3.139*** -2.862*** -2.688*** -2.624** 
(0.348) (0.425) (0.520) (0.566) (0.924) (0.951) (0.965) (0.998) (1.002) (1.041) (0.988) (1.053) 
             
R-squared 0.313 0.335 0.331 0.351 0.333 0.351 0.338 0.357 0.340 0.363 0.373 0.392 
F-value 125.25*** 22.67*** 103.17*** 22.06*** 88.81*** 21.32*** 74.25*** 19.81*** 62.34*** 18.39*** 60.71*** 18.87*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Countries 97 97 86 86 86 86 85 85 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns confounded? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1382 1382 1256 1256 1256 1256 1174 1174 1101 1101 1030 1030 
 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are politically democratic. All models use a robust estimator. See the notes for Appendix I. Significance levels are as 





















Appendix L: A Summary of Various Changes to the Model Specification (Using the Budget Share Measure and Robust Estimator) 
 
Dependent Variable: psegovtot Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
0#0. Poorer country regions & not politically democratic 
1.108* 0.522 1.000* 0.310 1.122 0.172 1.972** 1.255 1.798** 1.077 1.614** 1.315* 
(0.597) (0.626) (0.588) (0.617) (0.761) (0.806) (0.771) (0.829) (0.751) (0.804) (0.702) (0.767) 
0#1. Poorer country regions & politically democratic 
2.945*** 2.335*** 2.626*** 1.919*** 2.760*** 1.777** 3.292*** 2.617*** 3.268*** 2.608*** 3.037*** 2.724*** 
(0.491) (0.517) (0.479) (0.503) (0.697) (0.737) (0.709) (0.757) (0.690) (0.734) (0.642) (0.694) 
1#0. Richer country regions & not politically democratic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1#1. Richer country regions & politically democratic BASE 
3.705*** 1.652 -4.570*** -6.683*** -5.296* -5.963** -5.074* -5.589** -2.121 -2.119 -1.306 -1.495 
(1.036) (1.400) (1.533) (1.748) (2.708) (2.810) (2.701) (2.838) (2.692) (2.821) (2.531) (2.719) 
             
R-squared 0.247 0.264 0.328 0.348 0.328 0.347 0.373 0.386 0.402 0.421 0.483 0.492 
F-value 84.82*** 15.18*** 94.92*** 20.35*** 81.47*** 19.61*** 81.11*** 20.98*** 80.84*** 23.30*** 94.69*** 28.19*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Countries 96 96 85 85 85 85 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Years 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
             
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Covariates (controls) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of control variables 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 
Are the patterns confounded? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1299 1299 1175 1175 1175 1175 1099 1099 1091 1091 1024 1024 
 
Notes: BASE group is richer country regions that are politically democratic. All models use a robust estimator. See the notes for Appendix I. Significance levels are as 
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix M: Conditional Pairwise Scatterplots of Education Spending and Size of 





















































































































Notes: The conditional pairwise scatterplots comprise an OLS estimator applied to a dynamic (ECM) 
specification in conjunction with 4 controls (gdppc1, trade, fiscbal2 and debt2), similar to the controls used by 
the two papers of interest, two-way fixed effects and (heteroskedasticity) robust standard errors. The X variable 
and associated coefficient of interest in each case is the short-run size of government during either ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ times, conditional on all other explanatory variables. Outliers or extreme values are included, but are not 


























Appendix N: Notes for Tables 22 to 27 
 
The term “Gov.” refers to government spending or the size of government (G/Y). Good (Bad) times refers to 
periods of cyclical upturn (downturn) in real income per capita. The base or reference group in each case is 
government spending during ‘good’ times. The use of the hash (#) symbol in the list of variables and interactions 
given in the first column (as opposed to the use thereof when reporting the results) signifies the interaction 
between two variables. For example, “Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy” refers to the interaction between 
the short-run size of government (continuous) variable and the bad times dummy (categorical) variable. 
 
Wald tests for parameter equality of various coefficients – tantamount to an incremental or restricted F-test – are 
performed on each specification. These tests use an F-distribution. Only the applicable p-values are shown to 
save space. Wald tests for parameter equality test the null hypothesis that the differential coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero; the country fixed effects are jointly equal to zero; the year fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. 
Where multiple Wald tests are performed on the same model specification, one might argue that ‘family-wise’ 
error rates are inflated, so a Bonferroni-type post-hoc correction to the conventional critical level of significance 
(i.e., 0.05 or 5%) can be made by dividing 0.05 by the number of tests performed in each case, the result being 
the new critical level of significance. The interested reader can perform this computation when interpreting these 
results. 
 
The estimated coefficient (standard error) for the first-difference of the political constraint score for 21 OECD 
and richer countries might be reported as zero (or missing) because the difference of a variable that does not 
change over time is zero, and is left as reported by Stata. RMSE refers to the root mean squared error, which is 
the standard deviation of the estimated residual, and is an alternative measure of the goodness of fit, where lower 
values of RMSE indicate a better model fit. Comparing the RMSE across models using the same specification 
and estimator gives a good comparative indication of model fit. Countries refers to the number of countries used. 
Years refers to the average number of year (time-series) observations for each country. The number of countries 
and average number of year observations for each country are manually computed by running the following two 
lines of code after each regression in Stata: “predict resid if e(sample), resid” and “codebook cid if resid !=.”. 
One can then divide the total number of residual observations, which is the same as the sample size or e(sample) 
for the regression model, by the number of unique values for country (cid) to compute the average number of 
time-series observations (in Stata nomenclature: N/Nˍg = Tbar or gˍavg). 
 
In terms of a dynamic model or ECM, the estimated coefficients for the short-run or short-term (differenced) 
variables are denoted by “change (∆)”. The estimated coefficients for the long-run or long-term (one-period 
lagged) variables are denoted by “lagged level (t-1)”. The estimated coefficient for the error-correcting term (the 
cointegrating parameter) is given in the first row of each table. 
 
For the IV models, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is performed in Stata with user-written command 
“abar” (see Roodman, 2009b). The decimal places for the chi-squared statistic have been dropped to save space. 





















Appendix O: Example Computation of the Differential Intercept, One-Period Lagged 
Differential Slope and First-Differenced Differential Slope Variables 
 
country code cid year gov1 gdppc1_hpf lngov1 L1lngov1 D1lngov1 diffint L1diffslope D1diffslope 
Netherlands NLD 145 1989 51.26 – 3.936911 – – – – – 
Netherlands NLD 145 1990 51.691 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.945284 3.936911 .008373 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 1991 51.717 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.945786 3.945284 .0005028 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 1992 52.414 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.959174 3.945786 .0133872 1 3.945786 .0133872 
Netherlands NLD 145 1993 52.448 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.959822 3.959174 .0006485 1 3.959174 .0006485 
Netherlands NLD 145 1994 50.386 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.919713 3.959822 -.0401089 1 3.959822 -.0401089 
Netherlands NLD 145 1995 53.691 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.983245 3.919713 .0635321 1 3.919713 .0635321 
Netherlands NLD 145 1996 46.918 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.848401 3.983245 -.1348441 1 3.983245 -.1348441 
Netherlands NLD 145 1997 45.346 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.814322 3.848401 -.0340793 1 3.848401 -.0340793 
Netherlands NLD 145 1998 44.106 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.786596 3.814322 -.0277262 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 1999 43.462 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.771887 3.786596 -.0147088 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2000 41.763 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.732011 3.771887 -.0398762 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2001 43.122 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.764033 3.732011 .0320225 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2002 43.881 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.781482 3.764033 .0174482 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2003 44.731 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.800667 3.781482 .0191853 1 3.781482 .0191853 
Netherlands NLD 145 2004 43.635 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.77586 3.800667 -.0248072 1 3.800667 -.0248072 
Netherlands NLD 145 2005 42.308 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.744976 3.77586 -.0308833 1 3.77586 -.0308833 
Netherlands NLD 145 2006 43.029 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.761874 3.744976 .0168979 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2007 42.441 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.748115 3.761874 -.0137594 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2008 43.553 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.773978 3.748115 .0258636 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2009 48.164 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.874612 3.773978 .1006334 1 3.773978 .1006334 
Netherlands NLD 145 2010 48.132 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.873947 3.874612 -.0006647 1 3.874612 -.0006647 
Netherlands NLD 145 2011 46.971 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.84953 3.873947 -.0244167 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 145 2012 47.096 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.852188 3.84953 .0026577 1 3.84953 .0026577 
Netherlands NLD 145 2013 46.267 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.834429 3.852188 -.0177591 1 3.852188 -.0177591 
Netherlands NLD 145 2014 46.181 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.832568 3.834429 -.0018606 1 3.834429 -.0018606 
Netherlands NLD 145 2015 45.128 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.809503 3.832568 -.0230656 1 3.832568 -.0230656 
Norway NOR 146 1989 48.505 – 3.881667 – – – – – 
Norway NOR 146 1990 49.391 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.899768 3.881667 .0181012 1 3.881667 .0181012 
Norway NOR 146 1991 50.437 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.920725 3.899768 .020957 1 3.899768 .020957 
Norway NOR 146 1992 51.788 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.947159 3.920725 .0264335 1 3.920725 .0264335 
Norway NOR 146 1993 50.699 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.925906 3.947159 -.0212524 1 3.947159 -.0212524 
Norway NOR 146 1994 49.811 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.908236 3.925906 -.0176704 1 3.925906 -.0176704 
Norway NOR 146 1995 49.797 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.907955 3.908236 -.0002811 1 3.908236 -.0002811 
Norway NOR 146 1996 47.475 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.860203 3.907955 -.0477514 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 1997 45.918 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.826857 3.860203 -.0333462 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 1998 48.268 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.876769 3.826857 .0499117 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 1999 46.897 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.847954 3.876769 -.028815 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2000 41.744 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.731556 3.847954 -.1163981 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2001 43.403 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.770529 3.731556 .0389729 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2002 45.775 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.823738 3.770529 .0532095 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2003 47.094 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.852146 3.823738 .0284076 1 3.823738 .0284076 
Norway NOR 146 2004 44.161 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.787842 3.852146 -.0643036 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2005 41.003 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.713645 3.787842 -.0741968 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2006 39.336 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.67214 3.713645 -.0415051 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2007 39.471 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.675566 3.67214 .0034261 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2008 38.946 Cyclical upturn ('Good' times) 3.662176 3.675566 -.0133901 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 146 2009 45.047 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.807706 3.662176 .1455302 1 3.662176 .1455302 
Norway NOR 146 2010 44.1 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.78646 3.807706 -.0212467 1 3.807706 -.0212467 
Norway NOR 146 2011 43.01 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.761433 3.78646 -.025027 1 3.78646 -.025027 
Norway NOR 146 2012 42.239 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.743344 3.761433 -.0180886 1 3.761433 -.0180886 
Norway NOR 146 2013 43.29 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.767922 3.743344 .0245776 1 3.743344 .0245776 
Norway NOR 146 2014 44.853 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.803391 3.767922 .0354688 1 3.767922 .0354688 
Norway NOR 146 2015 47.796 Cyclical downturn ('Bad' times) 3.866942 3.803391 .0635514 1 3.803391 .0635514 
 
Notes: The following have reference: “lngov1” is the natural logarithm of “gov1”; “gdppc1_hpf” is the binary 
categorisation of cyclical periods (‘good’ and ‘bad’ times) for real GDP per capita (see diffint), where periods of 
cyclical upturn (good times) are the base or reference group (0) and periods of cyclical downturn (bad times) are 
the comparison group (1); “L1” and “D1” are the one-period lag and first-difference operators, respectively; 
“diffint” refers to the differential intercept. The base or reference group is periods of cyclical upturn. The 
























Notes: This table shows the applicable coefficient estimates (and associated standard errors in parentheses) for the baseline dynamic models of the national effort measure using the 
robust estimator, 4 and 10 controls, respectively, and two-way fixed effects for each of the five samples of countries. The variable for real GDP per capita (gdppc1) comprises 4803 
observations, but the Hodrick-Prescott filtered variable only comprises 4800 observations. There were several countries – Aruba, Cayman Islands and Sint Maarten (Dutch Part) – 
that were dropped because they each only had 1 observation for the entire panel time series. 
Variable Lambda Description of the Data All Countries 21 OECD Countries Middle-Income Countries Richer Countries Poorer Countries 
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
129600 
N (Bad times) = 2519 -0.211*** -0.314*** -0.122 -0.023 -0.284*** -0.288** -0.338*** -0.196* -0.181* -0.300** 
 N (Good times) = 2281 (0.048) (0.054) (0.106) (0.107) (0.091) (0.114) (0.093) (0.115) (0.098) (0.128) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.249*** 0.330*** 0.413*** 0.367*** 0.257*** 0.241** 0.473*** 0.456*** 0.288*** 0.161 
  (0.042) (0.049) (0.129) (0.132) (0.082) (0.106) (0.124) (0.146) (0.082) (0.106) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
6400 
N (Bad times) = 2523 -0.177*** -0.298*** -0.379*** -0.136 -0.254*** -0.258** -0.420*** -0.326*** -0.146 -0.271** 
 N (Good times) = 2277 (0.047) (0.053) (0.104) (0.105) (0.089) (0.112) (0.094) (0.113) (0.097) (0.126) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.225*** 0.308*** 0.506*** 0.435*** 0.233*** 0.204** 0.572*** 0.539*** 0.265*** 0.140 
  (0.041) (0.047) (0.127) (0.127) (0.080) (0.102) (0.124) (0.142) (0.080) (0.102) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
1600 
N (Bad times) = 2522 -0.105** -0.246*** -0.420*** -0.169 -0.162* -0.207* -0.468*** -0.446*** -0.016 -0.198 
 N (Good times) = 2278 (0.046) (0.052) (0.101) (0.103) (0.086) (0.109) (0.094) (0.111) (0.096) (0.125) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.177*** 0.289*** 0.524*** 0.455*** 0.149** 0.163 0.589*** 0.638*** 0.197** 0.113 
  (0.040) (0.047) (0.121) (0.123) (0.076) (0.101) (0.121) (0.135) (0.080) (0.101) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
800 
N (Bad times) = 2543 -0.100** -0.217*** -0.426*** -0.172* -0.177** -0.214** -0.485*** -0.479*** 0.022 -0.153 
 N (Good times) = 2257 (0.046) (0.053) (0.102) (0.104) (0.085) (0.109) (0.096) (0.111) (0.097) (0.125) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.176*** 0.277*** 0.533*** 0.462*** 0.158** 0.170* 0.624*** 0.703*** 0.185** 0.094 
  (0.040) (0.047) (0.119) (0.121) (0.075) (0.101) (0.119) (0.132) (0.081) (0.102) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
400 
N (Bad times) = 2524 -0.077 -0.205*** -0.458*** -0.361*** -0.111 -0.188* -0.619*** -0.522*** 0.023 -0.163 
 N (Good times) = 2276 (0.047) (0.053) (0.101) (0.104) (0.087) (0.110) (0.093) (0.111) (0.097) (0.124) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.169*** 0.275*** 0.552*** 0.511*** 0.140* 0.162 0.799*** 0.747*** 0.184** 0.102 
  (0.041) (0.047) (0.117) (0.121) (0.077) (0.104) (0.117) (0.130) (0.080) (0.101) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
100 
N (Bad times) = 2527 -0.116** -0.209*** -0.227** -0.159 -0.158* -0.230* -0.588*** -0.472*** -0.023 -0.298** 
 N (Good times) = 2273 (0.049) (0.055) (0.105) (0.107) (0.093) (0.117) (0.090) (0.115) (0.099) (0.124) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.201*** 0.288*** 0.501*** 0.456*** 0.194** 0.216* 0.774*** 0.705*** 0.216** 0.176* 
  (0.044) (0.049) (0.117) (0.119) (0.087) (0.112) (0.115) (0.130) (0.085) (0.103) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
25 
N (Bad times) = 2490 -0.112** -0.181*** -0.471*** -0.409*** -0.140 -0.147 -0.641*** -0.571*** 0.043 -0.289** 
 N (Good times) = 2310 (0.048) (0.054) (0.108) (0.113) (0.091) (0.112) (0.094) (0.115) (0.098) (0.122) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.197*** 0.269*** 0.558*** 0.542*** 0.172** 0.183* 0.796*** 0.732*** 0.177** 0.166* 
  (0.042) (0.048) (0.119) (0.123) (0.083) (0.105) (0.116) (0.129) (0.082) (0.097) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
10 
N (Bad times) = 2470 -0.219*** -0.280*** -0.529*** -0.427*** -0.227** -0.234** -0.707*** -0.655*** -0.073 -0.313*** 
 N (Good times) = 2330 (0.048) (0.053) (0.104) (0.109) (0.089) (0.108) (0.091) (0.108) (0.098) (0.120) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.272*** 0.342*** 0.583*** 0.545*** 0.225*** 0.226** 0.810*** 0.772*** 0.249*** 0.220** 
  (0.042) (0.048) (0.114) (0.119) (0.081) (0.102) (0.110) (0.120) (0.085) (0.102) 
             
Gov., change (∆) # Bad times dummy 
6.25 
N (Bad times) = 2468 -0.172*** -0.247*** -0.367*** -0.203* -0.130 -0.163 0.113 -0.309*** -0.078 -0.292** 
 N (Good times) = 2332 (0.048) (0.053) (0.105) (0.112) (0.089) (0.110) (0.109) (0.115) (0.097) (0.121) 
Gov., change (∆) N (Total) = 4800 0.237*** 0.315*** 0.543*** 0.481*** 0.184** 0.185* 0.207* 0.557*** 0.256*** 0.206** 
  (0.042) (0.048) (0.109) (0.114) (0.079) (0.103) (0.121) (0.116) (0.084) (0.102) 
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Notes: To generate the various scatterplots of the residuals for the baseline dynamic models, the robust estimator 
is employed with the same specification in each case, including four controls (gdppc1, trade, fiscbal2 and debt2), 
cyclical effects and two-way (country and year) fixed effects. Four instead of ten controls are used to plot the 
residuals because these four controls are more closely aligned with the models used by Afonso and Jalles (2013), 























































































Notes: To generate the various scatterplots of the residuals for the dynamic FEIV models, the 2SLS estimator is 
employed with the same specification in each case, including four controls (gdppc1, trade, fiscbal2 and debt2), 
cyclical effects and two-way (country and year) fixed effects. Four instead of ten controls are used to plot the 
residuals because these four controls are more closely aligned with the models used by Afonso and Jalles (2013), 
































































































































Appendix T: Tests for Nonstationarity of the Individual Series 
 
Statistic lnpsegdptot lnpsegovtot lngov1 lngdppc1 
 ALL COUNTRIES 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [No trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.974 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [No trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.970 
Result I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [Trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [Trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Result I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 21 OECD COUNTRIES 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [No trend included] 0.003 0.066 0.261 0.820 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [No trend included] 0.001 0.056 0.277 0.821 
Result I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [Trend included] 0.359 0.329 0.658 0.998 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [Trend included] 0.384 0.351 0.679 0.991 
Result I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
 MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [No trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.985 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [No trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.979 
Result I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [Trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [Trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Result I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 RICHER COUNTRIES 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [No trend included] 0.029 0.022 0.157 0.740 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [No trend included] 0.019 0.013 0.158 0.752 
Result I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [Trend included] 0.435 0.188 0.708 1.000 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [Trend included] 0.462 0.194 0.724 0.998 
Result I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
 POORER COUNTRIES 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [No trend included] 0.011 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [No trend included] 0.007 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Result I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
Inverse chi-squared (P) p-value [Trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 
Modified inverse chi-squared (Pm) p-value [Trend included] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 
Result I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
 
Notes: See Table 29 for a description of each variable. Not applicable (n/a) means a test for nonstationarity is not 
applicable. The tests conducted are Fisher-type unit-root tests based on the Phillips-Perron method. In each case, 
the AR parameter is panel-specific and panel means are included. For all series or variables, the tests are 
conducted both without and with a time trend included. Two lags are used in all cases to compute Newey-West 
(Newey & West, 1987; 1994) standard errors to cater for autocorrelation in the test equation. Two lags are 
assumed to comprise the maximum lag order of autocorrelation and seems a reasonable number of lags to select 
given the more strongly unbalanced nature of the data. Where applicable, the logs of the series (ln*) are tested 
for nonstationarity in much the same way as Akitoby et al. (2006). Only the respective p-value and result are 
shown to save space. An individual series is considered to be stationary or I(0) if the null hypothesis that all 
panels contain unit roots can be rejected at the 5% level or lower – the alternative hypothesis is that at least one 



















Appendix U: Notes for Tables 32 and 33 
 
The standard MG and/or AMG estimators are employed. Linear trend refers to the linear time-trend variable to 
cater for unobserved time-varying effects. The Phillips-Perron (P) refers to the probability value (p-value) 
associated with the inverse Chi-squared test statistic and (Pm) refers to the p-value associated with the modified 
inverse Chi-squared test statistic. Both the conventional p-value and ‘empirical’ p-value are reported for the 
Skillings-Mack test, the latter being obtained from a simulated conditional null distribution of the test statistic 
(conditional on the structure of missing data and tied rankings). Where not applicable (n/a) appears, this means 
no empirical p-value was computed. RMSE refers to the root mean squared error, which is the standard deviation 
of the estimated residuals, and is an alternative measure of the goodness of fit, where lower values of RMSE 
indicate a better model fit. Comparing the RMSE across models using the same specification and estimator gives 
a good comparative indication of model fit. Trends significant refers to the proportion of trend terms from the 
panel-specific regressions that are significant, and gives an indication of what proportion of countries in each 
sample exhibit significant (unobserved) time-varying effects. Countries refers to the number of countries used. 
























































































































































Notes: The scatterplots comprise the residuals and predicted values from the static model of the relationship 
between education spending and size of government controlling for GDP per capita and unobserved time-
varying effects, for which a linear time-trend variable is used. The residuals and predicted values are those 
obtained from the panel-specific regressions for the respective countries in each sample as part of applying the 
standard MG estimator. Each panel-specific regression incorporates an intercept, which might be thought of as 







































































Notes: The scatterplots comprise the residuals from a dynamic model, in which the static model is augmented 
with a LDV on the right-hand side of the relationship between education spending and size of government, 
whilst controlling for GDP per capita and unobserved time-varying effects in the form of a linear time-trend 
variable. The residuals are those obtained from the panel-specific regressions for the respective countries in each 
sample as part of applying the standard MG estimator. Each panel-specific regression incorporates an intercept, 
which might be thought of as catering for unobserved, time-invariant effects or individual (country) fixed effects. 
